EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND FRANCO-GERMAN RELATIONS: ERBFEINDSCHAFT OR ENGRENAGE?
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Abstract

Given the historical depth of Franco-German enmity, or *erbfeindschaft*, how have integrative efforts in West Europe been shaped by this rivalry? Three sets of tensions are identified in addressing that question: the theoretical tussle to explain West European integration; the explosive historical relationship between the two countries; and their cooperative, complementary relationship in European Community policy-making. For analytical purposes, two hypotheses connect these sources of tension in the multifaceted, complicated subject matter of Franco-German relations. These are that (a) when the Cold War was in full fury, both countries found cooperation a far superior strategy than discord; and (b) when the Cold War ended, disagreements increased without eliminating cooperation. Both are tested through a comparative study of agricultural and monetary policies of the Community, and prefaced by a rapid historical riffle of the ups and downs in that bilateral relationship. The conclusion is drawn that the Community interlocked the two countries in such a way as to make disengagement costly in spite of increasing divergences, and that this *engrenage* was possible because of the Cold War context.

*My appreciation to an anonymous reviewer and to Gustavo Acua for comments and support, respectively.*
Introduction and Hypotheses

A flurry of activities within the European Community since the mid-1980s suggests the deepening of integrative efforts. Variously described as reflecting the dark ages of integration, eurosclerosis, or europessimism, the early 1980s gave way to a relance européenne, evident in the Single European Act (SEA) of February 1986 and the Treaty of European Union (TEU) of December 1991. Fearing a forthcoming fortress Europe, the rest of the world spiralled into creating competitive trading blocs here and there. As if the plot was not thick enough, the Cold War ended, Germany was reunited, and one of the key new concerns was whether Europe would become Germanized or Germany Europeanized.

Dilemmas as these trigger theoretical debates. On the one hand is the position that all those activities since the mid-1980s represent the logical outcome of integrative efforts put into motion in the 1950s. On the other, the strain of the 1970s reflects sputtering resistance to supranationalism: After all, the engine of integration had indeed stalled every now and then since the 1950s, and perhaps the underlying cause may simply be self-seeking behavior of member states. Forty-odd years of fluctuating between one end of the analytical pole and the other produced a variety of explanations. Responses to whether integrative efforts should be widened or...
deepened, or indeed both, as well as if their orientation ought to be endogenously determined or exogenously influenced, offer some clue as to where West European integration presently stands and what its future potential may hold.

More critical may be the political context within which integration takes place. Is it just a coincidence that the Cold War brought West European countries together, and that as soon as it began to evaporate, West European countries dedicated themselves to integrative efforts again in order to deflect or prevent differences between each other? To be sure, without the United States providing the security umbrella for West European economic development through the creation of NATO in 1949, integrative efforts would have slowed and historical fears would continue to strain relations. Of particular importance was historical enmity, or erbfeindschaft, between France and Germany. The U.S. security umbrella on the continent provided at least an impetus for the two countries to slough off that mutual enmity to some degree. By the 1980s both had developed a pattern of institutional interlinkages, or engrenage—bilaterally and through the European Community. The Cold War began to dissipate simultaneously, raising the interesting question if France and Germany, out of a desire for European leadership, revive historical fears, or indeed permit the unfolding bilateral cooperation of forty years to shape West Europe’s future.

If integrative efforts have a relationship with security considerations, as was the West European experience, does it follow that that relationship is inverse—the greater the security threat, the more conducive integrative efforts, and the lesser that threat, the more constraints to integration? Two policy areas of the European Community are chosen for a comparative study to determine the nature of Franco-German relations today as a step towards predicting the immediate future—one representing the 1960s when the Cold War was in full fury, the other from the 1980s when the Cold War had evaporated. This study hypothesizes Franco-German cooperation prevailed over differences in the former case, and that differences increased in the latter case without necessarily displacing cooperation.

Agriculture, an area generally reflecting French strength, is an obvious candidate of a previous policy area. Not only has agriculture demanded a lion’s share of attention and resources over the years, it has also demonstrated how the two


countries have sought policy convergence. An obvious candidate for a concurrent policy area of analysis is monetary integration, since that was the essence of the controversial Maastricht Treaty.\(^\text{12}\) Widely regarded an area of German strength, monetary integration automatically pits integrative goals against national interests, and France versus its powerful next door neighbor.

Three distinctive dynamics are brought together for analysis: (a) theories of integration as they adjust to national preferences; (b) Franco-German relations as they bear upon European integration against the backdrop of historical discontinuities; and (c) a comparative study of European farm and monetary policies from the points of view of France and Germany. Each is treated, in that order, in three broad sections below, followed by concluding remarks.

**Theoretical Positioning: Whereto Beyond the State?**

How have the ups and downs of European integration been interpreted theoretically? At least five overlapping strands of thought may be construed from the literature, though not all of equal staying power:\(^\text{13}\) functionalism, federalism, regional economic integration, neo-functionalism, and inter-governmentalism, in both its state-centric and more liberal interpretations. The first two tended to be more influential in the late 1940s and early 1950s than at any time since, although some contend West Europe unwittingly reflects many aspects of federalism today.\(^\text{14}\)

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\(^{13}\) The literature is not always clear if these are treated as independent or dependent variables. As strands of thoughts, they are independent variables explaining the dependent variable of regional integration. That is how they are treated in this study. Sometimes they may be the object of explanation, becoming dependent variables as a consequence. Regional economic integration is one strand of thought that reflects this duality the most: it not only sets the stages of integration, which is the dependent variable, but also contains the arguments behind integration. Readers may profit by keeping this duality in mind.

Nonetheless, Figure 1 presents a very rough relative positioning of the five strands along a continuum of politics. To reiterate, this is only a tentative and illustrative sketch, meant to convey a rough rather than precise relationship. Table 1 spells out some of the key characteristics of each along various comparative, non-exhaustive dimensions.

Figure 1

Positioning Theoretical Frameworks along Continuum of Politics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intergovernmentalism</th>
<th>Neofunctionalism</th>
<th>Federalism</th>
<th>Regional Economic Integration</th>
<th>Functionalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

High Politics

Low Politics

The continuum of politics ranges from high to low, where high politics refers to security considerations, almost always in terms of military capabilities, and low politics refers to non-military capabilities, especially economic, but also including social, cultural, and other manifestations of competitiveness and accommodation. Whereas the central feature of high politics, as depicted here, is of the state being a dominant and decisive rational actor, the central feature of low politics is of both the coexistence of state and non-state actors, and the prevalence of parallel lines of authority between them. As such, the continuum does not convey a zero-sum trade-off, simply the shifting of priorities and all that that entails.

Along the spectrum, then, inter-governmentalism alone occupies the high politics end of the continuum, while functionalism is the only theoretical

15 Many question the usage of a continuum to depict the relationship between inter-governmentalism and supranationalism, arguing the relationship is not zero-sum and that sovereignty, the hallmark of inter-governmentalism, is not surrendered by embracing supranationalism. The continuum used here is not between inter-governmentalism and supranationalism, but between high politics and low. As such, it depicts shades of differences between the various theoretical formulations without thrusting any two of them in a zero-sum context. See Keohane and Hoffmann, op. cit.; and John McCormick, The European Union: Politics and Policies in The New Europe: Interdisciplinary Perspectives Series, ed. Stanley Hoffmann, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1996, pp. 12-15.

16 Stanley Hoffmann makes the most of the two terms, initially distinguishing one from the other emphatically, more recently softening that distinction. See, respectively, “Obstinate or obsolete? France, European integration, and the fate of the nation-state,” in The European Sisyphus, 76-96, but see pp. 71-106; and “Reflections on the nation-state in Western Europe today,” ibid., pp. 211-226.
formulation at the opposite end, at the pole of low politics. Regional economic integration theory and federalism are closer to functionalism, without being the same. Both are also different to each other, as explained below. Neo-functionalism lies closer to the inter-governmentalism end of the continuum than any of the other three, even though its goals are identical to those other three. Against that brief overview, inter-governmentalism is the only theoretical strand that does not postulate or predict supranationalism at a different level of analysis: If it occurs, it is expected to also reflect some degree of national interests, whether in terms of the state, as seems to be the proclivity of Stanley Hoffmann, or organized interests within states as appears to be the position of Hoffmann’s protégé Andrew Moravscik. The former is labeled (a) and the latter (b) under governmentalism in Figure 1. All other strands predict, to varying degrees, going beyond the nation state: functionalists expect it in the shortest period of time, neo-functionalism in the longest, with federalism and regional economic integration theory somewhere in the medium-term. Exactly where beyond the state these efforts are supposed to lead remains the underlying puzzle.

What does Table 1 inform us?

17 Walter Mattli and Anne-Marie Burley Slaughter seriously challenge the distinction between neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism; see “Revisiting the European Court of Justice,” International Organization 52, no. 1, Winter 1998, pp. 177-209.
18 See the several references to Hoffmann’s many relevant works in this section.
Table 1
Integration, Viewpoints, and a Comparative Profile

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions:</th>
<th>Functionalism:</th>
<th>Regional Economic Integration:</th>
<th>Federalism:</th>
<th>Neofunctionalism:</th>
<th>Inter-Governmentalism:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Initial articulation:</td>
<td>Between world wars</td>
<td>1960s</td>
<td>Between world wars</td>
<td>1950s</td>
<td>Informally 1960s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Salience in 1990s:</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>More limited theoretically than empirically</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dimensions:</td>
<td>Functionalism:</td>
<td>Regional Economic Integration:</td>
<td>Federalism:</td>
<td>Neofunctionalism:</td>
<td>Inter-Governmentalism:</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Underlying argument:</td>
<td>Single sector integration has spread effects</td>
<td>Integration of single policy area has spread effects</td>
<td>Parallel growth of state and supranational federal institutions</td>
<td>Societal and bureaucratic pressures channeled by state, and merge across boundaries</td>
<td>Relative military considerations underlie all other considerations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Dominant Characteristics:</td>
<td>Incremental growth of economic sectors</td>
<td>Incremental growth of political institutions</td>
<td>Incrementalism</td>
<td>*Expansive logic of sectors *Disjointed incrementalism *Transnationalism *Transgovernmentalism *Catalysts &amp; types of spillover</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Assumptions or Prerequisites</td>
<td>*Spurt in innovations *Boom in sovereign states *Neo-mercantilist planning</td>
<td>*Desire for economic integration *Simultaneous felt-need of more than one country</td>
<td>*Sovereign statehood *Desire for supranational federation</td>
<td>*Sovereign statehood reflecting: pluralism, economic symmetry, elite complementarity, adaptability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Engine of growth:</td>
<td>Innovation, dynamic sectors, elites</td>
<td>Effective policies</td>
<td>Visionary leaders</td>
<td>Elites</td>
<td>Favorable security balance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dimensions:</td>
<td>Functionalism:</td>
<td>Regional Economic Integration:</td>
<td>Federalism:</td>
<td>Neofunctionalism:</td>
<td>Inter-Governmentalism:</td>
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<td>------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Status of state:</td>
<td>Only one of many possible actors</td>
<td>Assumed to be important</td>
<td>Decentralized</td>
<td>Foundation of integrative process</td>
<td>Indispensable, irreducible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Scope:</td>
<td>Global, eventually</td>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>Domain of LCD bargaining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Major problems:</td>
<td>*State de-emphasized *Politics not separable from economics *Not all sectors may contribute to incrementalism *Integration possible through political will</td>
<td>*Divisible sovereignty creates hierarchy of issues, leaving military considerations out of the analytical framework *Too deterministic</td>
<td>*Insufficient attention to: global context, nuances in domestic politics *Under-estimates nationalism *Excessive reliance on single case *Spillover constrained</td>
<td>*Creeping absorption of issues of high politics in integrative process *Domestic preference formation and aggregation not explained *State centrality questionable</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Thirteen non-exhaustive and revealing dimensions of analysis are brought together. As with Figure 1, there is no hard and fast dividing line between the selected paradigms, indeed the discussions below convey how frequently they overlap. Among the conspicuous strands left out are Karl Deutsch's amalgamated security community, Paul Taylor's confederalism, the interdependence of Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, and regime analysis proposed by Stephen D. Krasner, Stanley Hoffmann, and others. Many of the omitted schools are fairly adequately reflected through the chosen categories, for instance, several elements of interdependence and regime analysis are part and parcel of inter-governmentalism; confederalism too is inherent in some of the traits of federalism, neo-functionalism, and inter-governmentalism. The five schools of thought selected capture enough of the theoretical details and sources of tension to suffice for this study.

**Initial Articulation**

Both functionalism and federalism were sparked by the two world wars, and in turn fostered, in rough chronological order, neo-functionalism from the 1950s, regional economic integration from the 1960s, and inter-governmentalism.
implicitly from the mid-1960s, 29 but more explicitly from the 1980s. 30 These dates conform roughly to the initial articulation of each theoretical formulation. An interesting pattern is that of war generating idealistic proposals, which are then subjected to and modified by practical experience, resulting in a non-zero sum theoretical tussle through which at least one element from each school is both retained and rejected. 31

Salience in the 1990s

Since the issue is the relevance of each body of thought today, the second dimension notes that all but functionalism and federalism are highly relevant concurrently — echoing the pragmatic transformation just mentioned. Functionalism appears more limited than federalism because it de-emphasizes the state — a theme discussed further below — while federalism seems to be more apparent in the slow maturation of European institutions today than in theoretical discussions. Both continue to provide the backdrop against which other theoretical bodies have been, and continue to be, reformulated. 32 Neo-functionalism and inter-governmentalism have experienced high tides and low, but continue to persist in one form or another. Regional economic integration theory is very much in vogue in the 1990s with the growth of trading blocs.


31 Theme inherent in E.H. Carr’s analysis of World War I, although he refers to idealism as utopianism, or Bethamite rationalism. See The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations, New York, Harper & Row, 1964, originally, London, Macmillan, 1939, pp. 26-31 specifically, pp. 22-94 generally. Recognized as one of the foundational works of the field of international relations, Carr’s book is interestingly dedicated to the “makers of the coming peace,” who turned out to also be the advocates of federalism and believers of the realist strain.

Key Advocates

David Mitrany and Jean Monnet influenced both functionalism and federalism, but proposed different functions or expectations of each. Both expected step-by-step emergence of a supranational federal structure from functional incrementalism. This was only logical, since technologically-driven integration needs coordination. They differed in the nature of the final outcome envisioned. For Mitrany the evolving federal entity served, at best, only as the infrastructure of economic activities, much along the lines of Adam Smith, and, at worst, simply withered away. For Monnet, the evolving federal entity, which he even labeled the United States of Europe, was there to stay with meaningful, decisive, political tasks. Both, however, moved from the state to a supranational level of analysis, where an alternative to the state was earnestly sought. Others to have a similar vision included Walter Hallstein, the first president of the European Community, and the Italian Altiero Spinelli.

Although regional economic integration is traditionally traced to the work of Bela Balassa in 1961, his arguments are themselves influenced by the writings of Jacob Viner a decade earlier. Balassa’s key argument, elaborated below, comprised of five stages towards economic integration, each transition sparked by the fulfillment of a specific policy goal, instead of the functionalist catalyst of technological innovations. Although the need for the state is most evident here, Balassa discusses it the least. Subsequent proponents, such as Peter Robson, retain Balassa’s original sequence and argumentations, and continue to neglect the state. Compounding this omission is the excessive reliance on a single case study —the real-life experiences in West Europe from the early 1960s. Whether the stages are relevant in other cases of regional integration, we have to wait and see, which points to the a posteriori nature of this articulation, making it more a historical justification than theoretical prediction.

Much the same can be said of neo-functionalism, although many of the key advocates offered more future projections from ongoing events than the regional integrationists did. As with the latter, neo-functionalists also relied almost exclusively on the single case study of West European experiences —the European Coal and Steel Community (E.C.S.C.) for Ernst B. Haas, and the implementation of

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the Treaty of Rome for Leon N. Lindberg, Stuart A. Scheingold, and others. Subsequent neo-functionalists display more detachment from the initial excitement of integrative efforts, and tend to be much more circumspect, as for instance, Joseph S. Nye. Ironically, even the grandfather himself, Haas, increasingly ventilates his own reservations of neo-functionalism serving a useful explanatory purpose.

Stanley Hoffmann alone raised the banner of political realism, from which inter-governmentalism emerged subsequently and more formally as a school of thought, from the heady early years to this day. His landmark explanation of the empty-chair crisis of 1965, compelled students of integration to pay more attention to such domestic factors as nationalism —as well as to the relations between states from the more traditional perspective of power politics. It was not until the 1980s that Paul Taylor, but more particularly Hoffmann's protégé, Andrew Moravscik, consolidated a school of thought out of these trenchant but scattered arguments.

Central Concerns and Expected Outcomes

With the exception of inter-governmentalism, all other groups highlight the promotion of common welfare, necessitating cooperation, and resulting in an expanded pie for all —that is, a non-zero sum outlook. In that sense, all groups are progressively oriented, see absolute gains as being more important than relative gains, and thereby lean closer to the low politics pole than to the high. Inter-governmentalism, by contrast, is a pessimistic school of thought because its central concerns are security-based, and therefore born out of a never-ending competitiveness in which relative gains are constantly more important than absolute. As such, the outlook is zero-sum.

34 The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1963.
36 See, among others, Philippe L. Schmitter, “A revised theory of regional integration,” in Lindberg and Scheingold, Regional Integration.
39 See Moravscik, op. cit., 1993; and Taylor, op. cit, 1983.
Underlying Argument

Recognizing the pitfalls of utilizing single statement explanations, this study nevertheless traces the underlying argument of functionalists and regional integrationists to incremental economic growth, of federalists to incremental political growth, of neo-functionalists to domestic socio-economic, socio-political, and political economic interests expanding across borders, and of inter-governmentalists to political-military considerations tempering economic integrative efforts. For both functionalism and regional economic integration theory, the basic argument is identical —integration in a single sector or policy area spreads to other sectors and policy areas.

The Schuman Plan of 1950, which created the E.C.S.C. the next year, served as the starting point of the functionalist incrementalism, spreading through the 1957 Treaty of Rome to agriculture in the 1960s, eventually monetary policy by the 1990s. Neo-functionalists accept this sequence, but also account for the underlying political dynamic as one of the pillars reflecting neo-functional arguments. Haas’s *Uniting for Europe* does so, although fewer subsequent works in this category are as positively inclined.

Balassa’s regional economic integration theory also parallels this sequence. He proposes in the first stage to establish a free trade area, then to move to a customs union, which involves adopting a common external tariff. The third stage creates a common market by unifying national fiscal and monetary policies, paving thereby the way for adopting a single currency in the fourth stage, called simply economic union. When the task is completed, full economic integration prevails, which is the fifth and final stage. Charles Pentland and others list six stages —prefacing Balassa’s five with sectoral integration, which is also the starting point for functionalists.

Federalists also seek incremental growth, but of political institutions. Key to their argument, however, is the expectation of growth along parallel lines —that is, supranational institutions creating a federated network out of states and evolving in similar fashion as their domestic-level counterparts. The argument assumes congruent institutional growth among states, which is not at all the case. Neo-functionalists have a more realistic assumption: pluralism in the constituent states—not necessarily as a pattern of interest inter-mediation, simply as an expression of democratic rights and values. State policies, they argue, affect both internal and external relations, and reflect the pressures of societal groups and bureaucratic agencies. Whether the form of interest intermediation is pluralism itself, consociationalism, corporatism, or any other pattern, some degree of long-term

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convergence at the European level is predicted—which adherents call transnationalism or transgovernmentalism. Finally, inter-governmentalists believe domestic priorities and relative military considerations shape the length, breadth, and depth of economic integration—an argument both succinct and inordinately parsimonious.

**Dominant Characteristics**

Underlying arguments suggest the dominant characteristics. Sovereignty occupies an important common role, for regional economic integration theorists by default, and for functionalists and federalists in terms of a slow pooling process, sector by sector, or policy by policy, at the supranational level. This willingness to negotiate sovereignty contrasts with the inter-governmentalist view. Neo-functionalists fall somewhere in between. They believe in a transfer of sovereignty but also take impediments into account, making the process more protracted than for the functionalist, federalist, and regional economic theorists. Several constraints are identified. Some are short-term: functional, technical, and political; or geographical, sectoral, boundary. Others are not: spillback, spillaround, and self-encapsulation. These reflect the promises and pitfalls of spillover. Henry Teune and others categorize some of the catalysts, such as reward-Generalization, imitation, and frustration.

Inter-governmentalists highlight the difficulty of overcoming those impediments. They point to the embedded appeal to nationalism, or systemic considerations of power politics as two potentially permanent roadblocks. Out of respect for them, state sovereignty has to be defended at all costs, and any integrative effort is seen as reflecting the national interests of the stronger members—resulting in least common denominator bargaining structuring supranational integration. Increasingly, intergovernmentalists pay attention to domestic groups,

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particularly as they reach out for supranational relations, reflecting a more liberal version encapsulated best by Moravscik.

Assumptions or Pre-requisites

Arguments not only carry expectations, but also reflect assumptions or the prior fulfillment of certain conditions. What are some of these? For functionalism at least three may be mentioned: periodic technological innovations, without which incremental sectoral growth may be stymied; growth of sovereign states, without which the rationale for supranational integration would disappear; and neo-mercantilist planning, whose very inefficiency and costs necessitate supranational integration. Both regional economic integration theory and federalism assume not only the state, but also the common desire for economic integration among a collection of states. Neofunctionalists take for granted that states should be pluralistic, and reflect a rough symmetry in economic development, elite complementarity, and adaptability. Interestingly, inter-governmentalists parsimoniously subordinate all such considerations to the basic security concerns of the state: They assume and expect the minimum.

Engine of Growth

Leadership and competitiveness provide the motor of growth. Either visionary or rational-minded elites provide the spurt for functionalism, federalism, and neofunctionalism. While they are important to both regional economic integration and inter-governmentalism, greater significance is placed upon the effectiveness of policies for the former and a favorable security balance for the latter. Competitiveness also plays a part in the growth of functionalism, as evident in the emphasis placed on technological innovation and dynamic sectors.

Key Actors

The state is the key actor in regional economic integration, federalism, and inter-governmentalism —and one of the key actors in neo-functionalism and functionalism. Under neo-functionalism, the state is more dominant and decisive, under functionalism less so.
Status of State

While the state plays a subordinate role under functionalism, it is either assumed, as in regional economic integration, or very actively involved under federalism, neo-functionalism, and inter-governmentalism. Under federalism, the state eventually becomes decentralized as the supranational entities mature. Although the state provides the springboard of the integrative process under neo-functionalism, it remains irreducible and irreplaceable under inter-governmentalism.

Scope

Whereas integration is seen as an exclusively regionalized phenomenon for economic integration theory, neo-functionalists see its possibility at both regional and global levels —although they concentrate largely on the regional. Functionalists have a more global vision of the integrative process since technological innovations have so open-ended implications. By contrast, because the state is seen as being fundamental, inter-governmentalists define their scope in terms of anticipated security threats —which could be regional, global, or both.

Major Problems

None of these streams of thought are flawless. As mentioned before, functionalism and federalism have received less attention and relevance than the others because they de-emphasize the state. It can be argued against functionalists that politics cannot be so separated from economic behavior, indeed, sometimes integrative efforts require a political will to overcome the weaknesses of the economic drive; and furthermore, not all economic sectors are capable of incrementalism. Similarly, federalists, for whom the state plays a crucial initial role, need to explain the absence or negligence of the security dimension in their analytical framework.

Other schools of thought retain the state either as an inherent entity or one actively involved, but raise other problems. Regional economic integration, for example, is too smooth, deterministic, and dependent on the experiences of only West European countries. It does not offer any explanations for possible reversals, and assumes every part of the world will follow the West European pattern in the same way. Some even describe it as being "distorted and twisted, if not simply false."47 Neo-functionalism, because it has attracted more attention in the literature than any of the other schools, presents probably the longest list of analytical ailments. These include the insufficient attention paid to the global and domestic

contexts, particularly the idiosyncrasies of party politics and the embedded appeal of nationalism within the internal milieu of states. As with regional economic integration, it too relies excessively on West European experiences; and the one concept it develops the most, spillover, also contains plenty of holes. Intergovernmentalists, on the other hand, find it difficult to accept, and have yet to respond to, the slow absorption of foreign policy and security considerations into the integrative process. This is most evident in the one area they divert all their attention to: West Europe, particularly from the adoption of the Treaty of European Union. In addition are some larger gaps, caused particularly by the inability to explain how societal interests are aggregated within the domestic context, and related with that, why state centrality is so impermeable when, in fact, interaction with domestic groups has been the essence of policy-making in plural society.

**Salient Contributions**

Finally, as if to reaffirm that theory-making is, like regional integration itself has tended to be, a cumulative process, each strand offers an element or two of lasting importance. For functionalism, this has been Mitrany’s doctrine of ramification, or spillover. Neo-functionalists, who also refer to it as secondary priming, offer many variations of it —functional, technical, and political, according to one conception, geographical, sectoral, and boundary, according to another. They also categorize the various constraints admirably, as evident in the terms spillback, spillaround, and self-encapsulation. These are all evidences of adaptability which, in turn, has led to an extraordinary type of survival for the theory itself —through exhilarating ups and seemingly fatalistic downs. Regional economic integration theory similarly provides very distinctive thresholds to evaluate the process by. By shifting attention from economic incrementalism to political incrementalism, federalists alert us to the possibilities of parallel institutional growth. Together with functionalists, they also offer the notion of pooling sovereignty. Finally, inter-governmentalists, by claiming the least, offer perhaps the most sustainable paradigm, one that is popular whenever whenever

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49 See Fioretos, op. cit.

integration is in crisis, empirically or theoretically, while also seeking to move out from its rigid original confines to capture selected supranational developments.

Franco-German Relations: From Erbfeindschaft to Engrenage?^51^

Against that theoretical backdrop, how can we situate Franco-German relations, since they were so central in two world wars and then the integrative efforts subsequently? While this section profiles those relations, the next applies theoretical observations from the previous section.

Franco-German relations, once structured for war, is today structured for peace. The dividing line was the Cold War: On the one hand, it unfurled, in the famous words of Winston S. Churchill, an Iron Curtain from Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, slicing Germany through the very heart. On the other, it globalized the historical European balance of power system, with the United States and the Soviet Union as the actors. Just as the collapse of the Soviet Union fundamentally altered this power balance globally, the improvement of Franco-German relations over a broader historical span constitutes an equally compelling and significant European-level reorientation, suggesting a possible claim to managing power balances again —this time globally. Four sections profile the transformation from erbfeindschaft, or hereditary enmity, to engrenage, or irreversible inter-linkage, in Franco-German relations. These focus on (a) the pre-World War I epoch, (b) World War I and its aftermath, (c) World War II and its immediate aftermath, and (d) the long-term post-World War II consequences. Table 2 summarizes them.


52 Robert Schuman boldly made this observation as early as in 1950. See his “Declaration of May 9, 1950,” in The Origins and Development of the European Community, eds. David Weigall and Peter Strik, Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1992, pp. 58-59. This declaration of Schuman proposes the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community, and as the volume indicates, marks the beginning of integrative efforts in West Europe.

Table 2
Franco-German Relations Historical Overview

<table>
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<th>Major Characteristics</th>
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<td>Pre-World War I:</td>
<td>*Napoleon’s forces occupy German states, German nationalism</td>
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<td>Erbfeindschaft</td>
<td>*1870-71: German unification following defeat of France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>*France drifts towards Triple Alliance, Germany towards Triple Entente</td>
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<tr>
<td>World War I and its</td>
<td>*Trench warfare decimates French adult male population, leads to creation of Maginot Line</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>immediate aftermath:</td>
<td>*German defeat underscored at Peace of Paris by harsh Treaty of Versailles: Rhineland and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rhineland de-militarized, Saar placed under League of nations, troops limited to 100,000, huge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>reparations imposed, Memel, Posen ceded, Danzig freed, and Anschluss forbidden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World War II and</td>
<td>*France defeated, but free French forces from various fronts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>immediate aftermath:</td>
<td>*Channel crossing leads to German retreat in the west</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>*Stalingrad defeat lead to German retreat in the east</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>*Occupied forces defeat and divide Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>Long-term post-World War II</td>
<td>*Compelled to work with France, the FRG recovers respect abroad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>developments:</td>
<td>*Driven to influence the FRG, politically, France discovers formula for economic transformation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engrenage?</td>
<td>*European Community provides the medium for mutual reciprocation</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Pre-World War I: Belligerent Inheritance

German unification in 1871 was both a culmination of hatred and bitterness of several centuries and its very renewal. The leading germanic community, Prussia, under the guise of the North German Confederation, defeated the leading continental power of two centuries, France—a defeat that was decisive, dramatic, and disturbing. Napoleon III was defeated more decisively than was Napoleon Bonaparte's, on both fronts—the battlefield and the negotiation table. At Waterloo, Bonaparte surrendered but France was not humiliated; and at the Congress of Vienna, France rightfully played the indispensable role it was expected to in restoring European balance. The astute bargaining methods of Count Talleyrand, which resonated so perfectly with those of his Austrian colleague, Prince Klemens von Metternich, ensured a proud diplomatic position for France in defeat. There was no such counterpart after the defeat of 1871. Napoleon III's defeat was also dramatic: Peace was imposed upon France by Otto von Bismarck on French soil, in the very citadel of traditional French power—the elegant, opulent Hall of Mirrors in the Palace of Versailles, wherefrom radiated the glory and grandeur of France since the time of the Sun King, Louis XIV. Finally, Napoleon III's defeat was also disturbing. The most powerful land army in Europe was crushed by superior Prussian strategy and weaponry—elements which subsequently positioned Germany permanently above France. Not only was a unified German state finally created, defying all historical odds, but its military, diplomatic, and economic successes resulted in what one scholar described as "a country drunk with good fortune." On the other hand, the humbling of the French army in the Battle of Sedan in September 1871, as well as the loss of Alsace and Lorraine, left a greater sense of vindictiveness among the French than the German sense of vindictiveness after Jena in 1806. The Treaty of Versailles in 1919 eventually allowed this humiliation to ventilate in an unusually harsh form.

Two developments within France, it might be argued, contributed to the French defeat: the French Revolution of 1789 with its clarion call for liberty, equality, and fraternity; and the emergence of a military adventurer, Napoleon Bonaparte by name, who sought to rule all of Europe. The French Revolution neither initiated liberal thinking in Prussia, which was briefly encouraged as early as in the 1740s by the enlightened despot, Frederick the Great, nor proved suitable through the ideas it released and the forms of emancipation provided the common people for a feudal Prussia. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, the eminent concurrent German scholar, called for a German, not foreign, motivation to overthrow the ancien régime. What the revolution did spark in Prussia was a series of vitally needed reform measures, "from above" as it were: extending limited democratization, as proposed by Freiherr Karl August von Hardenberg; eliminating serfdom in 1807; reforming education, as advocated by Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Wilhelm von Humboldt; creating a civil society along the lines of G. Friederich W. Hegel; building enlightened patriotism under Karl Freiherr Von und Zum Stein; and creating an effective military machine, under Count A. Gneisenau and G. von Scharnhorst. According to Friederich Meinecke, these represented the necessary first steps towards statehood.

Bonaparte catalyzed the intellectual fermentation through conquest. By first defeating Austria at Austerlitz in December 1805, then Prussia at Jena in October 1806, he dealt a fatal blow to the tottering symbol of the ancien régime — the Holy Roman Empire. In its place he established the Confederation of the Rhine in July 1806 under French control. Two implications follow: Napoleon created, almost overnight in historical terms, a United States of Europe — a goal his compatriots would seek in vain after World War II. Yet success for Napoleon was only short-lived; for Monnet and Schuman, it may still come over the long-haul. The second implication projects another irony: Napoleon united Germans through defeat and the Confederation, which was to inspire Bismarck in 1862 to create his own North German Confederation, a German enterprise, built by Germans, and meant to promote German interests. One of those interests was to avenge the 1806 defeat to France. This was fulfilled in 1871, and culminated in the accomplishment of the mother interest — the creation of Germany, not only as a nation-state, but also an empire.

Yet the mutual hatred and recrimination across the Rhine antedated Napoleon Bonaparte. Before Prussia's rise to eminence under the Hohenzollerns of Brandenburg in the eighteenth century, Austria was the chief germanic community. Although both Prussia and Austria were two of the dominant electorates of the Holy Roman Empire, Vienna was the center of gravity for many centuries, under the House of Habsburgs. Rivalry between the Habsburgs, on the one hand, and the

Bourbons of Paris, and even before them, the Valois, on the other, was not merely a scramble to demonstrate relative power superiority, but increasingly after the Peace of Augsburg in 1555, a French fear of encirclement. Through marriage, the Habsburgs joined Austria and Spain. It took all the ingenuity of Cardinal Richlieu, Cardinal Mazarin, and Louis XIV to keep France as the prevailing European powerhouse. Unfortunately for France, there were no counterparts to them after the middle of the nineteenth century under very similar circumstances: It was the announcement of the candidacy of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen to the vacant Spanish throne on July 1, 1870, "when peace brooded all over Europe," that led to the French declaration of war two weeks later. Bismarck anticipated this, while the French delusion of invincibility, given its track record, led to its downfall. A new era dawned across West Europe.

World War I and its Immediate Aftermath

One may argue World War I to be another of a long string of crisis-turned-conflicts across West Europe going back to the Renaissance: Reformation and Counter-Reformation of the sixteenth century, the Thirty Years War of the seventeenth century, the War of Spanish Succession and the Seven Years War of the eighteenth century, Napoleonic wars of the nineteenth century, and World War I of the twentieth. If so, the peace which followed was a historical aberration: Whereas at Augsburg in 1555, Westphalia 1648, Utrecht 1714, Hubertusburg 1763, and Vienna 1815, all protagonists, victors and vanquished, occupied a position of equality at the negotiating table, with the result that the outcome reflected symmetry and compromises, at the Paris Peace Conferences from 1919, upon the insistence of France and its leader, Clemenceau, Germany was treated as an outcast, with the result that the Treaty of Versailles was a uniquely harsh and imposed settlement by European standards, a "dictated peace," to the Germans. No doubt meant to avenge the Hall of Mirrors humiliation France suffered in 1871, the Treaty of Versailles took the broader historical antagonism between the two peoples.

Although the Treaty of Versailles inflicted full French fury upon Germany, it could not compensate for the permanent French slip from great power status. It imposed enormous reparations upon Germany, demilitarized the Rhineland, placed the Saar basin under League of Nations supervision for fifteen years, restricted the German army to 100,000, created a Polish Corridor and ceded Memel in Lithuania to the League of Nations and Posen to Poland, made the Polish city of Danzig free, and

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forbade *anschluss*, that is, union with Austria. German inability to fulfill several requirements, particularly reparations, fueled tremendous domestic resentment, which slowly but surely produced the National Socialist Party under Adolf Hitler. After being elected to Chancellorship in 1933, Hitler immediately undid every treaty stipulation, reviving German nationalism and past accomplishments—the iron and blood military tradition introduced by Frederick I; the appeal to German unity that Herder and Goethe articulated; the need for German purity that Nietzsche preached; and the resolute leadership and skillful strategic vision exemplified by the Iron Chancellor, Bismarck, himself. All of these culminated in a formidable Germany army, and another global war.

Structural changes within France also contributed to the growth of post-World War I German power. The defeat in 1871 vividly marked the relative decline of French military power, especially in terms of innovations and deployment of capabilities, as well as strategic planning. Germany was far superior in all of these areas after 1871, evident in the development of the needle gun in the 1860s, the naval expansion of the 1890s, the Schlieffen Plan before World War II, and so forth. A united Germany also meant more able-bodied men in an age when numerical strength was a critical military variable, whereas the lengthy trench warfare during World War I, decimated the French male population from which France would never recover in time for World War II. Recognizing this, France built the Maginot Line—a defensive gesture pitifully reflecting a flawed strategy and inadequate offensive capabilities. As in 1871, France was no match for Germany's military machine. The defeat of 1941 was even more comprehensive than in 1871: It crippled the domestic socio-political structure.

World War II and its Immediate Aftermath

Just as the settlement of World War I marked a drift from traditional European diplomatic practices, World War II globalized the European balance of power system and shifted authority from European powers to non-European. In a sense, though, while the Cold War was still played out across Europe, a breathing space was simultaneously created for hitherto European powers to divert attention to non-military pursuits. Germany was automatically divided, which eased concerns across the Rhine and the English Channel; and the defeated France survived owing both to this division and its historical reputation. Most importantly, though, two non-European powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, penetrated the European

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heartland — as if by some prior will of coming to the military rescue of an embattled, emfeebled continent.

The military presence of the United States and the Soviet Union, evident in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (N.A.T.O.) and the Warsaw Pact, was matched by an economic presence, evident in the Marshall Plan and the Council of Mutual Economic Cooperation (COMECON). However, the results were different: In West Europe economic reconstruction took priority over rearmament, while the East European response was exactly the opposite. By deferring military considerations (and costs) to the United States, West European countries were able to make maximum use of the breathing space for economic development; while East European countries lost both initiatives to the Soviet Union, which was interested considerably more in military and political outcomes than economic. One generation later, the Soviet Union would collapse in part due to this assumed burden and its heavy costs, but West European states would move from strength to economic strength to once again rethink military options.

The simultaneous advocacy of economic blueprints for postwar reconstruction during the war offered a way out of the embedded enmity engulfing France and the Federal Republic. David Mitrany, and others proposed a functionalist solution, whereby economic sectors could be integrated one by one, eventually eliminating the need for state, and, by extension, military calculations. Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, and others proposed a federalist solution which overlapped the functionalist proposal — a simultaneous but slower transfer of policy-making and policy-implementing authority to a supranational entity, eventually embracing all countries within a United States of Europe structure. The political vacuum caused by the shift of military decision-making to the United States, domestic infighting in France, and the division of Germany created the opportunity to implement one or more of these theoretical arguments, and significantly, France and the Federal Republic found each other working together on this different, economic dimension without being haunted by reciprocal historical fears. The Schuman Plan of 1950, which proposed the European Coal and Steel Community, was but one evident of a functionalist idea being implemented; and the Council of Europe from 1949 did likewise for the federalist proposal. Monnet and Schuman were the brains behind both, but it was Schuman alone in his capacity as the French Foreign Minister who struck a rapport with Konrad Adenauer, the Federal Republic Chancellor, making that distinctive breakthrough in burying the historical hatchet between the two countries. His venture translated his vision of an entity beyond the state into reality.

Among others to advocate this outcome was Winston S. Churchill and George F. Kennan. See McCormick, European Union, ch. 3.
Long-term Post-World War II Consequences

Through ups and downs, France and the Federal Republic, later France and Germany, became each other’s necessary partner—a marriage, figuratively speaking, not out of choice, but out of circumstances and convenience. Disagreements, bottlenecks, and dead-ends have been frequent: over the European Defense Council and the European Political Community in the early 1950s, the empty-chair crisis of the mid-1960s, through the monetary crisis of the 1970s, and the reunification of Germany in the 1990s. Yet, consensus, compromise, and conciliation have also been just as common: the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the Agricultural Code of 1962, the Single European Act of 1987, and the Maastricht Treaty of 1991. On balance, the desire to work together outweighs, even if only slightly, the regression into stalemate. Critical to sustaining the positive developments and ironing out the negative has been a remarkable rapport between leaders—between Giscard d’Estaing and Helmut Schmid, Francois Mitterand and Helmut Kohl, and Jacques Chirac and Helmut Kohl—based upon pragmatism rather than the charisma typical of Charles de Gaulle. Equally significant is the opportunity this rapprochement has allowed European-level decision-making to strengthen, indicating on several occasions that if either France or Germany desires individually to reclaim or recapture leadership as in the past, one cannot do so without the other—evident in the integration of farm policy in the 1960s, multilateralizing farm policy in the 1990s, and integrating monetary policy in the 1990s. In each of these arenas, both countries possess quite different individual-level interests, but both are also aware in an atmosphere of increasing globalization and multiple non-European sources of potential power that those interests can only be satisfactorily attained in collaboration with the other. Erbfeindschaft may finally, and historically all too suddenly, not be as viable or appealing as engrenage today.

Comparative Analysis: C.A.P. and E.M.U.

Introduction

This third substantive section brings together the previous two through the question it addresses: What integrative effort best explains Franco-German relations after World War II? A comparative study of agriculture and monetary integration serves that purpose. Given the complex nature of the two policy areas, Table 3 profiles the discussions to follow along eleven non-exhaustive, but explanatory dimensions. Before turning to the analysis, the salient findings are summarized first.

a. Just as the success of C.A.P. necessitated a Cold War context, the adoption of E.M.U. required both the success of C.A.P. and the end of the Cold War context.
# Table 3

**C.A.P. and E.M.U.: A Comparative Framework**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>C.A.P.</th>
<th>E.M.U.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Background environment:</td>
<td>Cold War context:</td>
<td>Institutionalization of C.A.P., the Uruguay Round Agreement, and German unification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-France and FRG driven to work together</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-E.C.S.C formed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Extended to Treaty of Rome: Articles 39-46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Determining Community member</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Initial positions:</td>
<td>a. <em>sine qua non</em> of European integration</td>
<td>a. use monetary union as <em>sine qua non</em> of political union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. secondary issue, at best</td>
<td>b. political union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a. single market</td>
<td>Result of intergovernmental conferences in December 1990 in Rome on (a) monetary union, and (b) political union.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. communitarian preferences</td>
<td>Effective November 1, 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. financial solidarity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 5. Terms of Compromise:           | 3 principles adopted: to establish (a) single market, (b) communitarian preferences, and (c) financial solidarity | Based on Delors Report, 1989:  
Stage I: Incorporate GB and other members which did not join EMS  
Stage II: Transition to EMU:  
-convert CECCBG into EMI, then ECB -coordinate convergence criteria: inflation, budget deficit, long-term interest rates, stable fluctuations  
Stage III: EMU, January 1999:  
-ECB to manage single currency, insure stability, remain aloof from political interference, and be accountable |
**Dimensions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>****</th>
<th><strong>C.A.P.</strong></th>
<th><strong>E.M.U.</strong></th>
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<td><em>Phases:</em></td>
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<td>a. 1960s: French farm support v. FRG farm opposition to Community decisions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>b. 1970s: French farm opposition v. FRG</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. 1980s: French farm support v. FRG farm opposition to farm reforms</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>d. 1990s: Furious French farm opposition v. restrained FRG opposition to multilateralizing agriculture</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Trend/Outcome:</td>
<td>farm support for MCAs</td>
<td>New dimension to special mutual relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. only from 1994</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>b. indirect influence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>c. 1980s: French farm support v. FRG</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>d. 1990s: Furious French farm opposition v. restrained FRG opposition to multilateralizing agriculture</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Bilateral relationship at time of outcome:</td>
<td>Special mutual relationship forged</td>
<td></td>
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<td>8. External context:</td>
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<td>a. multilateral rules:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>b. Cold War context:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>a. consistency with them</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. directly influential</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. State of regional integration theory:</td>
<td>Backbone towards establishing Free Trade Area (first stage) by 1968</td>
<td>Final phase of full economic integration</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. State of inter-regional competitiveness:</td>
<td>Of an increasing nature until Uruguay Round, better management since</td>
<td>Not really salient before Maastricht, expected to sharpen thereafter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. State of Franco-German relations:</td>
<td>Loss of French leadership owing to weaker currency: MCAs, and Uruguay Round agreement on agriculture</td>
<td>-agriculture: Inevitable German ascendancy: owing to stronger &amp; more stable currency -advantages accruing from future EU expansion -thinking of political union</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
b. Although France and Germany have had different approaches to the two policy areas based on their quite dissimilar interests, both were able to forge a mutuality out of their disagreements, which is becoming costlier to rupture than it was to assemble.

c. This special relationship is well positioned to offset European concerns over German reunification, in the process enhancing integrative efforts at a time of considerable post Cold War flux.

d. For as long as the Franco-German relations hold, the European Union is likely to come out of the current transition as a stronger international player, becoming pivotal again in the more global balance of power system.

Background Environment

Had not World War II ended in the economic collapse of West Europe and the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, recovery efforts at both national and supranational levels across West Europe would have been considerably delayed and constrained for several reasons. First, similar experiences after World War I suggest the declining resources within West European countries to manage the gigantic tasks. Second, the sheer nature of heightened competitiveness with the return of the United States to global trade and financial markets, would simply dwarf the capacities of any single West European country to claim economic leadership. Finally, the political will to augment the economic goals had likewise ebbed to the lowest point in a few centuries. An economic and political vacuum of this sort opened the way for both experimentation and external meddling. As it transpired, fear of the latter paved the way for the former to be pursued diligently. Paul-Henri Spaak, one of the leading advocates of integration in its hey days, put it succinctly: the real father of European economic integration and N.A.T.O. was the Soviet leader, Josef Stalin.

Another claim may be made on behalf of U.S. Secretary of State, George Marshall. While it is debatable if the multilateral institutions established by the United States after the war were indeed the acts of a benevolent or self-seeking world leader, they were indispensable for European recovery — first in implementing the Marshall Plan, then in nurturing European economies by relaxing

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the very multilateral rules and principles just adopted. It is widely accepted that the occupation of East European countries by Soviet troops directly threatened their western counterparts, as Italy and France faced grave left-wing challenges, and which in turn resulted in defending them at all costs. Proposals to establish a United States of Europe emanated from within Europe, such as from Churchill and Monnet, as well as from the United States, notably from the author of the first strategy of containment, George F. Kennan.

European thinking along the same lines were more sanguine. The end of the war produced the same idealistic and practical blueprints of development as was the case after World War I. Mitrany's sector-based integration had the cancer-like propensity of expanding to newer areas, but it overlooked the state at a time when state identification was crucial for recovery. Others, such as Monnet and Schuman, retained the state and spearheaded this effort by establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (E.C.S.C.) in 1951. Its positive impact culminated in the Treaty of Rome of 1957, creating the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the European Economic Community (E.E.C.), eventually rechristened the European Community from 1967. Alongside, the initial membership of 6 increased to 9 in 1973, to 10 eight years later, 12 by 1986, and 15 in 1994, with 11 more invited in 1997 to join over a period of time. By the turn of the century, then, the United States of Europe seems far closer to reality than may have appeared at any time since Napoleon Bonaparte.

If the Cold War context facilitated economic integration, integration within the Community had to begin with agriculture —and agriculture alone. A number of reasons explain why. First, it was the only sector whose integration was elaborated, through a number of specific provisions, in the Treaty of Rome. Second, agriculture is a universally sensitive sector —whose surpluses are essential for meaningful urbanization, and under industrialization, whose prices and incomes need to be preserved, and whose interests are jealously guarded by small, organized, and


71 From McCormick, op. cit., ch. 3.
72 McCormick, op. cit.
75 George, Politics and Policy in the European Community, ch. 8.
powerful groups. For an industrialized West Europe, a special place for agriculture was taken for granted from the very outset. Third, it fed into the practical thinking of the supranationalists, who could not do away with the state, and therefore had to begin with those economic interests controlled directly by the states. To varying degrees, agriculture was an impartial issue for all 6 founding members —the big ones, France, the Federal Republic, and Italy, and the little ones, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Fourth and finally, agriculture provided perfectly well that feature of functionalism that would serve as the dynamic of incremental integration —spillover, in both economic and political senses. At the same time, it facilitated positive and negative integration.

By contrast, E.M.U. considerations were plainly evident in the 1970s, but became meaningful only in the late 1980s, and particularly early 1990s. Since the E.M.U. would have to be influenced of necessity by the strongest economy in the European Community —that of the Federal Republic— it was not made a priority until the 1990s for at least three reasons. First, the offsetting advantages France sought with agriculture did not occur, and even if they did, they would be considerably constrained by the unexpectedly better position farm integration left the Federal Republic in. In other words, France had not gotten the decisive leadership status it wanted over agriculture from the very start, and as such it was unwilling to proceed with monetary integration which would only give the Federal Republic a double relative advantage. Second, Cold War considerations also meant that the Federal Republic would complement and supplement U.S. efforts politically, militarily, and economically —not compete with it. Proceeding with E.M.U. would inevitably threaten the dollar, and thereby the U.S. economic platform in the struggle against the Communist bloc. Third, European integration began with agriculture and was expected in due course to spill over onto other areas of economic activity —but it was premature for it to spill over on to the monetary area in the 1970s, when there were deep disagreements between France and the Federal Republic over the monetary compensatory accounts adopted in 1969 to stabilize exchange rate fluctuations, or in the 1980s when a solution to the spiralling costs of agriculture had not yet been found. It was logically imprudent to shift integrative efforts to another area without first resolving the problems of the initial policy arena.

Both policy areas, then, had a quite distinctive background setting. Only in the Cold War atmosphere could C.A.P. be initiated and developed, but E.M.U. required an end of the Cold War: Germany could convert its economic strength into political capital independent of the United States only after the Cold War; and only

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German unification provided France the reconsideration with which to push the E.M.U. option.

**Determining Members**

As evident already, the Community member to determine the fate of C.A.P. and E.M.U. have been France and the Federal Republic/Germany, respectively. For its own part, France utilized the privileged position it enjoyed in West Europe during the 1950s as the leading farm producer and exporter to determine a special place for this sector in the Community. The Federal Republic automatically earned a similar privileged position with E.M.U. by possessing the one currency and an economy powerful enough in West Europe to not be ignored, indeed reflecting the leadership characteristics of discipline and stability in its fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate policies, as well as its sturdy and enduring economic performances.

**Initial Positions**

Economic privilege does not necessarily translate into automatic leadership. Both France and the Federal Republic had to fight to assert their natural claims in both arenas. Whereas France insisted on agriculture being the *sine qua non* of West European integration, the Federal Republic was much more restrained — especially after its resurging economy in the 1950s wiped off a part of the war-time stigma. Being a large importer of foodstuffs, especially from non-European sources — South America as one — it did not want to go as far as to protect Community agriculture to the degree France did. Yet, since farming interests were/are so powerful in that country, it could not but support paying extra attention to agriculture — perhaps not as much as France desired, but sufficient to sympathize with the French point of view. The Federal Republic did not wish to tarnish the image of an attractive exporter of manufactured products, and this it did not wish to tarnish by engaging in protectionist agriculture. France, on the other hand, insisted on all or nothing, and it unilaterally held the clock of integration back in December 1961 until a settlement to the agricultural question was reached.

With the E.M.U., tables were turned. France, deeply concerned with German unification from late 1989 when the Berlin Wall came down, realized after the March 1990 elections in East Germany, which Helmut Kohl's C.D.P.-coalition won,

77 Hanns Peter Muth, *French Agriculture and the Political Integration of Western Europe: Toward "An Ever Closer Union Among the European Peoples"*, Leyden, Sijthoff, 1970.
79 Muth, op. cit.
that it could not prevent unification. Its most realistic response was to welcome the
unification, but seek offsetting compromises or guarantees through the European
Community. Since the Federal Republic had always cherished a political union —
which was not covered by the Treaty of Rome — and expanded powers for the
European Parliament, France skillfully converted the dangling monetary integration
proposal into a sine qua non of any political union. This was a dramatic example of
reciprocal interlocking, or engrenage, and provided the breakthrough out of an
otherwise embarrassing situation — indicating how even one generation after France
and Germany struck a working solution to the agricultural stalemate, they were able
to forge something similar on the monetary front as well.

Compromise

Both European powers compromised over the two issues — through the Agricultura
Code of January 1962 and the Treaty of European Union, also called the
Maastricht Treaty, of December 1991. Although the Agricultural Code let the clock
of integration start clicking again, it essentially projected the interests of France, and
France alone. On the other hand, the Maastricht Treaty, though subjected to a vote in
each member country before being implemented from November 1, 1993, was an
outcome of an inter-governmental conference in Rome during December 1990. As
such, it was more the product of collective efforts than agriculture, but necessitated
as much of a Franco-German understanding as agriculture. Compromise between
these two countries, in the final analysis, was pivotal to broader Community
approval.

Terms of Compromise

What were the terms of compromise?

Turning first to the Agricultural Code, agreement over three principles were
reached. These included the establishment of (a) a single market, in other words,
common farm prices, (b) communitarian preferences, meaning a common external
tariff, and (c) financial solidarity, which involved the creation of the European
Guarantee and Guidance Fund (E.A.G.G.F.), or F.E.O.G.A., as it is called in
French. These secured for France privileged access to the import demands of
Community members, in particular the Federal Republic, reduced reliance on non-

80 Fine articulation of this trade-off by Michael J. Baun, “The Maastricht Treaty as high
politics: German, France, and European integration,” Political Science Quarterly 110, no. 4, Winter
81 Muth offers the most detailed of the step-by-step process in the negotiations and prelude
of the common farm policy. See op. cit.
European exports to Community members, and a supranational institution with which to finance the modernization of French agriculture — each a significant accomplishment for a surplus farm producing country which had essentially neglected modernizing its sector of comparative advantage. Of course, these principles were not the last word on C.A.P., and they did not represent a zero-sum game at the expense of the Federal Republic. On the contrary, the very first principle would run into a stumbling block very early, as common prices were affected by the exchange value in which the France franc lost significantly to the Federal Republic deutschmark. Ultimately, the M.C.A.s adopted from the late 1960s converted the farm importing Federal Republic into the fourth largest exporter by way of subsidies. What began as an area of French comparative advantage in the 1950s and 1960s became from the 1970s a Federal Republic boom area — so much so that the small farm owners in that country, which were the prime beneficiaries of the M.C.A.s, resisted the reforms of C.A.P. that France had so much looked forward to. As a source of frustration in the 1980s, farm policy disagreements stalemated monetary integration. Until the MacSharry Reforms of 1991, which broke the Uruguay Round farm deadlock in 1993 through the Blair House Agreement with the United States, France literally reached a dead-end. Even the D.B.V. opposition to settlements inside Germany provided small consolation.

As with agriculture during the 1980s, E.M.U. also went through a stagnant phase at about the same time. Although the Delors Report of 1989 tried to revive the idea of monetary integration, Great Britain and Denmark opposed it from the outset. The report outlined a 3-stage evolution towards monetary union:

1. **First Stage:** Members outside the E.M.S., such as Britain and the three from the Mediterranean, would be incorporated, while the wider band of fluctuation would come to an end.

2. **Second Stage:** To further coordinate economic policies, the Committee of European Community Central Bank Governors (C.E.C.C.B.G.) would convert into the European Monetary Institute (E.M.I.), a transnational body that would transform into the European Central Bank, the core of E.M.U. which would issue and manage the common currency, since called the euro, and administer a single monetary policy on behalf of the European System of Central Banks (E.S.C.B.), paying top priority to

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82 Hendriks, *op. cit.*
price stability, remaining aloof of political interference, and becoming accountable to the European Community at large.87

**Third Stage:** Full E.M.U., projected from January 1999, and reflecting the fourfold convergence criteria for members over (a) inflation, (b) budget deficit, (c) long-term interest rates, and (d) sustaining normal fluctuation margins.

Of course, the key issue is whether all members will fulfill the convergence criteria. At present even the leading countries, France and Germany, do not. Yet, the goal still remains January 1999, although loopholes are built into the process. Great Britain and Denmark, which opposed the Delors Report and transition into the third stage, respectively, are exempted by virtue of protocols signed with the European Union. Through these protocols, Britain deferred until some time in the future when it may accept or reject E.M.U. —a protocol signed under Margaret Thatcher’s premiership by John Major, the next prime minister. In the time since, under Tony Blair’s Labor government, Britain seems to be less obstructionist and more inquisitive about what benefits E.M.U. may have.

**Trend/Outcome**

Although C.A.P. got off under strong French leadership only to find the French losing ground to the Federal Republic over the issue of M.C.A.s, E.M.U. seems to be cruising towards its own targets without as many German interests at stake. It seems likely, at the end of 1997, that E.M.U. will materialize by January 1999, but since the convergence criteria are not required of all members by then, the looser approach to monetary integration than agricultural integration may itself loosen broader integrative efforts. On the one hand, many members are ineligible to become members of E.M.U. from January 1999. On the other, 11 aspiring members given the green signal in 1997 have many hurdles to cross to become full members first, let alone joining the E.M.U. Thus, in contrast to agriculture, monetary integration may actually be disruptive. Although agricultural integration was costly and did not affect every member symmetrically, it created a sense of integration in the Community — evident in the spillover effects it released, the resolution of inherent dilemmas it entailed, in consolidating the performances of key supranational and intergovernmental institutions, and in spreading the magic of integration not only within Europe but outside the continent as well.88 That is a tall order for monetary integration to fulfill. While the requirements of monetary integration affect all

87 Ibid. ch. 3.
88 One of the earliest realist works on the outward spread of integration for West Europe is by Ernst B. Haas and Philippe C. Schmitter, “Economic and differential patterns of political integration: projections about unity in Latin America,” *International Organization* 18, no. 4, Autumn 1964.
members, unlike agriculture, fewer are likely to fulfill them all and benefit from the fruits.

**Bilateral Relationship in Outcome**


Trade Agreement of 1988, and then the North American Free Trade Agreement of 1993 with Canada and Mexico.

External Context

Two dimensions of the external context impinge upon the two policy areas — economic relations and security considerations, reflected best by multilateral rules and the Cold War context. Relevant multilateral rules for C.A.P. involve trade, for E.M.U. extant exchange rate norms. On the one hand, C.A.P. did not have any multilateral rules to follow until the Uruguay Round agreements established a few in 1993. On the other, by adopting those agreements, the European Union essentially pulled the plug on high-cost farm protection that was consuming two-thirds of all its resources, constraining, in the process, other regional policies and priorities. French farmers probably had more to lose in the short-term than their German counterparts from liberalizing C.A.P. They certainly were more vocal and hostile. What is significant, however, is the decision of the French government to multilateralize agriculture even though this would reduce French leverage over European Union matters. Another interpretation could simply by French confidence in the Franco-German special relationship: French loss of influence over agriculture was not a zero-sum outcome, indeed, it might have enhanced French credibility over issues in which it exerted lesser influence than Germany. What was reassuring over the Uruguay Round agreements from the French point of view is that, although German leaders favored farm liberalization, in public they backed France's policy of opposition unflinchingly.

Although no multilateral rules guided E.M.U. directly, the creation of a new currency, with all its implications for enhancing selective interests rather than general, did not violate any multilateral rules, indeed was consistent with extant norms and behavior. The Federal Republic had long been accepted as one of the three economic leaders from the 1970s, and its deutschmark was already one of the top three currencies. The euro is expected to substitute the deutschmark, with perhaps the significant difference of deepening the regional thrust more than the national currency deutschmark was able to. This may be significant because the euro may operate more autonomously from the dollar, thus invoking a greater competitive pressure than the deutschmark did previously in its relations with the dollar. The gap

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between the U.S. economy and the single European market would, as a consequence, only widen.

A widening economic gap between the two blocs would be commensurate with changes on the security front. With the evaporation of the Cold War, extension of N.A.T.O. to the east, and the expected reduced U.S. commitment to collective security in Europe would increase the salience of Germany on all of these fronts —as evident from the Yugoslavian civil war responses of N.A.T.O. for example. Indeed, it was a top German priority to emphasize the two arenas not included in the Treaty of Rome, a common foreign and security policy —through the European Union. The absence of a Cold War would directly influence the shape of E.M.U., since it was made the sine qua non of a common foreign and security policy, but not have any impact on C.A.P. Contrariwise, the very presence of a Cold War indirectly allowed European integration to blossom, and with it the development of C.A.P., while it seemed to have had a negligible impact over monetary integration.

State of Regional Integration Theory

How does the theory of regional integration explain the two policy areas?

One may recall the sequential phases of Balassa's regional economic integration theory, beginning with a free trade area, moving through a customs union and common market towards an economic union before establishing full economic integration. In terms of those stages, C.A.P. seems to have provided the backbone of establishing a free trade area by 1968, so that the Community could claim to be a customs union two years ahead of schedule. Since no other policy areas, if any at all, received as much attention as agriculture in the initial years, C.A.P. may be credited, for all its huge costs, of laying the foundation of West European integration. Not only that, it served as an example of both negative and positive integration, spillover, and negotiation dynamics at several levels of analysis —intergovernmental, supranational, transnational, and so forth. By contrast, the E.M.U. was not considered an engine of integration in the theory: a single currency was projected to be the primary task of the fourth and penultimate stage —at the economic union stage. Community monetary integration lives up to the theoretical articulation exceptionally well. In this sense, the theory of regional integration, as it unfolded in West Europe, parallels independently the course of the Cold War: Monetary

94 Here regional integration theory is being used as an independent variable explaining the two policy areas.
95 Bela Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration, Homewood, IL, Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1961, esp. ch. 1; and Peter Robson, op. cit.
integration was not seen as the motor of integration or possible amidst the Cold War; farm integration proved to be a more effective engine.

State of inter-regional Competitiveness

The state of inter-regional competitiveness for both C.A.P. and E.M.U. was different before the 1990s, and is expected to continue being different in the future. The nature of competitiveness for both policy areas is also quite distinctive: C.A.P. was subjected to multilateral rules from 1994, meaning greater management of competition with rival farm exporters—a situation that did not prevail before and culminating steadily in the trade wars of the 1980s, especially over grains. Multilateral rules have not to this day disciplined monetary relations involving the European Union. Instead, discipline has emerged from such gatherings as the O.E.C.D. or G-7, which involve some of the key European Union members, but not all, as well as the United States, Japan, and other non-European industrialized countries. But this was the pattern prior to Maastricht. What Maastricht did was to pave the way for replacing the deutschmark with the euro and Germany with the European Union—thus changing the nature of the monetary game in the O.E.C.D. and G-7. The collective presence of the European Union is only likely to sharpen competitiveness with the United States and the American bloc, such as N.A.F.T.A., and Japan.

State of Franco-German Relations

Both policy areas reflect a modified version of the historical fears of both countries. Two historical patterns evident are the constant French attempts to influence Germany behavior, and what seems to be inevitable failure. This was outrightly manifested with C.A.P., and to a lesser degree with monetary integration. France was more robust with agriculture because of the comparative advantage it enjoyed in that sector at the start, but constrained with monetary integration, an area not of any decisive advantage for the country. Yet, the outcomes over both still reflected France not being able to dictate its way through: With agriculture, the Federal Republic/Germany had more to gain than France over the long-haul owing to its stronger currency; and that stronger currency also permits Germany more advantages to set the rules over monetary integration than France. Most importantly, neither country can carry its own preferences in either policy area to actual policy outcomes.

Each needs the other, and it is this complementarity which is a new and significant factor in the bilateral relations since World War II.

**Conclusions**

Three disparate issues were brought together using two hypotheses inquiring if the full-fledged Cold War of the 1960s contributed to integration in West Europe, and if the easing and evaporation of that war elevated differences between France and Germany. Both arguments were examined using farm and monetary policy, respectively, and found to be valid. In turn, they support the contention that, in spite of ever-present differences, the two countries are too inter-connected to regress into the kind of hostility that drove them so often to war in the past.

A number of more specific observations were made. First, the Cold War eliminated the urgency in Franco-German relations, and thereby diluted the enmity mind-set. This was the outcome of the United States and the Soviet Union assuming away from Europeans responsibility for the continental military order —and for a time long enough for the Europeans, especially the French and Germans, to adjust to the changed condition. Second, at its high-point, during the 1950s, the Cold War kept Germany a necessary but low-profile actor, which meshed well with French interest: Among other factors, France was able to transform its own interests over agriculture into European interests in as pure a form as was possible. Third, at its low-point, during the 1970s, Germany was able to reassert itself on the basis of its strong, disciplined economic performances at a time when economic confusion prevailed elsewhere and the detente between the United States and the Soviet Union diluted European security considerations. France, never quite capable of assuming leadership, was not a serious contender for European leadership; and Germany alone was not such an option. Together, however, both supplied the minimal requirements for successive leaders of both countries energized collective hopes and dampened historical fears. Their pragmatic rapport fitted the situation well.

**Implications**

One implication is derived for each of the three issues analyzed. First, whichever theory addresses economic integration, it may be useful to assess the political or military conditions facilitating integration at the outset. In an international system without central authority, rarely do we find a group of contiguous countries where security considerations are not primary. In North America, for instance, one might hypothesize that the United States became involved in regional economic integration only when the Cold War ended. Similarly, the costs of military adventures or government led Argentina and Brazil to consider economic cooperation more
seriously. Clearly, the study indicates integrative efforts either assume security considerations or try to offset some security disadvantages. It would be interesting to evaluate the several trading blocs in the 1990s along these criteria.

Second, Franco-German relations today seem like a rendezvous with destiny, but in reverse historical order: Together, both countries are capable of sustaining stability in Europe—which would go a long way to promote integrative efforts on the continent; but outside of Europe this might trigger a form of competitiveness which could degenerate over time. Whereas competitiveness under erbfeindschaft was entirely a European affair, under engrenage it is likely to become more global than regional, with all that that implies. Whereas one foot of the bilateral relations seems rooted in the past, the other is probing a new frontier. Yet, competitiveness is potentially conflictual; harmony can not be assumed under the circumstances. What is reassuring, though, is that the ambitions of each partner are mutually offsetting—indicating a symbiosis from which it could be a lot costlier to disengage than to continue. It is only a question of how long other countries take to accept this new status quo.

Finally, the sequence of integration in other actual or potential trading blocs may not place agricultural and monetary policy in the same slots as did the European Community. According to Balassa’s theory, monetary integration serves as the penultimate stage of full economic integration by virtue of a policy-making logic: before a common currency emerges, other policy instruments need to be harmonized. Yet agriculture is not the starting point—in his theory or in the several nascent cases today. While farm policy may be a crucial sector in many countries, in the fast-moving market economy, agriculture is unlikely to serve as the engine of integration as it did in the European Community. Other more dynamic sectors may play that role, particularly now that multilateral farm trade rules are in place, unlike in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. Besides, few other trading areas, if any, are likely to have an aspiring world leader like France insisting upon its national interests becoming regional interests, thereby paving the way for agriculture to play the unique, stormy role it played in West Europe. Idiosyncratic factors and different configurations of power will most likely shape the contours of other trading bloc just as agriculture did for the European Community.
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