Brazil, India and South Africa:
Three Pathways to Regional (In)security
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Varun Sahni

BRAZIL, INDIA AND SOUTH AFRICA: THREE PATHWAYS TO REGIONAL (IN)SECURITY
Resumen

El propósito de este trabajo de investigación es analizar las problemáticas de seguridad regional de Brasil, India y Sudáfrica en sus respectivas regiones (Brasil en América de Sur, India en el sur de Asia y Sudáfrica en el sur de África). Los tres estados que se analizaron fueron tratados como potencias emergentes, i.e., potencias medias, las cuales tienen la capacidad y la intención de maniobrar hacia el camino de una Gran Potencia.

Un estudio de la distribución regional de sus capacidades militares y socioeconómicas sugieren las siguientes características: primacía regional brasileña, dominio regional indio y supremacía regional sudafricana. Además de esto, mientras que los vecinos de Brasil ignoran su posición regional, los vecinos de la India compiten por una posición más ventajosa y los vecinos de Sudáfrica reconocen la supremacía de éste.

En la primera de las tres secciones del trabajo de investigación, las tres potencias regionales son estudiadas en sus respectivas regiones, con un énfasis sobre sus fronteras geográficas, evolución histórica, características culturales y dinámicas de poder en su región. En la segunda sección se presenta un análisis comparativo de las opciones nucleares escogidas por cada una de las tres potencias emergentes, seguidas de tres estudios de caso. En la última sección se sitúa la seguridad regional de las potencias emergentes en el contexto de las estrategias centrales de Estados Unidos de América. Además de que se realiza un análisis sobre la cooperación en materia de seguridad entre Brasil, India y Sudáfrica y los Estados Unidos de América.

La conclusión básica del trabajo de investigación es que sus búsquedas para trascender en el campo regional y tener un impacto global, el contexto de seguridad regional es un factor crítico para las potencias emergentes.

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the regional security problematiques of Brazil, India and South Africa in the Southern Cone of South America, South Asia, and southern Africa, respectively. The three states are treated as emerging powers, i.e., middle powers that have the capability and intention to maneuver their way into great power status. A study of the regional distributions of military and socioeconomic capability suggest Brazilian regional primacy, Indian regional dominance and South African regional supremacy. Furthermore, while Brazil’s neighbors ignore its regional status, India’s neighbors contest it and South Africa’s neighbors acknowledge it. In the first three sections of the paper, the three regional powers are studied in their respective regions, with emphasis on the geographical boundaries, historical evolution, cultural characteristics and power dynamics of each region. A comparative analysis of the nuclear option chosen by each emerging power is presented in the section immediately following the three case studies. The final section situates the regional security of the emerging powers in the context of U.S. grand strategy and analyzes security cooperation between Brazil, India, South Africa and the U.S. It is concluded that in their quest to transcend their regional bounds and have a global impact, the regional security context is a critical factor for the emerging powers.
Introduction

Any serious attempt to analyze the regional security *problematiques* of Brazil, India and South Africa must first explicitly explain why (and how) the three countries are being compared. In some obvious senses, the three fit uneasily together. In terms of sheer size, for example, South Africa cannot be sensibly compared, either geographically or demographically, with Brazil and India. From the domestic political perspective, while Brazil and South Africa are consolidating democracies, India has been a robust functioning democracy for fifty years. Their respective regional settings are also dissimilar: unlike Brazil and South Africa, India belongs to a fractured region. In what ways, then, does it make sense to compare the three countries?

A useful starting point might be to focus on three lists in which all three countries feature: Jeffrey Garten’s list of the ten big emerging markets, Robert Chase, Emily Hill and Paul Kennedy’s list of nine pivotal states, and Carsten Holbraad’s list of 17 middle powers. All three categories of states contain a regional dimension. For instance, Garten considers the big emerging markets to be important not only because they are “the key swing factor in the future growth of world trade”, but also because they are crucial to “the avoidance of war in several critical hotspots”. Chase, Hill and Kennedy are even more explicit in their understanding of the regional relevance of the pivotal states:

> What really defines a pivotal state is its capacity to affect regional and international stability. A pivotal state is so important regionally that its collapse would spell transboundary mayhem: migration, communal violence, pollution, disease, and so on. A pivotal state’s steady economic progress and stability, on the other hand,

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would bolster its region’s economic vitality and political soundness and benefit American trade and investment.\(^5\)

Likewise, we would intuitively expect middle powers to have a significant impact on the security of their region. However, the precise relationship between middle powers and regional security is unclear. This lack of clarity largely stems from the nebulous and protean nature of the middle power concept itself. Middle powers could be defined on the basis of relative power, specific systemic and/or regional roles, potential to emerge as future great powers, or just a vague sense of being “in the middle”, geographically, economically, culturally or diplomatically.\(^6\)

In this essay, we define middle powers as the special category of states that lack, singly and collectively, the system-shaping capabilities of the great powers, but whose size, resources and role, actual and potential, nonetheless precludes them from being ignored by the great powers. In other words, middle powers may lack the capacity to challenge the way in which the great powers run the international system, but they are sufficiently powerful to defy any great power attempt to force them to behave in a manner against their choosing. Emerging powers, then, are middle powers on the ascendant, states that have the capability and intention to maneuver their way into great power status.

It is worth emphasizing that not all middle powers are necessarily regional powers, or vice versa. As Holbraad rightly points out, “[r]elegating the middle powers to regional roles means excluding the possibility that such states in certain situations may play roles at other levels of international politics...” Furthermore, the preeminent power in a region need not be a middle power. In the Western Hemisphere, a region consisting of four middle powers—Canada, Mexico, Brazil and Argentina—it is a great power, the United States, that is quite clearly the regional power. In sub-Saharan Africa, two middle powers—Nigeria and South Africa—share influence with an extra—regional middle power, France. In the Asia-Pacific region, a host of middle powers, India, Indonesia and Australia among them, await the coming China-U.S. bipolarity.

As will be readily apparent from the discussion above, defining the respective regions of Brazil, India and South Africa is itself a complicated issue. Nevertheless, an accurate identification of the respective “region” to which each of the emerging powers belongs is essential. Without it, any calculus of relative power would be a meaningless and futile exercise. Is Brazil’s region the Southern Cone, or South America, or Latin America, or the entire Western Hemisphere? Is South


\(^6\) For a thorough discussion on the characterization of middle powers, see Holbraad, Middle Powers, pp. 67-75.

\(^7\) Holbraad, Middle Powers, pp. 74-75.
Africa's region southern Africa, or sub-Saharan Africa, or the African continent, or the Indian Ocean-South Atlantic littorals? Is India's region South Asia, or some larger geographical-historical-cultural-strategic entity? Is China in India's region, or is it extra-regional? Barry Buzan's "security complex" is the most appropriate and easily applicable conceptual tool that is available to tackle these questions.

Buzan defines the security complex as "a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another". The essential notion at the heart of Buzan's concept is that "regionally based clusters" are the "normal pattern of security interdependence in a geographically diverse, anarchic international system". The essential structure of a security complex is determined by the patterns of amity and enmity and the distribution of capabilities among the principal states within it. On the basis of this conceptual insight, we can identify the regions to which Brazil, India and South Africa belong as, respectively, the Southern Cone of South America, South Asia, and southern Africa. Besides Brazil, the security complex of the Southern Cone consists of Argentina, Chile, Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay, with the omnipresent U.S. as a crucial extra-regional element. The South Asian security complex consists of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and the Maldives; however, India's long-standing boundary dispute with China adds an additional element to the complex. The members of the security complex in southern Africa are South Africa, Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. The three case studies that follow not only analyze the relative power configurations that characterize each of these security complexes, but also justify why they are indeed the most appropriate regional settings in which to study the regional security of the three emerging powers.

Before embarking on the specific cases, however, the precise meaning of regional security needs to be defined. Clearly, regional security involves more than merely situating national security within the regional context, i.e., relating the configuration of power in a region to the national security problematiques of the states that constitute it. The location of security at the regional level does more than just create an intermediate level between international security and national security, for the simple reason that "security" has very distinct meanings at the three levels. By international security we conventionally mean the prevention of war, particularly systemic war, in the international system. National security, on the other hand,
usually alludes to protection from existential threats, actual or potential. Regional security, it would appear, is a hybrid concept containing both meanings of security. In other words, regional security simultaneously implies the absence of war within the region and the protection of the region from extra-regional threats. In that sense, the formation of a cohesive region requires not only the resolution of internal conflicts but also the binding influence of a common external threat. The European Union, product of Franco-German amity and the Soviet menace, and ASEAN, resulting from the end of the Indonesia-Malaysia konfrontasi and the shared Chinese threat, are powerful empirical evidence in favor of this conceptual understanding of regional security.

It follows, therefore, that regional security has both an internal and external dimension. Thus, when studying a region, the following questions need to be asked: What is the geo-strategic configuration of each region? What is the distribution of power resources in each region? What are the historic patterns of amity and enmity (alliance structure) in each region? What is the history of extra-regional intervention in each region? In what ways has the regional configuration of power evolved? What is the respective level of regional cohesion? Does each region have an ongoing process of regional cooperation and integration? How successful is this process? These regional characteristics are closely related to the attributes of power of each emerging power and its policy perspective vis-à-vis its neighbors.

Depending on the distribution of capabilities among the regional states, an emerging power could be expected to enjoy a position of primacy, dominance or supremacy within its region. "Primacy" suggests a situation of Primus inter pares; "dominance", the lack of a convincing regional rival; "supremacy", the untrammeled ability to set the regional agenda. In our calculus of relative power we consider both military capability and socioeconomic levels. Military capability is zero-sum or negative-sum in nature, and therefore tends to be divisive at the regional level: faced with the concentration of military power in a region, the weaker states seek to balance their powerful neighbor. Thus, analyzing the regional distribution of capabilities solely on the basis of military prowess creates a distorted picture of regional rupture. A high socioeconomic level, on the other hand, is attractive; regional states tend to build links with a wealthy neighbor, which increases regional cohesion. In our analysis of the three regions, we will therefore consider both military capability and socioeconomic levels.
As Table 1 indicates, Brazil’s total population is much larger than that of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay, taken together. Brazil can also count on larger military and paramilitary forces than the combined forces of all its neighbors. Brazil’s GDP is larger than the combined GDP of its Southern Cone neighbors, as is its military expenditure. However, in terms of crucial weapon platforms, such as main battle tanks (MBT), submarines and combat aircraft, the other Southern Cone countries distinctly outnumber Brazil.
Table 2:

Socioeconomic Indicators for Brazil and its Neighbors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
<th>Total Population (in thousands, 1997 est.)</th>
<th>GDP (million US $, 1995)</th>
<th>GDP Per Capita (US $, 1995)</th>
<th>Female Life Expectancy at Birth (years, 1995)</th>
<th>Infant Mortality Rate (per 1,000 births, 1995)</th>
<th>Female Adult Illiteracy Rate (%) (1,995)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>851,1965</td>
<td>163,132</td>
<td>717,187</td>
<td>4510</td>
<td>70.1</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>16.8¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>278,0400</td>
<td>35,671</td>
<td>280,070</td>
<td>8055</td>
<td>75.7</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3.8¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>109,8581</td>
<td>77,74</td>
<td>6737</td>
<td>909</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>24.0¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>756,626</td>
<td>14,624</td>
<td>672,966</td>
<td>4736</td>
<td>77.4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5.0¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>406,752</td>
<td>50,88</td>
<td>8982</td>
<td>1860</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>9.4¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>128,5216</td>
<td>243,67</td>
<td>58,750</td>
<td>2497</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>17.0¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>177,414</td>
<td>32,22</td>
<td>178,47</td>
<td>5602</td>
<td>75.7</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2.3¹</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1. The latest estimates of adult illiteracy as assessed by the UNESCO Division of Statistics in 1994.

Table 2 gives us a picture of relative socioeconomic levels in the region. Although Brazil is by far the largest country in the region in terms of land area, total population and GDP, comparisons of other socioeconomic indicators are not in its favor. Argentina, Uruguay and Chile enjoy much higher GDP per capita and much better infant mortality and female adult illiteracy rates. In the entire region, only Bolivians have a shorter life expectancy than Brazilians do. Thus, in terms of socioeconomic levels, Brazil does have several regional rivals with which it has yet to catch up. While Brazil’s sheer size-in terms of geography, demography and economics-ensures its primacy in the region, Brazil cannot in any significant sense be said to dominate the Southern Cone.

Table 3

Conventional Military Capability in South Asia: India and Its Neighbors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>India</th>
<th>The Neighbors*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>983,436,000</td>
<td>310,289,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Armed Forces (Active)</td>
<td>1,175,000</td>
<td>869,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Paramilitary Forces</td>
<td>1,090,000</td>
<td>446,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP in 1997 (in US Dollars)</td>
<td>$385 billion</td>
<td>$112.5 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military expenditure in 1997 (in US Dollars)</td>
<td>$12.2 billion</td>
<td>$4.9 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Battle Tanks</td>
<td>3,414</td>
<td>2,285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Tanks</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored Reconnaissance Vehicles</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicles</td>
<td>1,350</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored Personnel Carriers</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery-towed &amp; self-propelled</td>
<td>4,355</td>
<td>2,045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Defense Guns</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>2,058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface-to-Air Missiles</td>
<td>2,075</td>
<td>850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principal Surface Combatants (Warships)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol &amp; Coastal Combatants</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Aircraft</td>
<td>839</td>
<td>488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Helicopters</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Airlift Aircraft</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Bhutan and Maldives not considered.

Unlike Brazil, India clearly dominates its region, but only in military terms. As Table 3 reveals, India’s population, GDP and military expenditure are three times larger than its neighbors’ are. Its military and paramilitary forces vastly outnumber those of its neighbors, as do the weapon systems and platforms in its arsenal. The only categories of weapon platforms in which India is outgunned are armored personnel carriers and patrol and coastal vessels—a lack of numbers that is more than compensated by India’s crushing superiority in armored infantry fighting vehicles, capital ships and submarines.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
<th>Total Population (millions, 1997 est.)</th>
<th>GDP (US $, 1995)</th>
<th>Per Capita GDP (US $, 1995)</th>
<th>Female Infant Mortality Rate (per 1,000 births, 1995)</th>
<th>Female Expectancy at Birth (years, 1995)</th>
<th>Adult Illiteracy Rate (% 1995)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>3287590</td>
<td>960178</td>
<td>338785</td>
<td>60.6</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>62.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>143998</td>
<td>122013</td>
<td>33127</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>73.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhutan</td>
<td>47000</td>
<td>22081</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>71.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maldives</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>69.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>217181</td>
<td>125922</td>
<td>2274</td>
<td>1079</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>76.4</td>
<td>75.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>796095</td>
<td>143831</td>
<td>68733</td>
<td>62.6</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>75.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>65610</td>
<td>128732</td>
<td>12840</td>
<td>74.2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The latest estimates of adult illiteracy are assessed by the UNESCO Division of Statistics in 1994.
However, Table 4 convincingly demonstrates that India's depressingly low socioeconomic level remains its Achilles' Heel. Despite its enormously larger land area, population and GDP, India’s GDP per capita, infant mortality rate, life expectancy figures and female adult illiteracy rate are similar to those of Bangladesh, Pakistan and Nepal, and significantly worse than those of Sri Lanka and Maldives. India’s consistent socioeconomic under-performance, both in absolute and relative terms, explains why it does not enjoy regional supremacy: while none of its neighbors—not even Pakistan—can convincingly challenge India’s domination of South Asia, they are nevertheless unwilling to concede regional leadership to India. For the other countries in the region, the only factor in India’s favor is its size. Apart from democracy, there is no other attribute of India that is worth emulating.
To fully understand the link between superior socioeconomic levels and regional supremacy, no better example exists than South Africa. Table 5 sheds light on the peculiar nature of South Africa’s regional superiority. Although South Africa is outnumbered by its regional neighbors in terms of population and military-paramilitary personnel, it can afford to spend much more than them on military capability for the simple reason that its GDP is five times larger than theirs is. South Africa is outgunned, at least nominally, in several crucial categories, including MBT, artillery, capital ships and combat aircraft. This military imbalance is partly attributable to large quantities of unusable Soviet-made materiel in Angola, and partly the result of deliberate South African policy.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
<th>Total Population (in thousands, 1997 est.)</th>
<th>GDP (million US $, 1995)</th>
<th>GDP Per Capita (US $, 1995)</th>
<th>Female Life Expectancy at Birth (years, 1995)</th>
<th>Infant Mortality Rate (per 1,000 births, 1995)</th>
<th>Female Adult Illiteracy Rate (%) 1995</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>1221037</td>
<td>43337</td>
<td>133924</td>
<td>3230</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>18.3 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1246700</td>
<td>11570</td>
<td>3838</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>76.7 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>801590</td>
<td>18265</td>
<td>1326</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>24.4 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>824292</td>
<td>1613</td>
<td>3162</td>
<td>2059</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>17364</td>
<td>906</td>
<td>1190</td>
<td>1389</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>28.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>752618</td>
<td>8478</td>
<td>3085</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>20.1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>390757</td>
<td>11682</td>
<td>8800</td>
<td>786</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>20.1 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1. The latest estimates of adult illiteracy as assessed by the UNESCO Division of Statistics in 1994.

As Table 6 indicates, although marginally smaller than Angola in land area, South Africa has by far the largest GDP per capita, the lowest infant mortality and female adult illiteracy rates, and the longest life expectancy figures in southern Africa. As South African policymakers realize, the last thing that the neighboring countries need or want is a situation of conflict with the leading state in the region. Thus, South Africa’s supremacy in southern Africa has a socioeconomic rather than a military basis: its overwhelming socioeconomic superiority in the region virtually makes its military capability redundant.

Comparisons with leading states in other regions could help clarify differences in the status of the emerging powers in their respective regions. Like Germany in Western Europe, Brazil has primacy in the Southern Cone. India dominates South Asia, in a manner analogous to Indonesia in South East Asia, Nigeria in West Africa, and Australia in the Oceania region. South Africa enjoys supremacy in southern Africa; the only other example that comes close to South Africa’s regional status is the U.S. in North and Central America. Furthermore, the type of regional superiority enjoyed by the emerging powers in only one half of the equation. To get the complete picture, we also need to consider the attitude of the neighboring states to this superior regional status; in general, the emerging power’s regional superiority could either be acknowledged, contested, or irrelevant. Thus, South Africa’s neighbors acknowledge its regional supremacy, but neighbors of the U.S., such as Mexico, contest its regional status. India’s domination of South Asia is contested while Indonesian regional dominance is largely irrelevant in South East Asia. Brazilian primacy in the Southern Cone is every bit as irrelevant as German primacy in Western Europe. The important point to note about the reactions of the neighboring states to the leading states is their context-specificity. Friendships can get converted into rivalries, and vice versa: the “German Problem” was the core of the European regional security problématique not so long ago, and even a decade ago the “Front-line States” were loath to recognize South African regional supremacy.

In the three sections that follow, Brazil, India and South Africa are studied in their respective regional settings. The geographical boundaries, historical evolution, cultural characteristics and power dynamics of each region are analyzed. A comparative analysis of the nuclear option chosen by each emerging power is presented in the section immediately following the three case studies. The final section places the regional security of the emerging powers in the context of U.S. grand strategy and international security concerns, and analyzes security cooperation between Brazil, India, South African and the U.S.

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11 This aspect relates closely to regional patterns of amity and enmity in Buzan’s formulation.
Brazil in the Southern Cone: Irrelevant Primacy

Brazil dominates the South American landmass and shares land borders with every South American country excepting Ecuador and Chile. While Brazil does not itself have a Caribbean or a Pacific coast, several of its neighbors do. We therefore need to explicitly justify our analytical confinement of Brazil’s regional security problematique to the Southern Cone. Why do we consider Chile, which does not border Brazil, as a part of Brazil’s security region, but exclude Colombia, which does share a long land border with Brazil, from our analysis?

Our conception of Brazil’s security region as the Southern Cone also runs counter to declared Brazilian policy. The National Defense Policy enunciated in November 1996 declares that Brazil is “a country of different regions and a diversified profile-belonging simultaneously to the Amazon, Atlantic, Southern Cone, and River Plate basin”\(^\text{12}\). The policy statement lauds the formation, through “positive and concrete diplomatic action”, of “a veritable ring of peace” around Brazil, based on Mercosur, the Amazon Cooperation Treaty, the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries and the South Atlantic Zone of Peace and Cooperation.\(^\text{13}\)

The Amazon region, in particular, remains a perennial source of worry for Brazilian defense planners. The National Defense Policy refers to “the actions of armed groups that are active in neighboring countries, on the edge of the Brazilian Amazon”,\(^\text{14}\) underlines the importance of “borders and boundaries that are precisely defined and internationally recognized”,\(^\text{15}\) and “give[s] priority to the development and reinvigoration of the strip of land along Brazil’s borders, especially in the northern and central western regions”.\(^\text{16}\) The last point refers to the Brazilian army’s Projecto Calha Norte (Northern Ditch Project) aimed at demarcating, controlling and protecting Brazil’s Amazonian territories.\(^\text{17}\)

Jack Child points to the deep-seated belief among Brazilian geopolitical and security analysts that their country must ensure that it “fully and effectively occupies all its territory and that it is the dominant power in the vast empty spaces of the


\(^{13}\) PDN Brasil, pt. 2.10.

\(^{14}\) PDN Brasil, pt. 2.12.

\(^{15}\) PDN Brasil, pt. 4.2.

\(^{16}\) PDN Brasil, pt. 5.11.

This belief finds emotional expression in the slogan "A Amazônia é nossa" ("Amazônia is ours") and is an essential element in the "seemingly inevitable Brazilian path to grandeza, the code word for the moment when (and never if) Brazil will become the first superpower to emerge from the Southern Hemisphere".  

If the Amazonian region is so central to Brazilian security thinking, how can we exclude it from our analysis of Brazil’s military security? Our reasoning is simple: despite its rhetorical and programmatic emphasis on the Amazonian region, Brazil does not face any significant security threats from the north. According to Child, Colombia, Venezuela, Guyana, Suriname and French Guiana are “more Caribbean than South American”. Thus, they comprise a distinct security complex in which Brazil does not feature. Child further argues that “the vast interior areas of the Orinoco and Amazon Basins serve as a buffer between the Caribbean Basin and the Southern Cone”. While initiatives like the Calha Norte Project may eventually make Brazil a player in the Caribbean Basin security complex, for the next decade or two Brazil’s regional security concerns will remain embedded in the security complex of the Southern Cone. In Child’s list of twenty potential conflict situations in Latin America, the only one that explicitly includes Brazil is the “Argentine-Brazilian rivalry” for influence and resources to which all the Southern Cone countries are parties.

The Southern Cone can be defined as the system of power politics involving major actors such as Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Peru, and smaller buffer states such as Uruguay, Bolivia and Paraguay, with the remaining South American states somewhat on the periphery of this power relationship. The security complex of the Southern Cone has evolved from two 19th century balance of power systems in South America—the Pacific System involving Chile, Peru and Bolivia, and the River Plate/Atlantic System comprising Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay. The Southern Cone region is dominated by Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru and is organized around two “diagonal alliances” between Brazil-Chile and Argentina-Peru. The central political relationship in this geopolitical space has traditionally been the rivalry between Argentina and Brazil to influence the Southern Cone.

From a historical perspective, the Argentina-Brazil rivalry has a heritage that goes back nearly five centuries to the arrival of the Iberian powers in South America. The present borders of Brazil are the result of adventurous exploration and

19 Child, Quarrels Among Neighbors, p. 34.
20 Child, Quarrels Among Neighbors, p. 7.
21 Child, Quarrels Among Neighbors, p. 7.
22 Child, Quarrels Among Neighbors, pp. 16-17.
23 Child, Quarrels Among Neighbors, p. 7.
24 Child, Quarrels Among Neighbors, p. 100.
settlement by Portuguese and later Brazilian bandeirantes (bandits), backed by the
dexterous diplomacy of the Portuguese and Brazilian states—all at the cost of Spain's
imperial possessions and its several successor states. Brazil's history of territorial
conquest through stealth and diplomacy—exemplified by its constant move westwards
towards the Pacific—aroused the fear and suspicion of its neighbors, which was
matched only by Brazilian fear of "encirclement". Towards the south, Brazil's
expansion was met by Argentina. Rivalry between the two took the form of gaining
influence in the buffer states of Bolivia, Uruguay and Paraguay whenever the
opportunity arose. These included the Cisplatine War (1825-1828) between
Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil over the Banda Oriental, Brazilian intervention in the
Argentine Civil War between Buenos Aires and the Provinces in 1852, the War of
the Triple Alliance of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay against Paraguay from 1865 to
1870, and the Chaco War (1932-1935) between Bolivia and Paraguay.

An underlying theme of this rivalry was the suspicion of the Spanish-
speaking states that Portuguese-speaking Brazil was merely acting as surrogate for
the English-speaking hegemonic powers, Great Britain and the United States. This
of course added an important extra-regional dimension to the Southern Cone rivalry.
Portugal had been the longest standing British ally on the Continent. Brazil, for its
part, assiduously sought for thirty years following the Second World War to cement
its wartime alliance with the United States, during which an entire Brazilian division
had fought against the Axis powers in Italy. Driven partly by its fears of
encirclement and partly by its dreams of grandeza (grandeur), Brazil in effect
offered a barganha leal (loyal deal) to the U.S.—Brazil would remain loyal the
regional hegemony of the U.S. and in return be accorded the status of junior partner
or sub-hegemon. During these decades, Argentina was scathingly critical of this
arrangement, which it viewed as the principal impediment in the creation of an anti-
U.S., Latin American identity under its own leadership. The U.S., it must be added,
ever fully accepted the deal offered by the Brazilians. As Philip Kelly trenchantly
remarks, "the Argentine-Brazilian contention preserved the buffer states' autonomy,
restricted regional economic integration, allowed the United States' "divide-and-
conquer" diplomacy toward South America, and checkmated both Brazil's and
Argentina's global participation".25

If the effects of the Argentine-Brazilian rivalry were so apparently negative,
why did both countries persist with this negative-sum relationship for so long? Here,
it is important to recognize that the behavior of the two South American states had
an economic basis. Unlike the Brazilian and U.S. economies, which are
complementary in nature, Argentina's agricultural exports of beef and wheat are
directly competitive with U.S. production. Thus, Argentina's historic anti-U.S.
orientation is based on its need to build a durable relationship with the European

25 Philip Kelly, Checkerboards and Shatterbelts: The Geopolitics of South America (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1997), pp. 52-53.
continent, specially—the Falklands—Malvinas dispute notwithstanding with Great Britain. Argentina’s traditional affinity to Europe can also be explained by the predominantly European extraction of its population. Thus, the Argentine-Brazilian rivalry was based on a lot more than mere policy preferences.

By the 1970s, a nuclear dimension had entered the Argentine-Brazilian rivalry. Nevertheless, the rivalry never turned to open conflict. Child characterizes this competitive relationship as “low-key and even cordial, but... nevertheless a present and constant factor.” In the mid-1970s, Brazil broke away from its subservient relationship with the U.S. The critical event that forced Brazil to reevaluate its relationship with the U.S was the latter’s opposition to the Brazilian-West German nuclear agreement of 1975. During the Carter administration, U.S. bilateral relations with both Argentina and Brazil reached their nadir, largely as a result of Carter’s human rights policy. The military regimes in Argentina and Brazil closed ranks in the face of shared pressure from the U.S. In 1980 the military governments of generals (and presidents) Jorge Videla and João Figueiredo signed an agreement on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which marks the beginning of the Argentine-Brazilian entente. This process of understanding was greatly strengthened by Brazil’s support for Argentina during the Falklands-Malvinas war against Great Britain in 1982. After the war, the Brazilian Embassy in London handled Argentine interests in Britain until the two countries reestablished diplomatic relations. The process of regional integration in the Southern Cone was initiated through this new cooperative dynamic.

The impact of Mercosur has been entirely positive and beneficial for Argentina and Brazil. In Kelly’s words, “rapprochement between the two states, ... has relaxed tensions in the area, increased regional integration and development, kept U.S. influence a bay, and heightened international status for both Brazil and Argentina”. The integrationist project in the Southern Cone, which involves “a cooperative Argentine-Brazilian condominium”, aims at breaking the geographical isolation of the region by making it a force in the world economy. According to Kelly, Brazil’s foreign policy has traditionally fluctuated along a spectrum ranging from imperialist to balance-of-power participant to U.S. surrogate to great power aspirant to regional hegemon to regional integrationist. In his opinion, Brazil’s foreign policy today is 70% integrationist, but it still retains a residual 30% element of regional hegemony.

As far as external influences in the region are concerned, the U.S. remains the dominant extra-regional actor in the Southern Cone. Brazil’s attempts to distance itself from the U.S. a foreign policy trend that began in the mid-1970s, continues to

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26 Child, Quarrels Among Neighbors, p. 99.
27 Kelly, Checkerboards and Shatterbelts, p. 53.
28 Child, Quarrels Among Neighbors, p. 99.
29 Kelly, Checkerboards and Shatterbelts, pp. 176-180.
be pursued forcefully by the administration of Fernando Henrique Cardoso. However, just as Brazil has moved away from its hitherto close relationship to the U.S., traditionally anti-U.S. Argentina is moving ever closer to the hemispheric hegemon. During the presidency of Carlos Saúl Menem, Argentine diplomacy has evolved a new doctrine of *realismo periférico* (peripheric realism). A cornerstone of this policy is the explicit recognition of U.S. leadership in the Western Hemisphere. Argentina has not hesitated to follow the U.S. lead in international issues in which its own material interests are not involved. These include issues on which there is a consensus within the Western bloc, such as the Persian Gulf War, during which Argentina was the only Latin American country to commit its forces, or issues which coincide with the “fundamental values” of democratic Argentina, such as human rights offences in Cuba. Under the new diplomatic doctrine, Argentina opposes U.S. policy only when its material interests are adversely affected by U.S. actions, such as disagreements over agricultural protectionism during the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations. Finally, Argentina now takes a principled and moralistic stand only on those issues that do not impose a material cost upon it, and that do not bring it in a position of confrontation against the U.S. Thus, Argentina can now be regarded as having one of the most pro-U.S. policies in the Americas. In the long term, Argentina’s new attitude toward the U.S. obviously has major implications for Brazilian regional security policy and Argentina-Brazil relations.

*India in South Asia: Contested Dominance*

That India’s security complex needs to be defined with care and caution is obvious: even the two principal agencies of the Indian government responsible for foreign and security policy appear to have different notions of India’s strategic neighborhood. The *Annual Report 1998-99* of India’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) links India’s security “directly with its extended neighbourhood”, a term that “particularly includes India’s neighbouring countries and the regions of Central Asia, South-East Asia, the Gulf and the Indian Ocean.” The report goes on to assert that “India has a direct stake in the security of this entire region but is not hemmed in by it”. MoD’s understanding of India’s neighbors is worth analyzing. Pride of place is given to China, “India’s largest neighbour”, with whom relations “have improved in recent years”. While insisting that “India does not regard China as an adversary but as a

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32 MoD Annual Report, p. 2 (pt. 1.2).
great neighbour”, the report does point out that “China’s assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme and the transfer of missiles and missile technology to Pakistan affect the security situation in South Asia”. On Pakistan, the report lists a series of confidence-building measures that “would contribute in a tangible way to the objective of fostering a climate of stability and security the region”. The other neighbors mentioned in the report are Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Myanmar (Burma), Sri Lanka and Maldives. Although the report asserts that India shares a land border with Afghanistan, that country is included in Central Asia rather than amongst India’s neighbors.

India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) clearly has a rather different understanding of which countries constitute India’s neighbors. MEA’s Annual Report 1998-99 classifies India’s neighbors into three categories: the western neighbors (Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan), eastern and southern neighbors (Bangladesh, Myanmar, Maldives and Sri Lanka) and the northern neighbors (Bhutan and Nepal). India’s largest neighbor, with whom India contests the largest disputed land border in the world, is not listed as a northern neighbor but is tucked away in East Asia, along with Japan and the two Koreas. Clearly, this curious classification of China has less to do with geo-strategic realities than with MEA’s internal bureaucratic organization.

So is China a part of India’s security complex? Although China is not a part of South Asia, it nevertheless is a critical element in South Asian regional security. Geo-strategically, China is at the very heart of Asia. Indeed, China defines Asia; there can be no Asia without China. China is the only Asian country that skirts every sub-region of Asia, whether it is Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, Central Asia, Inner Asia, or South Asia. Thus, any geo-strategic (as opposed to geographic) definition of South Asia must necessarily include China.

Viewed from New Delhi, this is a totally defendable proposition. China is a country against which India has fought-and lost-a war in 1962. Nearly half a million Indian soldiers are deployed on India’s disputed northern border with China. Indian policymakers have repeatedly expressed their concern about nuclear and missile cooperation between China and Pakistan. However, many analysts of South Asia persistently ignore the “China factor” in India’s security planning and continue to draw a spurious and artificial equation between India and Pakistan. India, with a population of 980 million, is nearly 80 per cent of China’s size (population of 1.2 billion) and over eight times larger than Pakistan (population of 120 million).

34 MoD Annual Report, p. 3 (pt. 1.6).
37 MEA Annual Report, pp. 31-33.
Nevertheless, India’s attempt to contend with China is seen as hopelessly ambitious, while Pakistan’s determination to match India step-for-step is seen as perfectly natural. This flawed perception of an India-Pakistan equation lies at the root of the security problematic in South Asia.

Since the India-Pakistan war of 1971 that led to the creation of Bangladesh, South Asia as a region has remained prey to “structural insecurity”. The Indo-centric nature of South Asia is a fact of history and geography, a structural element that India cannot avoid and its neighbors cannot afford to ignore. Geographically, India forms the core of South Asia and its neighbors the periphery. India shares borders with each of the other countries in the region, while none of its neighbors share a land border with any South Asian country other than India. As Table 3 clearly indicates, Indian military power in conventional terms far outweighs the collective power of all its regional neighbors. Thus, the only way the other countries of South Asia could contend with Indian power was by resorting to external balancing-seeking extra-regional intervention—which India resolutely opposes. Until Pakistan’s nuclear tests in June 1998, there seemed to be no way out of this security dilemma. However, by gaining strategic parity with India, Pakistan has shattered the structural insecurity that has plagued South Asia and opened the possibility of durable peace in the region.

It is undoubtedly true that Pakistani insecurity vis-à-vis India lies at the heart of the regional security problematique in South Asia. However, a more secure Pakistan is a necessary but not sufficient prerequisite for durable peace in South Asia. It is important to note that India-Pakistan antagonism is distinct from the structural insecurity problem outlined above. India’s conflict with Pakistan has its roots in ideology and identity rather than in an asymmetry of power. Indeed, among important sections of the Pakistani policy elite, the obsession of parity with India has a certain hallucinatory quality. The central problem remains that Pakistan was founded on the “two nation theory”, an ideology that conferred distinct national identities on Hindus and Muslims. From the Indian perspective, the passage of time may be the best solution to the India-Pakistan problem. For the post-Partition generation of the Indian elite, Pakistan has always been another country, colored differently on the map in school. For them the equation “Pakistan = homeland for Indian Muslims” makes absolutely no sense, since there are as many Indian Muslims today as the entire population of Pakistan. As the post-Partition generation reaches positions of power and influence in India in the coming decades, the centrality of Pakistan in India’s Weltanschauung is likely to diminish considerably. Whether a similar process will take place in Pakistan is an open but crucial question.

38 James Manor and Gerald Segal begin a recent article with the question, “Why does China receive so much more international attention than India?” See Manor and Segal, “Taking India Seriously”, Survival 40. 2 (Summer 1998), p. 53.
Thus, the configuration of relative power in South Asia in the post-Cold War period is characterized by Indian dominance, Pakistani defiance, and overt bilateral nuclearization leading to strategic parity between the two. While India and Pakistan have officially been at peace since 1971,39 their armed forces continue to fight each other. In the Kashmir valley and further afield, Pakistan is pursuing a low cost, moderately effective strategy of supporting insurgent groups against New Delhi. India officially describes the Kashmir insurgency as a “proxy war”, an epithet that successfully captures Pakistan’s role in organizing, arming and financing the insurgent groups but belies the endogenous reasons for widespread Kashmiri discontent.40

However, the true dimensions of the India-Pakistan rivalry are revealed on the steep slopes and in thin air of the Saltoro ridge, a southern offshoot of the Eastern Karakorum mountain range. On the Saltoro ridge, the Indian and Pakistani armies have been locked in an eyeball-to-eyeball struggle for control of the Siachen glacier, one of the most uninhabitable places on the planet, since April 13, 1984.41 This is by far the longest-running war between two regular armies in the 20th century, in probably the most unlikely battlefield in all of human history. The following facts will reveal the sheer absurdity of this war. The war zone receives 6 to 7 meters of the annual total of 10 meters of snow in winter alone. Blizzards can be of speeds up to 150 knots (nearly 300 kilometers per hour). The temperature drops routinely to 40 degrees below zero on the centigrade scale. Average wind chill factor (WCF) in the winter is around 1,400, but WCF as high as 3,000 has been recorded. For these reasons, the Siachen glacier has been called the “third Pole”. This is, however, a misleading appellation because it focuses solely on the adverse weather conditions and completely ignores the deleterious impact of altitude and terrain. In reality, the high altitude severely compounds the bitter climatic conditions. Base Camp for Indian forces is 12,000 feet above sea level. The altitude of some Indian forward posts on the Saltoro range: Pahalwan (20,000 feet), Zulu (19,500 feet), Indira Col (22,000 feet), Bana Post (21,000 feet), Kumar (16,000 feet), Bila Top (18,600 feet) and G-III (17,000 feet). Due to the steep gradient of the Saltoro range, the area is also badly prone to avalanches. These adverse conditions have direct consequences: since the war began only 3 per cent of the Indian casualties have been due to hostile fire; the remaining 97 per cent have fallen to the altitude, weather and terrain. The most

curious aspect of the Siachen war is that it is not a total war, a dramatic contrast to almost all the other long wars this century. India and Pakistan continue to maintain full diplomatic relations with each other, and have all manner of other bilateral ties, including sports and culture.

With the old Islamabad-Washington-Beijing and New Delhi-Moscow-Hanoi axes a thing of the past, the only significant extra-regional influence in South Asia is China. The latter seeks to offset Indian regional dominance by assisting Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programs, and is setting up naval bases in Burma to distract Indian attention from the disputed China-India border. However, it is clear that neither India nor China have a desire to raise the ante in their mutual rivalry. India, for two reasons, would like to bide its time and not increase the range of its disagreements with China. First, India is currently completely out of China’s league, and needs at least 15 years of 7-8% annual growth before it can reasonably expect to contend with China. Second, it is by no means clear whether China is destined to be a long-term rival of India’s. India’s security community is divided on this question. One view is that as the two giants on the Asian landmass, and inheritors of two of Asia’s “mother civilizations”, India and China are involved in a long-term negative sum game. From this perspective, as China becomes too powerful and difficult to accommodate, an axis is likely to form aimed at the containment of China, running through Washington-Berlin-Moscow-New Delhi-Jakarta-Hanoi-Tokyo. A regional security arrangement in Asia could be an alternate route to containing Chinese power. However, an alternate perspective is an axis formed around “Asian values” and aimed against the West, running through Teheran-New Delhi-Kuala Lumpur-Beijing. A variant of this axis has been suggested by Dick Wilson, who talks about a future Asian “security trinity” consisting of China, India and Japan, which would amount to an Asian directoire rather than an axis. Of late, some Russian policy analysts have been floating the idea of a new Big Three Alliance consisting of China, Russia and India to counterbalance an increasing assertive and offensive NATO. Thus, the long-term future of India-China relations, clearly an issue of world historical importance, lies too far in the future for its contours to be accurately discerned.

South Africa in southern Africa: Acknowledged Supremacy

In terms of relative capabilities, South Africa’s predominant position in southern Africa is self-evident. Even during the apartheid years, South Africa was “the mover-and-shaker” in southern African affairs: the state with by far the greatest

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capability to affect and influence the course of regional events". However, South Africa’s peculiar domestic arrangements under apartheid stood in the way of regional leadership. As Robert Jaster put it in 1986, “the paradox of regional politics is the fact that South Africa has been unable as yet to translate this overwhelming military and economic power into anything like a comparative degree of political influence in the region”. On the contrary, for all its military and economic power, South Africa’s sense of isolation within its region only increased during the last decade of the apartheid system. A contemporary observer noted that “regional policy is today very much a matter of military survival”. It was this notion of regional security-of being under siege-which underlay the “destabilization policy” of the P.W. Botha government (1978-1989). The officially declared objective of destabilization was “to cripple SWAPO and the ANC militarily” and “to create such military and economic pressure on the sanctuary states... that they would be forced to deny the guerrillas sanctuary”. However, as Jaster points out, “the destabilization policy had a third and overriding objective: to bring about a regional detente on terms imposed by South Africa and formalized in a series of bilateral accords; in short, nothing less than a Pax Pretoria”.

The new policy of “clubbing [the] neighbours into submission” was legalized through the amendment of the Defence Act in 1977. The amended legislation allowed the South African Defence Force (SADF) to operate not only “in any part of the Republic of South Africa” but also, for the first time, in “neighbouring states”. By 1984, two of South Africa’s neighbors buckled under its military and economic might and sued for peace. At the negotiating table, South Africa successfully hammered out the Luanda Accord establishing a cease-fire with Angola and the Nkomati Accord of mutual non-aggression with Mozambique. In Jaster’s opinion, “there is no doubt that it was the destabilization policy and the punishing blows it dealt to Angola and Mozambique which led those two states to agree to sign such politically distasteful and costly pacts with the apartheid regime”. Thus, from a strictly security perspective, there can be no doubt of South Africa’s ability to have its way in southern Africa.

44 Jaster, South Africa and its Neighbours, p. 6.
46 The South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO) and the African National Congress (ANC).
48 Jaster, South Africa and its Neighbours, p. 16.
49 Jaster, South Africa and its Neighbours, p. 17.
51 Jaster, South Africa and its Neighbours, p. 21.
However, even the purposeful exercise of South African power by the Botha administration could not win regional leadership for the apartheid regime. In 1979, South Africa’s proposed the creation of a “constellation” of ten regional states under its leadership for regional cooperation and detente, but the idea quickly fizzled out. In a rapid countermove, Botswana, Angola, Zambia, Mozambique and Tanzania set up the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), with the explicit aim of “reducing the region’s economic dependence on South Africa”. The regional states in SADCC included Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (the so-called BLS states), all of which had “close economic links with South Africa through the Southern African Customs Union”. South Africa was the source of 90% of the imports of the BLS states, while the Customs Union provided two-thirds of the total budget revenues of Lesotho and Swaziland. Other Front-line States were also heavily dependent on South Africa’s economy and infrastructure. In a show of its economic muscle in the región, South Africa withdrew 25 locomotives on loan to Zimbabwe in 1981, strategically timed to disrupt a bumper grain harvest, and relented only under strong U.S. pressure. Nevertheless, its economic and military muscle notwithstanding, during the apartheid years South Africa did not “gain political influence in the region commensurate with its military and economic clout... [and] thus failed to meet the criteria of a true regional power...” In other words, while South Africa could bring overwhelming power to bear on its neighbors, it was not able to force them to acknowledge its supremacy in southern Africa.

The establishment of multiracial democracy after the elections of April 1994 and the ending of apartheid had “profound political and strategic consequences”. As the White Paper published by South Africa’s Department of Defence (DOD) in 1996 put it, “the government is no longer unrepresentative and at war with its own people and neighbouring states in Southern Africa”. The White Paper also points out that “[a]fter two and a half decades of isolation,... [the] country’s foreign relations have been transformed from an adversarial mode to bilateral and multi-lateral co-operation”.

The impact of South Africa’s domestic changes on the regional security context is huge. The DOD’s Defence Review 1998 notes, in its chapter on regional

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52 Jaster, South Africa and its Neighbours, p. 45.
53 Jaster, South Africa and its Neighbours, p. 46.
54 Jaster, South Africa and its Neighbours, p. 46.
55 Jaster, South Africa and its Neighbours, p. 67.
56 Jaster, South Africa and its Neighbours, p. 12.
57 Jaster, South Africa and its Neighbours, p. 65.
security, that the most significant strategic development “is South Africa’s new status in Southern Africa, previously an arena of intense conflict”. South Africa’s relations with neighboring states “have shifted from animosity to friendship and cooperation”. This change is fully reflected in South Africa’s assessment of its national security, and provides a marked change from the sense of being isolated and besieged that dominated the final years of white minority rule. The White Paper states that South Africa “is not confronted by an immediate conventional military threat, and does not anticipate external military aggression in the short- to medium-term (+/-5 years)” This has important implications for force design: “the size and capability of the SANDF, ... should not be seen as threatening by the other states of Southern Africa”. The White Paper suggests that “reductions in South Africa’s force levels and weapons holdings might stimulate a broader process of disarmament in Southern Africa”. It, however, adds the important proviso that “force reductions should be kept within reasonable proportions if South Africa is to play an active supportive role in the region”. The bottom line, in both the White Paper and the Defence Review, is that “South Africa has a common destiny with Southern Africa”. Nelson Mandela expressed this sentiment succinctly in 1993, several months before his inauguration as president: “South Africa will resist any pressure or temptation to pursue its own interests at the expense of southern Africa”.

In its recent official documents, the South African government has repeatedly reiterated its interest in instituting confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) in the region. Some of the CSBMs emphasized include annual consultation and exchange of information, the establishment of a regional arms register, notification, on-site inspection and verification of military exercises, and a communications network and crisis hotline. Apart from CSBMs, “defence cooperation with other Southern African states is a priority” for South African defense planners. As the Defence Review points out, “South Africa now engages in

64 DOD 1998, ch. 2, pt. 20.1. The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) was established in 1994 through the integration of former statutory and non-statutory forces. The former category includes the South African Defence Force (SADF) and the forces of the four “homelands” (Transkei, Ciskei, Venda and Bophutatswana), the latter guerrilla forces like the ANC’s Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation).
69 SADR 1998, ch. 4, pt. 11.3.
defence co-operation with a number of countries and participates in regional security arrangements under the auspices of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). To this end, South Africa is seeking to “strengthen the security and defence forums of SADC” and “encourage the development of a multi-lateral ‘common security’ approach in Southern Africa”. However, the one area of security cooperation that the Mandela government is particularly focusing on is multilateral peace support operations, both in the region and in the continent.

The White Paper points to the “expectations that South Africa will become involved in multi-national peace support operations on the continent”. As a precondition to participate in such operations, South Africa insists that “[o]perations in Southern Africa should be sanctioned by SADC and undertaken with other SADC states. Similarly, operations in Africa should be sanctioned by the OAU”. Furthermore, “[p]eace enforcement operations which take place under the auspices of the OAU or SADC require prior endorsement by the UN Security Council”. While noting that “a standing peacekeeping force in the region is not required or feasible”, the Defence Review asserts that “the SADC states are committed to regional co-operation in preparing for peace support operations”. In order to achieve this, “[c]ombined training should be undertaken with the forces of countries with which South Africa is likely to be involved in peace support operations”.

The SADC states have taken significant steps in the direction of combined peacekeeping training. In 1997, a combined peacekeeping exercise “Operation Blue Hungwe” was organized in Zimbabwe. In April 1999, about 4,000 military and police personnel from ten SADC countries participated in a peacekeeping exercise in South Africa code named “Operation Blue Crane”. The brigade-sized exercise was held at the SANDF’s Battle School at Lohatla in the Northern Cape province, and included troops and police from Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zambia. Participation by Angola and Zimbabwe was limited to observer teams.

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72 DOD White Paper 1996, ch. 4, pt. 6.4. The structures of SADC include the Summit, the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, and the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee.
75 SADR 1998, ch. 5, pt. 5.3.
76 SADR 1998, ch. 5, pt. 15.
On the face of it, South Africa's neighbors recognize—maybe even welcome—its supremacy in the region. This, however, could be a transitory phase based on the extended honeymoon that South Africa is currently enjoying, thanks to the moral stature of President Nelson Mandela. Indeed, there are already some signs of resistance to South Africa's regional supremacy, principally from Zimbabwe. In April 1999, Zimbabwe crafted a military assistance pact with Namibia, Angola, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, principally to prop up militarily the regimes in the latter two countries, both of which are facing serious insurgencies. The Congo conflict, in particular, transcends the region because Rwanda and Uganda are actively supporting the Congolese rebels. Zimbabwe's initiative, by de-facto splitting SADC, puts it in a collision course with South Africa, which has been attempting to reach a negotiated settlement to the Congo conflict. With Robert Mugabe in a militant mood, South Africa under a Thabo Mbeki government may find the regional agenda spinning out of its control, and its regional supremacy being once again contested.

Three Nuclear Pathways

In a ceremony marking Brazil's accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in September 1998, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright remarked, "In the wake of South Asia's nuclear follies, Brazil has given the lie to the dangerous nonsense that the global nonproliferation regime is dead... Brazil has clearly rejected the tortured claim that the way to rid the world of nuclear weapons is to saddle the world with new nuclear weapon states". This undiplomatic statement not only reveals the depth of U.S. concerns over the emergence of new nuclear states, but also betrays a total lack of understanding about why states choose to "go nuclear" or, alternately, to renounce the nuclear option.

In an interesting article, Scott Sagan proposes three "models" about "why states decide to build or refrain from building nuclear weapons: "the security model", according to which states build nuclear weapons to increase national security against foreign threats, especially nuclear threats, "the domestic politics model", which envisions nuclear weapons as political tools used to advance parochial domestic and bureaucratic interests, and "the norms model", under which nuclear weapons decisions are made because weapons acquisition, or restraint in weapons development, provides an important normative symbol of a state's modernity and identity". Sagan locates the nuclear decisions of all three of the

emerging powers-South Africa’s unilateral rollback, Brazil’s bilateral renunciation, and India’s going nuclear-in terms of the domestic politics model. Thus, he is of the view that “fear of ANC control of nuclear weapons (and perhaps also concern about possible seizure by white extremists) was critical in the decision” \(^{85}\) of the de Klerk government to dismantle South Africa’s nuclear devices. Likewise, the reason for Brazil and Argentina to “shift from nuclear competition to cooperative restraint in the 1980s... was the emergence of liberalizing domestic regimes in both states”. \(^{86}\) Sagan also argues that domestic politics—the existential political crisis face by Indira Gandhi in 1974—provides a much better explanation than national security compulsions for “the very puzzling occurrence” of India not developing a bomb for ten years after China tested a weapon, and then developing and testing a weapon less than three years after it dismembered Pakistan. \(^{87}\)

While Sagan’s article is a valuable contribution to the literature on proliferation, it tends to ignore the fact that more than one model may explain a state’s nuclear behavior. In the case of India’s nuclear tests of May 1998, all three models provide partial explanations of India’s decision: Indian decision-makers were incensed by the increasingly blatant nuclear and missile cooperation between China and Pakistan (the security explanation); the fragile coalition headed by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was on the verge of collapse (the domestic politics explanation); and the idea that nuclear weapons would allow India “to walk tall in the world” found a particularly receptive audience among the BJP’s leadership and cadres (the norms explanation). As William Walker perceptively remarks, “India’s nuclear tests on 11 and 13 May can therefore be seen as a lashing out against Pakistan, against China, against the nuclear weapon states, against the non-proliferation regime. India’s nuclear weapon programme has always been deeply motivated by the thirst for prestige.” \(^{88}\)

Is Madeleine Albright right in contrasting the wisdom of the South Americans with the folly of the South Asians? If Argentina and Brazil could bury the nuclear hatchet in a few short years, why cannot India and Pakistan emulate this prototypical example of mutual nuclear renunciation? Does the Southern Cone have any relevance for South Asia?

As we have already seen, Argentine-Brazilian rivalry has been a perennial feature of international relations in South America. In its essence, this was a competition about influence in the region. The nuclear rivalry between Buenos Aires and Brasilia was merely a sub-set of their larger competition for regional influence.

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It is important to underline that the Argentine-Brazilian rivalry was never based on a territorial dispute or an identity conflict. The two countries were therefore able to overcome their traditional hostility and become close friends when they discovered a community of interests that outweighed their antagonism. Faced with shared pressure from the U.S., the generals on both sides broke the ice and initiated a new era of understanding. In 1980 the two military governments signed an agreement on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Nuclear rapprochement was greatly strengthened by Brazil's support for Argentina during the Falklands/Malvinas war against Britain in 1982. For the Argentine generals, this conclusively demonstrated that Brazil-unlike Chile, which actively helped British forces during the war-was not their enemy.

Thus, when the democratic transition took place in Argentina and Brazil, in 1983 and 1985 respectively, the new civilian presidents found that their generals had already opened up the path to bilateral nuclear co-operation. One of the first acts of the two civilian governments was the Iguazu Falls declaration on the peaceful purposes of the Argentine and Brazilian nuclear programs in 1985. In 1987 a Brazilian delegation visited the Pilcaniyeu gas diffusion enrichment plant in Argentina, followed a year later by an Argentine visit to Brazil's Aramar ultra-centrifuge enrichment plant. By 1991 nuclear co-operation between the two countries was in full swing, culminating in the setting up of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC).

The nuclear understanding between the two South American giants was the essential first step that initiated an exciting process of regional cooperation and integration. The integrationist project in the Southern Cone aims at breaking the geographical isolation of the region by making it a force in the world economy. In the ultimate analysis, both Argentina and Brazil felt that they had more to gain from economic cooperation than from nuclear competition. Mercosur is self-evidently based on the new strategic relationship between Argentina and Brazil. In that sense, Mercosur is no different from the European Union and ASEAN. In each case, regional integration necessarily required the transformation of one cardinal bilateral relationship: an enmity that was keeping the region apart had to be converted into friendship. The lesson for South Asia is a stark one: as long as India and Pakistan remain at loggerheads, regional cooperation in the sub-continent is a mere pipe dream.

So why are India and Pakistan so adamantly pursuing their nuclear ambitions, instead of learning a lesson from Argentina and Brazil? There are, unfortunately, five important differences between the South American and South Asian nuclear situations that make a bilateral nuclear deal between India and Pakistan highly unlikely, and perhaps even undesirable.

89 Downloaded from http://www.abacc.org.
The triangulation of China

Most western analysts see only two routes to denuclearization in South Asia: an India-Pakistan bilateral deal, or a regional nuclear-free arrangement. Neither is acceptable to India, for the simple reason that China is left out of the equation in both scenarios. As we have already seen, for many Indian policymakers any geo-strategic (as opposed to geographic) definition of South Asia must necessarily include China. It is thus patently unrealistic to expect Indian policymakers to ignore China's nuclear capability.

It is undeniable that in recent years India's relations with China have significantly improved. Nevertheless, China remains the cardinal country in India's international relations in the foreseeable future. In the Southern Cone, the Argentina-Brazil relationship was never subject to the triangularity that exists in South Asia.

The lack of a nuclear umbrella

One reason why Argentina and Brazil could renounce nuclear weapons is because an implicit U.S. nuclear umbrella exists over the entire Western Hemisphere. South Asia has never been under the nuclear umbrella of a single extra-regional power, nor is it likely that such a nuclear umbrella will exist in the future. It could be argued that the U.S. and Soviet nuclear umbrellas did cover Pakistan and India respectively during the later years of the Cold War. This is at best a debatable proposition. Furthermore, even if these two umbrellas did exist during the Cold War—and it was never a single umbrella—they no longer do. Thus, India and Pakistan lack the guarantee of protection from nuclear attack that Argentina and Brazil enjoy, making nuclear renunciation virtually impossible.

Apart from the U.S. nuclear umbrella, it must be remembered that a regional non-nuclear mechanism already existed in Latin America for several years. This mechanism comprises the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which came into force in April 1969, and the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL). The pre-existing regional arrangement helps explains the ease with which the two South American states were able to jointly renounce the nuclear option.

The burden of history

The shadow of the past lies much darker in South Asia than in the Southern Cone of South America. The last time Argentina fought against Brazil was in 1828. In 1852, Brazil intervened in an Argentine civil war, the last occasion when Brazilian and Argentine soldiers faced each other in battle. In contrast, India and Pakistan last

\[90\] For information on OPANAL, check http://www.opanal.org.
waged war against each other in 1971, a war which resulted in Pakistan losing half its territory and population. Although open war between the two has not occurred since then, the armed forces of the two countries continue to engage each other in hostile action, most notably since 1984 on the Siachen glacier.

The India-Pakistan conflict is vastly dissimilar from the Argentine-Brazilian rivalry for influence over South America. To an extent it is a territorial dispute over the Kashmir valley. However, from a Pakistani perspective it is also ultimately a conflict about national survival. Like Israel, Pakistan perceives itself as the homeland of an endangered people—the Muslims of the subcontinent. This self-identification has persisted even after the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971, although there are now as many Indian Muslims than the entire population of Pakistan. Countries such as Israel and Pakistan can be expected to renounce their nuclear deterrent only as the last step in a comprehensive settlement with traditional enemies, and not a moment sooner. South Africa, which during the years of white minority rule viewed itself in similar “homeland” terms, renounced nuclear weapons and apartheid at exactly the same time.

The shattering of asymmetry

The regional configuration of power in South Asia and South America are also vastly dissimilar. Brazil has never dominated South America, or even the Southern Cone, in the way India dominates South Asia. Pakistan’s military insecurity was further accentuated after 1971, for two reasons. The first reason has to do with Pakistan’s lack of strategic depth relative to India. Unlike India, which has a large hinterland that is safe from Pakistani attack (and which can “absorb” a Pakistani offensive), the entire territory of Pakistan presents a target for Indian firepower at times of war. Pakistani defense planners are quite familiar with India’s preferred war strategy, an armored thrust in the plains sector of Punjab and Sindh coupled with an attempt to gain air superiority. With major cities like Lahore just a stone’s throw from the border, the possibility of an Indian armored breakthrough remains a military nightmare for Pakistan.

91 It is important to point out that this perspective of cultural conflict and survival carries much greater weight in Pakistani policy. The construction of an Indian “national identity” has always been reflected in a multicultural and multiethnic state. For example, the most senior military scientist in India (the Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister) is Muslim. For whether the nuclear race between India and Pakistan should be considered as a cultural contest, see Denise Groves, “India and Pakistan: A Clash of Civilizations?” The Washington Quarterly 24, 4 (Fall 1998), pp. 17-20. Also see the essay that inaugurated the debate on civilizational competition in the future: Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations”, Foreign Affairs 72, 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 22-49.

Secondly, Pakistan has a distinct numerical inferiority vis-à-vis India in conventional forces. For both these reasons—geography and numbers—it is in Pakistan's interest to possess the Great Equalizer. Thus, Pakistan's nuclear deterrent has at last broken the security dilemma in South Asia by giving Pakistan strategic parity with India. Indeed, the countries of South Asia might well discover that the new situation contains within itself the seeds for a durable peace in the region.

**The rejection of discrimination**

Finally, it is extremely unlikely that India and Pakistan will ever join Argentina and Brazil in becoming members of the NPT which, whatever its supposed virtues might be, is a patently discriminatory arrangement. For this singular reason, non-proliferation can never become an international norm, like non-aggression and non-intervention have been for fifty years.

Unlike Argentina and Brazil, which have been sovereign states in the international system for nearly two centuries, India and Pakistan are post-colonial states. The indignity of colonial subjugation is far from a distant memory in either country. On the contrary, many Indian and Pakistani political leaders have experienced European domination in their own lifetimes, and are therefore extremely sensitive about international arrangements that discriminate against their countries.

If India and Pakistan are unlikely to agree to a mutual renunciation of nuclear weapons, what does the future hold for a nuclearized South Asia? Can the two countries reach some kind of nuclear understanding? The analysis presented above suggests that nuclear weapons in South Asia may enhance Pakistan's sense of security, which is a prerequisite for durable peace in the region. The danger in South Asia lies much more in an accidental launch than it does in a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan as a result of deterrence or crisis instability. The primary task facing Indian and Pakistani diplomats and security specialists is to design a fail-safe system of monitoring that ensures the effectiveness and reliability of the lines of communication between both countries. If nuclear weapons could keep the peace in Europe for half a century, there is absolutely no reason why they cannot be just as safe—and just as positive an influence—in South Asian hands.

**U.S. Policy and Bilateral Security Relations**

How do the three regions and the three emerging powers fit in U.S. grand strategy? What have been the dominant features of U.S. security policy towards Brazil, India and South Africa? In more theoretical terms, how has the most important great power—the systemic hegemon—responded to the rise of the three emerging powers? Is their growing prominence and regional role viewed as a challenge or as an opportunity?
The *Strategic Assessment 1998*, published by the Institute for National Strategic Studies, provides provocative answers to these questions. It divides the world into four categories. The *core partners* of the U.S., consisting of “successful democracies”, has “less than one-fifth of the world’s population but four-fifths of its economic capacity”. The *transition states*, which account for most of the world’s population, “will determine how much further the core will grow and therefore whether the future will be fundamentally more or less secure”. The *rogue states* (and non-state rogues) oppose the values and interests of the core and “are especially eager to acquire [weapons of mass destruction] and other dangerous technologies”. The *failing states*, “[w]hile relatively few and small, ... could impose huge humanitarian demands” on the core. Thus, the four key interests of the U.S. are to “[r]ecast core alliances as more balanced partnerships, ... [e]ncourage the reform and integration of transition states into the core, ... [w]eaken or coopt rogues, [and] ... [r]educe the effects, incidences, and causes of state failures”. The three emerging powers—Brazil, India and South Africa—are all treated in this analytical taxonomy as transition states.

The document suggests that the U.S. regional goal in Latin America should be to “[f]urther the process of reform and democratization [and] ... [d]evelop partnership based on shared interests and responsibilities within and beyond the hemisphere”. In pursuit of this goal, the Strategic Assessment proposes a regional strategy that would “[e]xpand contacts that share U.S. defense management technology combined with civilian control”. Equally important are “exercises that bolster capacity for multilateral operations”, such as Latin American participation in small-scale conflicts. The regional goal for Africa is to “[w]ork with core partners and Africans to avert state failure, promote reform, and improve humanitarian operations”. This goal would require “[i]mproving NATO capacity to act in African crises [and]... creating African competence in crisis management”. Apart from these continent-wide goals and strategies, the document has nothing specific to say about either Brazil or South Africa.

On South Asia, which the *Strategic Assessment 1998* labels as “The Indian Ocean Region”, the general emphasis is on “historic animosities”. The document notes that for Muslims and Hindus, “there is little middle ground and little room for

compromise", and speculates that "perhaps 200 years' experience in India convinced the British of the need to separate Hindu from Muslim". U.S. interests in the region are suggested to include encouraging India and Pakistan to resolve their differences peacefully, containing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), promoting a climate of regional trust and cooperation, and encouraging regional states to embrace core values. The document makes the following observations about India's military establishment:

The Indian armed forces have nearly a million troops and sufficient combat platforms to mount a credible defense of national interests... Unlike Pakistan, India possesses the manpower, expertise and raw materials to support a growing defense industry. To India's possible disadvantage, however, military leaders play no role in the formulation of defense policy, and for the most part, bureaucrats within India's Ministry of Defence know little about national security and defense issues. As a result, India has neither a national strategy planning process nor strategic defense doctrine.

The Strategic Assessment 1998 also analyzes China, Russia and India as "potential regional peers". These three transition states, the document argues, "possess the theoretical resources and sufficient independence of interest to become larger adversaries of the core states". The document opines:

India has a growing economy (roughly 6 percent a year), a large technically trained population, the world's largest population of pre-school children (i.e., adults in 2018), a functioning space program, nuclear weapons, and a military of proven competence-as well as vast poverty and backwardness, a politically and culturally divided population, and a relatively weak central government. India has established a hegemonic position in South Asia and sits near two shipping chokepoints (the straits of Hormuz and Malacca). Yet, India is a democratic state with no serious quarrels with core states. To emerge as a major power by 2018, India would need faster economic growth (e.g., 10 percent a year), a unified will to power, and a greatly accelerated space and nuclear program. Even then India is likely to be on good terms with the core.

What is the nature of the bilateral relations, particularly security relations-arms sales, training agreements, and joint exercises-of Brazil, India and South Africa with the U.S. and with one another? It is interesting to note that all three emerging powers were military allies of the U.S. during the Second World War. Brazil send an

101 Strategic Assessment 1998, p. 53. Most Indians would find this analysis of their history and culture deeply flawed and offensive.
102 Strategic Assessment 1998, pp. 53-54.
103 Strategic Assessment 1998, p. 54.
105 Strategic Assessment 1998, p. 54.
entire division, the *Força Expedicionaria Brasileira* (Brazilian Expeditionary Force) to the Italian campaign. South Africa under the leadership of General Jan Smuts contributed troops to the North African campaign. Millions of Indian soldiers, recruited both in British India and the princely states, fought in the jungles of Burma and Malaya, in the deserts of North Africa and in the hills of Italy. After the Second World War, military cooperation between the U.S. and India, now independent, came to an end as the latter forcefully pursued its policy of non-alignment, with the exception of a brief flurry of collaboration after India's border war with China in 1962. Robert Jaster describes well South Africa's attempts, in the 1950s and 1960s, to "gain accession to a Western defence alliance, ... by sending token forces to join in Western struggles against Communism far away from South Africa itself. South Africa thus showed its solidarity with the West by taking part in the Berlin Airlift and dispatching a South African Air Force (SAAF) squadron to fight in the Korean War. In spite of these initiatives, however, Western antipathy to apartheid was too strong to allow any Western government to take the political risk of an alliance with South Africa". Thus, it was only with Brazil that the U.S. established a flourishing and multi-faceted security relationship after the Second World War. This was done under the auspices of the Inter-American Defense System (IADS).

In the period following the First World War a number of Latin American armed forces turned their gaze away from their traditional European suppliers and instructors and looked instead toward the United States, which had emerged from the war with a great deal of credit. At the institutional level, U.S.-Latin American military links were established in the 1930s and 1940s when a number of Latin American countries received U.S. military missions. The IADS developed out of these somewhat tentative beginnings. In 1942, soon after the U.S. entered the Second World War, an Inter-American Defense Board was established in Washington, D.C. With the successful culmination of the war in sight, the principle of "regional security" was enshrined in the Act of Chapultepec (Mexico City) in 1945. By the time the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance was signed at Rio de Janeiro in 1947, the U.S. had established a military preponderance that was global in scope and, because of its atomic monopoly, unrivalled.

The three decades from the mid-1940s to the mid-1970s were the golden years of the Inter-American Defense System. The IADS was a multi-faceted complex of agreements and relationships. If one were to identify the various strands of the IADS, it is possible to classify ten broad categories of interaction. There was, first and

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106 Jaster, South Africa and its Neighbours, p. 7.
foremost, the Rio Treaty of 1947, a typical “one for all, all for one” type of multilateral security arrangement, as specified by its Article 3. Secondly, the IADS consisted of a number of U.S. military assistance programs, such as the grants of arms and equipment under the Military Assistance Program (MAP), the Foreign Military Sales credit program (FMS) and the Security Support Assistance Program which provided special funds to threatened pro-U.S governments. U.S. military advisers, organized into Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG) — and in the case of U.S. Special Operations Forces, into Mobile Training Teams (MTT) — formed the third strand of the IADS. The supply and sales of US arms outside the assistance programs must be regarded as yet another form of U.S.-Latin American military interaction.

Perhaps the most significant aspect of U.S.-Latin American military relations was the emphasis on training. The U.S. Armed Forces established training facilities specifically for their Latin American counterparts in (what was then) the Panama Canal Zone. Apart from the notorious U.S. Army School of the Americas at Fort Gulick, the Canal Zone also was home to the Inter-American Air Force Academy at Albrook Air Force Base, the Small Craft Instruction and Training School at Rodman Naval Base and the Jungle Operations Training Center at Fort Sherman. Latin American military officers also attended courses in the U.S. The blue-ribbon course for Latin American lieutenant-colonels was of ten-months duration and was run by the Inter-American Defense College at Fort Leslie McNair in Washington, D.C. Large numbers of Latin American military officers also attended the National War College (Ft. McNair), the Army War College (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania), the Naval Postgraduate School (Monterrey, California), the Command and General Staff College (Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas), the Armed Services Staff College (Norfolk, Virginia), the Special Warfare School (Ft. Bragg, North Carolina) and the Infantry School (Ft. Benning, Georgia).

Joint military exercises were another important aspect of the IADS. Perhaps the quintessential example of this type of military interaction is the annual UNITAS exercises, joint U.S.-Latin American naval maneuvers that have been regularly held since 1961. Regular conferences of U.S. and Latin American military chiefs have also been held since the 1950s. The Conference of American Armies and the Conference of Chiefs of American Air Forces are both held annually, while the Inter-American Naval Conference is held biennially. Yet another point of regular contact between the U.S. Armed Forces and their Latin American counterparts are the three military communication networks, the Inter-American Military Network, the Inter-American Telecommunications System for the Air Force, and the Inter-American Naval Communications Network.

The U.S. military presence in Latin America is organized in Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), based in Panama. When the U.S. Marine Corps left Panama in 1914 after an eleven-year deployment, it was replaced by a coast artillery unit of
the U.S. Army. In 1917, after the U.S. entry into the First World War, the U.S. Army formed a Panama Canal Department. In 1941, at the height of the Second World War, a new Caribbean Command was established by the U.S. Army. In 1963, this command was renamed as Southern Command and tasked with the defense of the Panama Canal and interaction with Latin American military establishments.

Finally, U.S.-Latin American military interaction also took place through the conventional channels of military diplomatic representation. The much-quoted example in this context is the role played by Brigadier General Vernon Walters as the U.S. military attache in Brazil during the coup of 1964.

From the mid-1970s onwards the IADS has been in a slow yet steady decline. Perhaps the most dramatic indication of this was the closure of the U.S. Army School of the Americas in September 1984, 38 years after it was established. What causes can we assign to this decline in U.S.-Latin American military interaction? The most obvious cause appears to be the issue of reliability. The human rights agenda of the Carter administration created enormous distrust among the military regimes of the region and led in most cases to policies aimed at reducing dependence on U.S. arms. The perceived abandonment of Argentina by the Reagan administration during the Falklands-Malvinas war gave further credence to the notion of U.S. unreliability on security issues. Coupled with this was an important structural reason. The U.S.— supplied surplus weapons of World War II and Korean War vintage were obsolete by the mid—1960s. However, the Johnson and Nixon administrations were reluctant to replace the obsolete weapons in Latin American armories with more sophisticated weapons because the U.S. was by then deeply involved in the war in Vietnam. Also, it is worth considering that increased interaction can create not only admiration but also resentment, particularly when the senior partner has a deprecatory attitude toward the junior partner. Finally, increased Latin American sophistication in military matters, such as the Venezuelan excellence in training and the Brazilian proficiency in arms production, must also be considered.

U.S.-Brazilian military cooperation is now essentially limited to the annual UNITAS naval exercises, now in its 38th year. An U.S. Navy task force "circumnavigates the continent, conducting bilateral or multilateral operations, practicing navigation, underway replenishment, gunnery, search and rescue, and occasionally missile-firing exercises". The Strategic Assessment 1998 points out that "[the] navies of Latin America have led the way in establishing military-to-military contact, because they can do so without raising nationalistic issues such as sovereignty and constitutional bans on foreign military forces within state boundaries". With India, the U.S. has conducted naval exercises involving its 7th Fleet for three years in a row. Additionally both countries send senior officers, of
the rank of colonel or brigadier general-equivalent, to each other’s institutions, such as the National War College in Washington, D.C., and the National Defence College in New Delhi. The U.S. and Indian air forces have also exchanged officers who have been trained as flight instructors in each other’s schools, followed by a couple of years as instructors in each other’s air force academies. After India’s nuclear tests in May 1998, several of these exchange programs have been put into cold storage. U.S. military cooperation with South Africa has included providing funds and airlift for “Operation Blue Crane”, the SADC peacekeeping exercise that took place in South Africa in April 1999.111

While India and Brazil have not engaged in tangible security cooperation, Brazil, South Africa, Argentina and Uruguay have conducted a joint naval exercise named DRAGAO, on the lines of UNITAS.112 However, the two emerging powers with the most significant security links are India and South Africa.

India is one of the extra-regional states, along with the European Union, the U.S. and Canada, which provided funds and personnel to “Operation Blue Crane”.113 India and South Africa are exchanging information on counter-insurgency operations. The Indian Army is particularly interested in learning from South African experience with land mines and improvised explosive devices. India has also expressed an interest in various South African weapon systems, including the Rooikat armored personnel carrier, while South Africa is looking into the acquisition of Nag anti-tank missiles from India. To meet its large requirement from self-propelled artillery, India is jointly developing with South Africa to integrate a South African gun with the chassis of an Arjun tank.114 India has emerged as the single largest importer of South African defense equipment, purchasing 50 percent of South Africa’s annual weapon production.115 After the first meeting of the India—South Africa Defence Committee in Pretoria in August 1998, it was decided that the bilateral security relationship “had to transcend the purely buyer—seller relationship” and “encompass other vital dimensions such as joint research and development, joint production and joint ventures in defence-related matters”.116 In terms of military training exchanges, South Africa recently sent a senior military

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114 “India, South Africa plan regular talks on defence”, The Hindu (New Delhi), August 1, 1998.
116 “Implementation of joint panel decisions: India, SA to set up review mechanisms”, The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), December 8, 1998.
officer to the New Delhi-based National Defence College. In 1998, the Chiefs of the Indian Army and Air Force visited South Africa while the Chief of the South African Navy visited India. Thus, the security cooperation between India and South Africa holds the potential to become a major strategic factor in the Indian Ocean region. Countervailing trends include South Africa’s growing closeness to the U.S. —a trend which is expected to further intensify in the future under a Thabo Mbeki administration— which contrasts with a general coolness in relations between India and the U.S., especially in the aftermath of India’s nuclear tests.

Conclusion

A comparative analysis of the regional security problematiques of Brazil, India and South Africa must attempt to provide at least tentative answers to a number of important questions. What can we say about the pathways adopted by the three emerging powers? Does the comparative analysis suggest that one pathway is “better”? What do we understand by a “better” pathway to regional security? What is the criterion: promoting regional peace and stability, or finding the most effective route to regional dominance? How important is the regional context? Does the regional context in effect determine the pathway taken by each emerging power? Or is the policy adopted by each emerging power in some ways unrelated to the constraints imposed by the regional power configuration?

Our study suggests that the regional role of an emerging power depends on at least three factors. The first two —military capacity and socioeconomic levels— determine the relative capability of the emerging power within its own region. However, the patterns of regional enmity and amity —a product of past history and current policy— are a critical factor in the reaction of the neighboring states to the regional role of the emerging power. Thus, South Africa was able to gain undisputed leadership in its region once it abandoned the divisive domestic policy of apartheid. The Brazil-Argentina entente, on the other hand, was based much more on a change in perception than policy. In South Asia, the India-Pakistan relationship remains hostage to history; in that region, perceptions about the past continue to place a limit on the possibilities for the future. Seen in this light, it makes little sense to talk about a “better” pathway to regional security, since policy breakthroughs are only one element in a complex web of factors, regional and extra-regional, that define the security problematique of a region. Only one thing can be said for certain: in their quest to transcend their regional bounds and have a global impact, the regional security context is a critical factor for the emerging powers.

117 “India, South Africa plan regular talks on defence”, The Hindu (New Delhi), August 1, 1998.
118 “Implementation of joint panel decisions: India, SA to set up review mechanisms”, The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), December 8, 1998.
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