THE SUCCESS OF PRESIDENTIALISM? BREAKING GRIDLOCK IN PRESIDENTIAL REGIMES
The Success of Presidentialism? Breaking Gridlock in Presidential Regimes

Pilar Domingo y Scott Morgenstern

NÚMERO 73
Introduction

Despite the pessimistic forecast of the advocates of parliamentarism, in the last fifteen years Latin American democracies have shown that presidential regimes can sustain themselves and even progress towards consolidation. This paper asks what the pessimists neglected from their analyses. In particular, we ask how various presidential regimes have generally avoided one particular problem—the possibility or even probability of gridlock—that Linz and others discuss.

The approach we take to this problem is founded on the debate on presidentialism versus parliamentarism. Whilst this debate has done little by way of convincing Latin American democracies to move towards parliamentary forms of government, it has prompted more systematic research on the institutional aspects which determine how presidentialism works. Our efforts are squarely within this scheme as we look at institutional mechanisms and incentives that act on the legislators and executives that work against gridlock. While we agree that systems which divide the executive and legislature can end in gridlock, we argue that in spite of divided government throughout most of Latin America, gridlock is exceptional. Our argument is that 

1. Executives and legislators actively seek to avoid gridlock to protect their own interests and 
2. That the countries' democratic founders built into their constitutions various tools which (generally) the executives can employ to avoid this type of problem.

The paper is divided into three sections. The first examines briefly the state of the literature on the debate between parliamentarism and presidentialism. The debate centres predominantly on institutional-constitutional factors which define the workings of presidential and parliamentary forms of government. The first section will also, however, point out those conditions beyond the institutional make-up of a regime which will either hamper or be conducive to democratic successes.

The second section addresses the recent evidence for success and failure of presidential democracies, drawing from the experience of divided government in Latin America in the last wave of democratisation. The third section then examines those incentives and institutional mechanisms by which gridlock is either dealt with, overcome, or circumvented. Here the paper also draws on the US presidential experience, which has been much neglected in the comparative studies of Latin American presidential systems.

The Problem

Perhaps the main problem of presidentialism identified in the literature is that of gridlock in the relationship between the executive and the legislative. Much of this discussion is based on one notable case where the executive's lack of majority
support in the legislature resulted in regime breakdown: Chile in 1973. However, if we examine the recent history of Latin American presidentialism, and the more longer term case of the US, it appears that divided government, whilst frequent, more often than not can avoid regime breakdown. Table 1 shows comparatively those countries in Latin America and the United States which currently have divided and united governments in terms of the congressional party make-up, (taking into consideration also those examples of majority control of congress where coalition politics operates).

| Table 1 |
| Current Divided Control in South America and the United States |
|---------|------------------|
| Argentina | Scarce Majority |
| Bolivia | Divided (Coalition Government) |
| Brazil | Divided |
| Chile | Divided (Opposition Senate) |
| Colombia | Unified |
| Ecuador | Divided |
| Paraguay | Divided |
| Peru | Unified |
| Uruguay | Divided |
| United States | Divided |
| Venezuela | Divided |

In the recent history of Latin America, the only instance of actual regime breakdown has been Perú in 1992. In large part we can attribute this breakdown to divided government in that Fujimori closed the congress having failed to overcome executive-legislative conflict. In effect, divided government has been the motive of other serious institutional crises (Brazil under Collor de Mello, Bolivia under Siles Suazo, Guatemala under Serrano, Ecuador under Bucaram, and the government shutdown in the US under Clinton), but regime breakdown did not occur, and in fact constitutional solutions were sought to resolve critical situations. Given the relative frequency of divided government, it is pertinent to examine the critique of presidentialism more closely in terms of the perils of gridlock. However, it is important to stress that there is a wide chasm between policy gridlock in divided government and regime breakdown. It is precisely this grey area of how gridlock within presidentialism is dealt with that interests us.
The critics of presidentialism in the debate on presidentialism versus parliamentarism have clearly had a more visible impact on the theoretical and academic analysis of the new democracies than on practical decisions of constitutional design. Other than the constitutional plebiscite in Brazil in 1993 where the option of changing to a parliamentary system was put to the popular vote, no other Latin American regime has recently seriously contemplated the possibility of adopting a parliamentary mode. Nonetheless, the forceful critique of presidentialism made by a group of keen academic advocates of parliamentarism has had an impact on the academic institutional analysis of contemporary Latin American presidencies, and in a tangential way may have affected some constitutional choices.1

The critics of presidentialism find strong support for their position in the discouraging history of past failed attempts to build sustainable democracy in Latin America, (Linz, 1994 and Stepan and Skach, 1993). This track record certainly merits some attention.2 A first step is to establish the defining characteristics which distinguish presidentialism from parliamentarism, although bearing in mind the great variety of both regime types. Our interest here is predominantly with those problems which contribute to gridlocking situations in presidential systems.

Presidentialism is defined essentially by two features. Firstly, the president, head of the executive, is elected by direct vote or by an electoral college which generally can only respect the electoral preference. Secondly, the presidential and congressional term is fixed: neither may dissolve or issue a vote of no confidence regarding the other. By contrast, in a parliamentary system, the head of government is elected by parliament. His or her mandate is subject to a vote of confidence which can be withdrawn. Equally, the head of government can dissolve the legislature, and call elections. Within both families, the institutional variation is significant as is the nature of the relationship between the executive and the legislative quite diverse.3 However, it is from these distinguishing institutional features that various conclusions have been drawn regarding the viability of presidentialism. Specifically regarding the perils of gridlock are the following.

Firstly, the principle of separation of powers, and specifically, the independent election of the executive and legislative raises the problem of dual legitimacy, or in the terms of (Stepan and Skach, 1993: 4-5), mutual inter-organic independence. Both

1Linz was invited in an advisory capacity to Bolivia to suggest possible institutional reforms before the constitutional reform of 1994. Others have had impact on electoral rules such as Lijphart in South Africa or Shugart in Argentina and Easter Europe - although the latter is not a critic of presidentialism.

2(Shugart and Carey, 1992; and Shugart and Mainwaring, 1997) on the other hand compare the track records of presidentialism and parliamentarism on a longer historical and geographic scale, with the result that the difference is significantly reduced.

3Clearly, Britain's two-party majoritarian system bears little resemblance to the coalition politics of such parliamentary systems as the Netherlands or Belgium.
the president and the legislature derive their legitimacy and mandate independently from one another, and do not need the vote of confidence of the other. Thus, the relationship between both bodies is inherently not one of cooperation. Especially when the executive does not hold majority support in congress (that is, in situations of classic divided government), the relationship is potentially highly conflictive and can seriously imperil governability. According to the detractors of presidentialism, it is this structural danger of gridlock that causes ungovernability, prompts political polarization and eventual regime breakdown. By contrast, parliamentarism helps resolve the problem by creating: a) a unified legitimacy of the head of government and the legislature, and b) a relationship based on a mutual vote of confidence. This creates structural incentives for cooperation and consensus. In the context of multipartism, it forces coalition formation, hence consensus building, thereby avoiding polarization. Moreover, when gridlock does arise, parliamentarism resolves the crisis institutionally, through either a vote of no confidence or by dissolving parliament, thus averting regime breakdown.

This leads us to the second problem identified with presidentialism, namely, the perils of rigidity resulting from fixed terms of executive and legislative. An unpopular president, or one with minority support in congress, cannot be removed from power without resorting to exceptional means. This implies a lack of regime flexibility which may be necessary to overcome moments of political or economic crisis. Past democratic breakdowns in Latin America have in part been a consequence of this. Presidentialism only offers impeachment as the institutional mechanism by which an unpopular president can be removed. By contrast, parliamentarism allows for the necessary changes to be made in the executive through the vote of no confidence. According to the pro-parliamentarists, the greater flexibility of parliamentarism will guard against regime breakdown, at the cost of governmental instability. But under presidentialism, the cost of executive stability may lead to the more perilous situation of regime crisis.

A third problem identified by (Linz, 1994: 55-58) is the zero-sum, winner takes all, nature of presidentialism. In a presidential election the stakes are high, and the victor faces few institutional incentives to share the winnings of executive office. In a situation of minority support in congress, this feature limits the possibility of coalition politics and consensus building, thus heightening the polarizing tendencies of presidentialism and aggravating the problem of gridlock. These are the main causal

---

4 The impasse in the Allende government in Chile, the Fujimori coup in Peru or Siles Suazo in Bolivia are examples of where the problem of gridlock can lead. In the later case, however, it is important to stress that regime breakdown was averted.

5 Recent examples are Collor de Mello in Brazil, Andrés Pérez in Venezuela and Nixon in the United States. In Ecuador the congress resorted to a constitutionally questionable vote to remove the president due to mental incapacity. These cases all occurred under divided government.
explanations behind the problem of gridlock in contexts of divided government put forward by the critics of presidentialism.\(^6\)

In response to these claims, the critics of this enthusiasm for parliamentary solutions present arguments mostly to the effect that the presidentialism versus parliamentarism debate requires more detailed analysis of the institutional aspects that determine the functioning and survival possibilities of both systems. In the first place, their position does not necessarily imply the defense of presidentialism as a better option, so that the debate does not only consist of assessing the merits of one system of government over the other (Sartori, 1994; Lipset, 1990). Rather, the critique often centers on the perils of placing too many expectations on parliamentarism, and questions some of the institutional arguments on which the pro-parliamentary position is based (Mainwaring, Shugart and Carey in numerous papers).

From a purely institutional perspective, detractors of the pro-parliamentary position have made the point that the dichotomy of presidentialism versus parliamentarism is more complex and requires more careful analysis of the variety of institutional arrangements which ultimately determine how presidentialism works in practice (Shugart and Carey 1992; Mainwaring and Shugart, 1993; and 1997; Morgenstern 1996; Jones 1996). They claim that although some of the weaknesses identified hold true, these can be mitigated by very specific institutional mechanisms. And moreover, presidentialism may in fact have certain advantages over parliamentarism.\(^7\)

A first point that is made is that how presidentialism works will be strongly determined by the electoral system, the nature of the party system, (in terms of the number of parties, and party structures and internal dynamics), by the timing of electoral cycles and also by the system for the election of the president.\(^8\) For instance, a parliamentary system with majoritarian electoral rules, as in Britain, reproduces many of the vices that are identified with presidentialism. In many ways a British general election provides a winner-take-all situation, as a result of the party structures and electoral system. The problem then is perhaps more a question of how to limit the negative effects of zero-sum games.\(^9\)

\(^6\)Added evils of presidentialism which are put forward are the tendency towards over-personalization of power in the figure of the president, especially where political parties are weak (Linz, 1994: 62-64). Unclear, however, is how parliamentarism per se provides the necessary conditions for the strengthening of political parties. Nor is it evident, in the event of changing from presidentialism to parliamentarism, that the necessary strong party systems would emerge in the Latin American context, where they do not exist. Moreover, over personalization is a characteristic of modern politics through the mass media, and its impact on parliamentary systems is by no means negligible (Sartori, 1994: 114).

\(^7\)See Shugart and Carey, 1992; Mainwaring and Shugart 1993; Mainwaring, 1990; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997.

\(^8\)See Mainwaring and Shugart 1993; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997b; Shugart, 1995.

\(^9\)Horowitz, 1990 suggests that the critiques of presidentialism are based on assumptions that have more to do with the electoral regime than with the presidential versus parliamentary dichotomy.
This has led to a discussion of the differing institutional arrangements across presidential systems. (Shugart and Carey, 1992) and others, for example, focus on the differences in electoral systems (in terms of the varieties of proportional representation, open versus closed list systems, regionally versus nationally rooted parties, and the personal vote generally). Additionally, how the executive is elected will greatly impact the nature of the relationship between the executive and the legislature, and how incentives for cooperation or consensus politics may emerge. Recent Latin American experiences with the second round majority run off method have had fairly negative results in terms of regime stability, as they can produce executive branches with very weak legislative support. Examples of this are the Fujimori coup in 1992, the failed attempted self coup in Guatemala in 1993, or the crisis of Coller de Mello in Brazil. The Bolivian system, by contrast, in which the congress elects the president, has produced successful coalition governments since 1985. The point here is that the method of presidential election will largely affect the type of relationship that can develop between the executive and the legislature, and the types of incentive structures that can deter gridlocking patterns.

There are further determining institutional factors which define how presidentialism will operate. How the power of congress and executive are defined and operate both in formal terms and in practice affects the process of government, and executive-legislative relations. Such powers include the nature and scope of presidential veto and decree powers, the executive's capacity to initiate legislation (and control the legislative agenda with urgency provisions); and the executive's role in drawing up the budget (Shugart and Carey 1992; Mainwaring and Shugart, 1993, 1997; Morgenstern 1996). In addition, the degree of federalism or centralized government will determine levels of concentration of power (Linz, 1994; Lujambio 1995). (The second section of the paper discusses in more detail the implications of some of these institutional specificities for avoiding gridlock.)

With regard to the rigidity of the fixed mandate, it may be that a fixed term in office grants the system the sufficient stability to carry out a policy agenda. The recent economic adjustment measures in much of Latin America, which were socially costly and politically delicate, arguably required an unremovable executive. Under conditions of economic austerity, parliamentarism because of its excessive flexibility,
may have been subjected to such plebiscitary pressures that would have made economic reform more difficult to pass (Whitehead, 1988). Thus, the fixed mandate may indeed be an asset of presidentialism. Immediate re-election, moreover, may provide institutional mechanisms by which to increase incentives for good government and consensus seeking behavior on behalf of the executive (Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997), thus overcoming immobilism.

Finally, the winner takes all aspect of presidentialism is mitigated by the principle of separation of powers and checks and balances. Separation of powers, moreover, may have the added advantage that legislators exhibit a more independent judgement on matters of legislation, (Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997; and Przeworski, 1995). Moreover, increasingly judiciaries are playing a more prominent role in constitutional politics throughout the region (Stotzky, 1993; and Domingo, 1994). As the political relevance of this third branch increases and the positive aspect of separation of powers is strengthened, it may come to act as the third balancing power which mitigates regime threatening gridlock situations, and deters further crisis deterioration.\(^{12}\)

\textit{b) Non-institutional factors}

So far we have examined the institutional explanations of how presidentialism might fail or succeed in achieving regime consolidation. The reality is that several years into democratic government, with very few exceptions, the experience of presidential democracy in Latin America has been generally successful. These modest successes (modest in terms of the still unresolved problems of contemporary Latin American democracies) are taking place within a presidential context, and in some cases using the same constitutional design prior to previous regime breakdowns. There is then a strong case for arguing that the previous breakdowns of presidential rule might not necessarily have been prevented by the presence of parliamentary forms of government. For this argument it is necessary to point to those non-institutional conditions which currently favor democracy building, (be it presidential or parliamentary).

In past (and failed) democratic experiences in Latin America it is important to stress that regime breakdown in many cases reflected societal cleavages and levels of political polarization which arguably were beyond resolution within a democratic

\(^{12}\)The role of the Brazilian and Venezuelan supreme court was crucial in the impeachment of Collor de Mello and Carlos Andres Perez, respectively. Nicaragua provides another interesting example. The legislature passed a series of constitutional reforms that the president refused to publish. The courts ruled in favor of the legislature, obliging the executive to publish the amendments. They added that if the president failed to do so, the legislature could publish them themselves.
The success of presidential institution of any kind. The ideological polarization of the 1960s, the effect of the Cuban Revolution and the general cold war context invited the possibility for, not merely institutional or policy gridlock, but conflict between regime alternatives. Currently, there is greater homogeneity regarding the desirability of liberal democratic forms of government around common economic models, which allows for the following conditions conducive to democratic stability.

Firstly, in global terms, the crisis of the left, and the fall of the Soviet block paved the way for a process of political moderation, the end of polarized political options and a rapprochement between the forces of the left and the centre right, (although at least for now, clearly in favour of the latter).

Secondly, the military authoritarian experiences left traumatic levels at various levels of society, and within the current political and economic elites of the dangers of future democratic breakdowns. Those sectors which in the past had supported the military coups as a temporary measure to put an end to economic and political crises learnt along the way that the military regimes presented different problems, and in many cases, obstacles to the developmental possibilities of these countries. (Chile is perhaps an exception in some senses).

Thirdly, the success of presidential democracy, linked to the above, also has to do with the reality of a “changed” political right, which now, and specifically in the context of liberal economic policies, shows a stronger commitment to democratic forms than in the past. The support of the right, and the economic and political groups that are represented by it, is essential for the survival of democracy, be it presidential or parliamentary. (In the case of Spain, for instance, the right needed to feel represented for the democratic process to be successful.) In addition, the international economic trends push for credible and reliable democratic institutions.

Fourthly, US support for democratic rule has changed considerably, both at the level of the US public and in the political discourse. Now, more consistently than in the past, the United States embraces democratic progress and human rights policies. This is complemented by a global international pressure which promotes democracy. No less important is the recognition by such institutions as the World Bank and the IDB that economic growth without democracy and socially perceived benefits is unlikely. This is clear from the millions of dollars spent on the reform and improvement of democratic institutions.

The significance of these factors cannot be over-stressed, and moreover, they provide a conducive setting for gridlock situations to be avoided. The costs of allowing gridlock to seriously threaten regime viability are now much higher than

---

13The critics of presidentialism posit that parliamentarism could have averted, for instance, the Chilean crisis of 1973. However, parliamentarism did not prevent the Spanish Civil War in 1936, or the breakdown of the Weimar Republic in Germany.

14Here it is perhaps important to stress that this support of the right is strongly contingent on the current hegemonic economic model. In the event of emerging alternatives to the current economic order it is possible to envisage the withdrawal of the rights in its support for democratic rule.
they were in the context of the 1960s and 70s. Current conditions and international pressures provide indirect yet powerful incentives for the political actors to cooperate and avoid regime crises that can lead to breakdown, whether parliamentary or presidential.

II Experiences with Divided Government

To what degree have the divided governments succeeded or failed? There is no short answer to this question since there are examples of both dramatic failures as well as relative successes under divided, as well as unified, control of governments. And moreover, we can fully attribute neither the successes nor the failures to divided government. But, a review of the correlation (again, there is not a necessary causal relation) between divided government on the one hand and economic growth and democratic stability on the other does provide a useful framework from which to judge the criticisms of presidential democracy and, as we do in the following section, explain why gridlock has not been as serious a problem as these critics predict.

Our main concern is the relation between divided government and democratic survival, but it is also worthwhile to briefly consider economic performance as economics are so often tied to democratic viability. The primary conclusion we can draw here is that there is apparently no relation between economic growth or stagnation and divided or unified government. The worst recent economic situation in the US occurred under unified control in the 1970s and we had strong growth under divided control in much of the 1980s; in Venezuela’s divided government saw poor economic growth from 1979-1984, but the previous (1969-1974) and following (1989 to present) divided governments have been at least as successful as the last unified governments; and similarly, the divided government that continues to rule in Brazil ended hyperinflation and returned the country to economic growth. Perhaps, though, the most interesting example comes from Argentina. After the 1989 elections but before his term had officially expired, Alfonsin resigned. Menem then came to office facing an opposition controlled congress. During this short lapse he formulated and put into practice his economic program which ended the hyperinflation and led to several years of impressive economic growth (Chart 1). Moreover, Menem would have likely faced even greater opposition to his plan if his party, whose membership largely opposed neo-liberal economics, had been installed in congress.

In terms of democratic stability, we must first consider the most famous example of the failure of divided government: Chile in the 1970s. President Allende was elected with just 36 percent of the vote and was supported by approximately the same percentage in the congress. In spite of this limited support, he tried to impose radical economic and social changes. The congress, logically, opposed his efforts. Moreover, when the social tension grew, neither Allende or the congress could deal with the problems since each blocked the other's initiatives. In this sense divided government very much was at fault for the resultant 17 years of dictatorial rule.
recently, divided government led to the “self-coup” in Peru. When Fujimori tired battling what he called an obstructionist congress, he simply closed their doors.

*Chart 1*

**Argentina Economic Growth**
(Constant Prices)

![Graph showing economic growth in Argentina](image)

On the positive side, we must consider all the countries whose democracies have survived divided control. As noted above, there are very few cases of unified control in the Americas and, with the exception of Peru, all have held several successive presidential elections since the mid-1980s. The table shows how long each of the South American countries have lived under democratically elected governments (Table 2). Only Peru’s three year old regime has avoided at least one period where the president was from a different party than the majority of each house of the legislature.

In terms of policy, gridlock has been more an exception than a rule. In Brazil, in spite of the president’s very limited partisan support in the legislature which have impeded some important reform efforts, Cardoso has had tremendous policy success. Not only did the congress approve his major economic reform (the Real Plan), it recently approved a reform allowing Cardoso to run for a second term of office. In Argentina, Alfonsin and, as noted, Menem implemented great economic changes while they lacked control of at least one house of the congress. Others have instituted significant reforms to their social security systems, central bank policy, and even the constitutions. The case of Mexico at the state level is interesting as well. While the PRI lost its national control of government for the first time in 1997, at the state level divided government has been common in the 1990s. Divided rule in these states, however, “has not produced constitutional crises nor permanent paralysis” (Lujambio, p. 14).
Table 2
Current Democratic Rule in South America

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Years Democratic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina*</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia**</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Alfonsin resigned a few months before the end of his term in 1989
**Siles Suazo resigned one year early in 1985

The most interesting cases of actual gridlock come from the United States. When Reagan, who wanted to increase defense spending at the expense of social programs, clashed with the Democrats who wanted the opposite, the result was a deal instead of gridlock. We are still paying the consequences of this budget-busting deal, but this example shows that two directly opposed parties will not necessarily lock heads. In 1995 Clinton and the Republicans did close the government over differences in budget priorities. The result of this conflict, however, shows that gridlock is not necessarily such a problematic outcome. The military, the regulators, and much of the rest of the bureaucracy continued their functions; only “non-essential services”, such as national parks, were closed. Moreover, as explained below, this angered constituents and as a result, the two sides have subsequently come to agreements.

Outside of the United States some of the divided democracies have been challenged by coup attempts (Venezuela) or strong politically motivated protests (Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil), but with the exception of Peru, the military has not recently disrupted the electoral calendars. We have seen too presidents resign before the end of their terms, and if we include the United States, three presidents have been impeached and one removed for his “emotional state” (Ecuador). These cases, however, show the durability of democratic presidential regimes. In spite of strong social and constitutional challenges, these countries did not succumb to a new wave of military rule, but instead, found ways to maintain themselves within a democratic framework.

Siles Suazo in Bolivia in 1985 and Alfonsin, after the 1989 elections but before the official date on which he should have left office.
III Road-Clearing Mechanisms

While we do not deny that gridlock has been a serious problem at times in some countries, the previous section shows that divided government has, at least recently, yielded only one democratic breakdown. Moreover, while gridlock has contributed to breakdown in some historical cases, there are many examples where gridlock has been accepted, overcome or avoided —instead of leading to military alternatives. That is, in some cases divided governments have accepted the status quo (appeasing Madison), while in others the government branches have either come to terms with one another or one branch has found ways to pass their policy programs in spite of opposition from the other branch. This section addressed the latter two outcomes. Here we detail numerous powers and incentives that have enabled presidents and legislators to either overcome or avoid serious inter-branch conflicts.

Our primary argument is that presidents and legislatures rely on common interests plus three types of powers to avoid or deal with gridlock: constitutional (formal), statutory or delegated, and informal. The importance of each factor is a function the reason for the inter-branch disagreement (which determines interests) and the players’ capabilities.

Why do executives and legislatures sometimes fail to reach agreements? There are two short answers: they either disagree on ideological grounds or they see political advantages in stopping the other’s initiatives. Where they disagree on substance, the two sides can try to evade each other, or they must try to influence, cajole, buy-off, evade, or compromise with the other side. To some extent they employ the same strategies when political considerations (apart from substantive interest) tell one side to veto the other’s initiatives. Under these situations, however, offers of pork or negotiated settlements may be much less effective since the legislators may see even greater access to the feeding trough if they can position themselves or their party to win the presidency in the near future. Thus, analyses of actual or potential gridlock situations must first consider the players’ incentives to work for or against gridlock. Then we must add an analysis of the various formal and informal tools that help the two sides achieve 1) deal with gridlock and 2) avoid the opposing branch.

A. Interests in Cooperation

A very common assumption in political science is that legislators are driven by reelection or other career goals. Others argue that at least some legislators are also interested in policy, though all recognize that legislators must be reelected to pursue their other goals. In the post-dictatorship era we described earlier, it seems unquestionable that many legislators are also interested in democratic legitimacy or sustainability (without which they could not maintain their jobs). While it is obvious
that policy interests should foster inter-branch cooperation, how do the other interests (reelection seeking and democratic sustainability) affect gridlock?

Reelection goals pull on legislators in two directions. In the first place, they incite legislators to highlight differences with the incumbent president, at least if they are members of an opposing party. The electoral cycle heightens this affect. As elections draw near, each side will likely become more critical of the other, stressing even minor differences in order to sell the voters on a distinctive image.

Reelection seeking may also work in favor of inter-branch cooperation, since "out parties" may see a need to portray themselves as a viable alternative. Surely "out parties" will continue to criticize the president, but constructive criticism and deal-making in which each side can claim some victories may be preferred to an obstructionist image that gridlock might foster, even by policy disinterested single-minded office seekers.

Though the US budget of 1995 did end in gridlock, this exception reinforces the logic. The Congressional Republicans and the Clinton White House were at odds over budget cutting measures. Both called for balanced budgets, but Clinton felt that the Republicans cuts were too drastic and the Republicans who had offered campaign promises of balanced budgets were unwilling to negotiate. When no agreement was reached, as noted above, the non-essential government services were stopped. The public was outraged and after a few weeks, the Republicans largely gave in to Clinton's demands. The Republicans were clearly interested in both policy and reelection. Gridlock hurt them in both ways; not only did they fail to win large concessions from Clinton, with the fall in public opinion towards the obstructionists, the Republicans legislators hurt their reelection chances (though they did still win in 1996). As a result the Republicans have apparently learned that accords are a much better political strategy than gridlock.

The other incentive that works towards inter-branch cooperation is an interest in democratic legitimacy and stability. Democracy requires at least minimal consensus and cooperation to ensure the survival of institutions and the rules of the game. Largely as the result of long periods of horrible dictatorial rule (or experience with democracy as in the United States), political actors have come to appreciate the need for acceding to at least this level of cooperation. One way in which this recognition has manifested itself is in pacts and delegation of power from the legislature to the executive.

Pacts

Pact formation and coalition politics reflect and support interests of parties in presidential systems to cooperate with one another. Pacts come in two primary flavors: foundational pacts (often quite formal) which survive over time, and coalition politics or short-term legislative pacts designed precisely to overcome specific gridlock situations.
Perhaps the best two examples of the former are the National Front formed in Colombia in 1958, and Venezuela’s Pacto de Punto Fijo of 1958. In Colombia, gridlock in the 1950s had manifested itself in tremendous violence. As a result, two main parties agreed to share power for the next sixteen years. Interestingly, it created the potential for even greater gridlock, requiring approval of two-thirds of the legislature for any policy changes. The pact, however, helped generate cooperation instead of conflict. In Venezuela, the 1958 pact has been frequently invoked to improve inter-branch relations in that country (and it has been attempted on inter-country relations). For many years after the pact was signed, the opposition participated in the cabinet and all legislatures, even those where a majority were not of the president’s party, have delegated emergency powers to the president (Crisp, forthcoming).

In other cases, parties have formed coalitions very similar to those found in parliamentary systems. In Uruguay, for example, the parties have often negotiated in the name of “governability.” Currently, for example, the Colorados and the Blancos, who combine to hold two-thirds of the legislative seats, are in a coalition against the leftist Frente Amplio. The Colorados, who hold the presidency, gain since they have a reliable partner in passing their policies and the Blancos gain ministerial posts and policy influence. In Chile, pre-electoral coalitions are formed to ensure electoral success, and these last for the duration of presidential mandates. In Bolivia, since 1985, and after the fiasco under Siles Suazo where the country was immersed in political and economic crisis, the lesson has been that the executive needs to negotiate durable, post-electoral majority coalitions to ensure stable government (perhaps the most similar case to parliamentary coalition politics). Three successive stable coalition governments indicates that the parties in Bolivia see their interests best served by cooperative practices, and gridlock is avoided.

Finally short-term or ad-hoc legislative pacts are also frequent. Brazil, especially under Cardoso, provides a clear example. The relationship between the Brazilian Congress and their executive is highly complex due to the unstable and undisciplined parties, but legislative pacts have ensured governability and effective political decision making—even constitutional reform. It might be argued that this is not too dissimilar to US legislative politics.

The dynamics of pact-making and coalition formation are intimately linked to the structure of electoral and party systems. How these interact and operate will create different kinds of incentive structures for parties to seek coalition-building or cooperative accords which will mitigate executive-legislative conflict (Shugart and Carey, 1992).

Though the pact ended the violence, it has been criticized on many grounds. Archer (1997) for example, explains that the pact led to a decreased capacity of the state to deal with serious problems. Achieving a constitutional reform which allows presidential re-election was no minor accomplishment for the current president.
Delegated Budgetary Power (Contingency Funds)

Presidents and legislatures also want to avoid gridlock and bottlenecks by providing presidents with contingency funds. While we have information on only three countries, Mexico, Brazil, and the US, it is likely that most, if not all presidents have such accounts.

To explain contingency funds we will use two polar cases from the democratic spectrum: the US and Mexico. In the latter, the budget gives the president a large contingency fund which is largely hidden from public view. Much of these funds go for salary adjustments and debt relief. Some are truly used for emergencies, such as drought, and a final part of these funds has been heavily criticized as it likely goes to serve presidential political ends. Though this last use has little to do with the need to speed up the legislative process, the other two uses do serve this purpose. It is important to note that the president and legislature include these funds in the budget in spite of the Mexican president's loyal support in the legislature which assures passage of his policies.

In the US, the president also controls a disaster emergency fund. This allows him to direct money due to natural or human disasters. The US president also has a more interesting, if not controversial, type of contingency funds. In early 1995 Mexico desperately needed a financial bailout and Clinton pledged to help. The legislature, however, was ill-inclined to support loans fearing that Mexico would default. Legislatures were also wary of voter responses to what they called "a Wall Street bailout, not a Main Street bailout." When Clinton realized he could not pass the credits through the legislature, he accessed $20 billion from a currency stabilization fund, in addition to arranging $17.8 in credits from the IMF and another $10 billion in credits from the Bank for International Settlements (CQ Almanac 1995, 10-17). This obviously upset some members of congress who tried to repeal the loans. Others, however, quietly applauded the president's action since they secretly approved of the plan and were able to avoid the vote.

The contingency funds in both countries, as well as the US president's stabilization funds, are ultimately subject to legislative control. If the legislatures did not approve of their use, they could, at least in the case of the US, pass laws to rescind the payments. They could also refuse to include these funds in future budgets. They continue to allow these funds, we believe, since they recognize the (at least occasional) need for swift presidential action.

---

18Rep. Duncan Hunter, cited in Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1995, 10-16. Hunter was referring to the argument about how the credits would largely serve the US financial institutions to which Mexico was heavily indebted.

19In fact, there were several attempts to recall the loans to Mexico.
Delegated Decree Power

Incentives also lead legislators to delegate lawmaking power to their presidents, effectively avoiding difficult passage in their own branch. Delegation is common in all presidential systems. In the U.S. the legislators delegated negotiating power to the president for NAFTA (only retaining for themselves a final up or down vote), they routinely allow the bureaucracy significant latitude in administrative decisions (executive orders), and the president is allowed significant wiggle room in most foreign affairs. In Latin America delegation generally comes in the name of “decree laws”. Carey and Shugart (forthcoming) describe two basic forms of decrees: constitutional and delegated. The former type we will discuss below when we discuss formal gridlock-breaking powers. Delegated decree powers, fit squarely in the camp of gridlock evasion due to interests in legitimacy and democratic stability.

Generally without specifying among the types of decree powers, O'Donnell (1994) and others criticize decree powers for their centralization of power. Where decrees powers are delegated by the legislature, however, there are more virtues than vices. Delegation of power implies that the principal (in this case the legislature) does retain the right to oversee the agent’s (here the president’s) actions. In addition, they reflect the legislature’s recognition of a problem that requires a quick, executive decision. If the legislature were uninterested in keeping the democracy running smoothly, they would have no reason to delegate powers. Certainly policy interested legislators would prefer to make their own decisions and reelection seekers should generally refrain from giving the president extra powers. Presidential decrees may help the legislators avoid blame for unpopular decisions, but is this credible when the legislators authorize the use of the power and retain oversight guarantees?

Many constitutions explicitly allow the president some lawmaking powers, at least for a limited time and with legislative oversight. There are multiple examples of legislators who, within their constitutional authority and apparently in recognition of the necessity to avoid gridlock or bottlenecks, endow the president with such powers. A first example comes from Uruguay where legislatures routinely allow (through an article in the budget bill) presidents to alter inflation indices throughout the year. With inflation ranging about 50 percent a year, this power effectively allows the president to control the budget. Other countries have allowed even wider decree powers. Following the return to democracy, Argentina faced tremendous challenges, both political and economic. The legislature was ill-suited to take the quick and decisive action that the voters (and the legislators) saw as necessary. Some also

20 Menem’s use of decrees have been among the most strongly questioned. In addition to passing economic emergency laws, he has used decree powers to circumvent the legislature on many basic issues as well. (In one infamous case he passed an emergency decree to allow more soccer coverage on television.) Moreover, there is little oversight for these actions as the courts decided that decrees had the same standing as laws and thus required a new law, subject to a presidential veto, to overturn them.

21 See de Riz and Feldman (1991) who discuss the consensus on policy decisions at the time.
argue that if the legislature were to become involved in the economic debates, the element of surprise so important to stabilization programs would be lost. As a result, the Congress passed an enabling act allowing President Alfonsin to decree his stabilization plans.

Bolivia, Peru, Nicaragua, and Venezuela provide further examples. The Bolivian constitution gives the president the authority to declare a "state of siege" that augments his powers, but this declaration requires congressional consent, expires after 90 days unless there is a war, and cannot be renewed within the year without congressional approval (article 111). Similarly, the new Peruvian constitution allows the legislature to modify or repeal these decrees without subjecting the changes to a presidential veto (Schmidt, forthcoming), and the Nicaraguan constitution allows the president the power to declare a "state of emergency" but only for a "determined time period". The Nicaraguan constitution also stipulates that a law will regulate these periods (article 185). Apparently, the Venezuelan legislature has also realized the need for executive policy-making and thereby granted the necessary tools to the president. For example, the legislature gave Pérez the power to enact wide-ranging reform in response to the huge new oil revenues in the early 1970s (Geddes 1991). Similarly, Betancourt was given powers to confront economic problems in the early 1960s and Luschine was given such powers to deal with the economic crisis of the mid-1980s (Crisp, forthcoming). These presidents are not exceptions. In fact, Venezuelan presidents have used "extraordinary" powers almost incessantly since democratic rule was installed in 1958.

Our purpose in describing these cases is not to enter into the debate that O'Donnell started about whether decree powers alter the degree of democracy. Instead we argue that delegative decree powers reflect legislators' recognition of the need to resolve political crises and in so doing, reflect their interests in avoiding gridlock (or at least bottlenecks) and maintaining democratic stability.

B. Formal and Informal Road Clearing Tools

In addition to the incentives that help resolve gridlock situations, presidents and legislators have numerous formal and informal tools to help them clear the legislative path. Linz's original argument was based on a stylized view of presidential systems in which presidents and legislatures were equally powerful. Shugart and Carey then showed that presidential systems are quite varied; some afford much more power to one or the other branch. These imbalances imply that gridlock can be overcome.

In some cases the congress has the upper hand. For example, if the Colombian legislators were truly fed-up with their relation with the president, they could change the constitution relatively easily without, it should be emphasized,
presidential intervention. In Venezuela the Congress does not have to worry about gridlock, since the legislature can override a veto with a simple majority vote. In other words, the Venezuelan legislature could govern without the president (and thereby the threat of gridlock) if it so desired.

In other cases, however, it is the president who is able to find either formal institutional or less formal ways to overcome congressional obstacles. This subsection will consider some of these presidential tools or what some might consider weapons. The formal weapons include urgency provisions, budgetary powers, and to an extent, constitutional (if not delegated) decree powers. Informally presidents pressure legislators through their management of resources (including attractive posts for ex-legislators) and generating public pressures.

Urgency Provisions

While executives are (supposedly) decisive, legislatures are deliberative bodies. As a result, in addition to formal gridlock where one branch of government explicitly rejects the proposals of the other, presidential initiatives are often caught in bottlenecks. Sometimes these bottlenecks are truly the result of time consuming legislative deliberations coupled with a limited capacity to deal the numerous demands made by the executive, the public, political parties, and interest groups. Other times the bottlenecks are strategic; legislators may find it in their interest to tie up bills in committee instead of making explicit pronouncements. In response to this problem, many constitutions include “urgency provisions” that force, or at least pressure, the legislatures to deal with presidential requests.

Urgency provisions come in two basic types (Table 3). In some countries the urgency provision is simply an agenda-setting tool. For example, in Brazil, the legislature must deal with bills the president deems urgent within 45 days or they take precedence over every other legislative matter. In Colombia it is even more stringent as there is no waiting period, all urgent bills immediately take precedence over other legislation. Though these measures do not force the legislature to approve executive requests (ending gridlock), they effectively eliminate the bottleneck.

The stronger type of urgency provision also fails to necessarily end a stalemate, but it puts additional pressure on the legislature. In Chile and Uruguay if the executive declares a bill urgent, the legislature must make a pronouncement within a specified (short) time period; if it fails to do so, the bill becomes law. This

---

23 The Colombian Constitution requires a 50 percent vote by two successive legislatures to change the document. It should also be noted that most other constitutions do not require executive input into constitutional change, but most require super-majorities and possibly approval by states for reform.

24 The Chilean constitution is a bit vague here. Though article 71 requires congressional action within 30 days, there is no explanation of what happens if the congress fails to act. Article 49 states that if the president asks for urgent treatment of a matter, then the senate must act within 30 days or its assent is
is also true in Ecuador, but unlike the former two countries the Ecuadorian legislature can pass a bill which is not subject to a veto to rescind such legislation.

Table 3
Urgency Provisions: Mexico and South America

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>None</th>
<th>Agenda setting only</th>
<th>Bill becomes Law without Congressional Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Chile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Ecuador*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Paraguay**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td></td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The legislature can overturn these laws without subjecting their decision to a presidential veto
**The legislature can overturn these laws with a vote of 2/3.

Source: Morgenstern, 1996

Decree Powers

Earlier we discussed decree powers as a delegation of powers from the legislature. Many presidents are also endowed with constitutional decree powers which help them avoid a potentially obstructionist legislature (Carey and Shugart, forthcoming). Like delegated decree powers, constitutional decree powers come in many varieties; some constitutions grant presidents wide lawmaking powers while others limit the time that a decree will be in effect or the thematic areas in which the president can legislate. For example, the Brazilian constitution allows decree powers for only 30 days and the Peruvian constitution prohibits the president from emitting emergency decrees that pertain to taxes. In addition, as noted above, some constitutions include mechanisms by which the legislature can repeal executive decrees. Though many complain of their abuse, presidents in most of Latin America (and arguably the US as well) have used some type of decree powers to avoid legislative bottlenecks or gridlock.

Perhaps the best example of a constitutional decree power comes from Argentina. Until the constitutional reform of 1995, decrees were not mentioned in their constitution. Since they were not forbidden, Alfonsin and in particular Menem, however, made great use of decree powers, both with and without explicit consent of the legislature. When the legislature challenged what they considered Menem’s abuse assumed. Since article 49 does not discuss the lower house, and article 71 does not express a reversion point, there is at least room to argue about the fate of urgent bills.
Domingo and Morgenstern: The success of presidentialism?

This power the courts sided with the president. They ruled that if the legislature wanted to repeal a decree they would have to pass a law and subject it to a possible presidential veto. Brazilian legislatures have had similar problems in limiting presidential decrees. Though the constitution puts time limits on their effectiveness, several presidents have taken advantage of a loophole. The constitution does not discuss the reissuance of decrees and therefore presidents have instructed their staff to routinely issue decrees as they expire (Power, forthcoming).

Budget Powers

The budget is largely an omnibus policy statement affecting policies crucial to all parties and branches of government. As a result, it is a highly contentious issue and therefore a likely area to generate gridlock. In fact, budget fights have led to a civil war in Chile and, as noted, in the US, the non-essential government services were shutdown for several weeks in 1995. These major fights, however, are an exception, due to constitutional rules and the omnibus nature of budget bills.

Unlike the US, most Latin American constitutions allow the presidents more budgetary weight than the legislature (Morgenstern 1996) (Table 4). They do so in two ways. First, only the Argentine and Mexican constitutions do not severely circumscribe the legislatures' ability to modify the executive budget. Under most other Latin American constitutions the congress can only reduce executive proposals, and Peru and Chile explicitly prohibit any legislative initiative that increases expenses. Colombia and Ecuador offer examples of slightly less stringent provisions. In the first the legislature can only increase the budget with the consent of the executive, and in the other, the congress can only increase expenses if it also identifies a funding source.

Second, about one-half of the Latin American constitutions put important limits on legislative debate (Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay). If the legislatures in these countries do not pass the budget on time, then the president's budget becomes law in four of these seven countries (and the law is vague for Ecuador and Mexico).

As with the case of the urgency laws, the budget provisions do not necessarily end gridlock. Even under these provisions, as happened in the United States in 1995, the legislature could approve a budget that the president finds unsatisfactory and we would be left with an inter-branch showdown. These provisions, however, do limit legislative maneuvers and prevent them from proposing budget-busting provisions that the president cannot accept. It is much less likely that the legislature would approve a budget that is too low for presidential approval (McCubbins 1991).

---

25 See papers by Baldez and Carey (1996), Heller (1996), and Jones (1996) for more detail on budgeting in Latin America.

26 We discuss this case in the section about incentives.
possible that a budget-conscious legislature (or one angry at the president) could drastically cut the president's favorite program. The nature of the budget bill, however, allows the president to battle back. By offering the legislature increases in their preferred programs, he should be able to win support for his programs as well. McCubbins (1991) provides an interesting example. In the early 1980s Reagan wanted to increase defense spending at the expense of social programs. The Democratic Congress wanted the reverse. The result was not gridlock, but a (budget-busting) compromise to increase both programs and pay for it with debt. This is a critical case since it pits the two branches directly against one another. As a result, it suggests that budget compromises are more likely that budget gridlock.

Control of Public Resources

At least for some countries, even more important to avoiding gridlock than specific decree, urgency, budget, or veto powers is the president's (formal or informal) control over patronage resources. If the president can control candidate nominations, dole out bureaucratic jobs, or distribute public resources to the districts of key members of congress, he will often be able to buy the support he needs.

---

27 This is true to some degree for any legislation, but omnibus bills facilitate the deal-making. In omnibus bills both sides can guarantee that the other cooperates in the deal. As game theory teaches, if the bills are voted on sequentially, there should be more concerns about defection. It should also be noted that some legislatures have to be very wary of deals they cut with presidents due to the latter's partial veto powers. If they make a deal to increase resources for a program that the president cannot eliminate there is little problem. But if they try to create a new program to which the president is opposed, they are at risk.
Amorin Neto and Santos (1997) discuss this issue for Brazil during their democratic period of 1946-1964. Their primary finding is that “patronage was the basic currency for political transactions” (pp 7-8). Like Ames 1987 who argues about the importance of particularistic resources in Brazilian congressional elections, Amorin Neto and Santos argue that politicians are more interested in reelection than ideology or national policy. As a result, control of patronage resources determines voting patterns in the legislature.

In some cases actors other than or in addition to the president, such as governors (Samuels 1997), local bosses or caciques, or labor leaders control these type of resources and therefore they are important to executive-legislative relations. We know of no country, however, where the president is unable to grease the legislative wheels where necessary. The degree to which this is an effective tool is an unanswered empirical question, but our belief is that it plays a tremendous role in determining the success of many presidential initiatives.

Access to state resources provides, in fact, a powerful incentive for opposition parties to seek cooperation with the president. The post-electoral coalition politics of Bolivia, whilst certainly linked to the electoral system for the presidency, nonetheless has much to do with retaining access to state patronage. In fact this may explain why the post-electoral coalitions in Bolivia, which since 1985 have lasted for almost the entire presidential term, have been so enduring.28

Public Pressure

A final informal tool for breaking gridlock is fomenting public pressure or what Kernell (1986) calls in his analysis of U.S. presidential politics “going public”. Presidents have a privileged place in the media to which even leaders of congress can seldom accede. Kernell explains that U.S. presidents have been quite successful using or manipulating public opinion to support their causes. This analysis could surely be applied to the Latin American presidents who constantly resort to mass media tactics to muster public support for their initiatives.

Presidents (or legislatures) can also go public via plebiscitary instruments. Two cases of constitutional reform through plebiscites stand out. In 1991 the Colombian president called for and received plebiscitary approval of a constitutional convention and reform, though the constitution clearly gives the Congress sole rights to constitutional revisions. The second example comes from Brazil in the 1960s. Goulart had taken office under a new constitution that limited his powers significantly. In an effort to restore some of his office’s prerogatives, he mobilized

28 It is in this sense that the Bolivian presidential system is not all that hybrid. To the extent that it has a parliamentary mode this is momentary and only for the election in congress of the president. Beyond this moment, successful coalition politics which avoids gridlock is the result of informal incentives, such as access to state patronage.
parts of the army and public opinion. He even threatened to close the congress if they failed to approve his reforms, which they finally did. It must be noted here that although Goulart did successfully use public opinion to force through his policy initiative, the costs were very high as the mobilized public was one contributing factor to the downfall of democracy in 1964.29

In addition to these extraordinary plebiscites, Uruguay, for example incorporated the referendum in the Constitution of 1967 as part of the normal recourse to political decisions. On several occasions, the referendum has been resorted to to decide politically delicate or difficult decisions. The most notable case was perhaps the referendum on how to deal with the human rights violations under military rule. More recently, the referendum was used for their recent (1996) constitutional reform.

**Conclusion**

The recent Latin American and much longer term US experience suggests that presidentialism in all its varieties may be capable of providing solutions to the problem of gridlock. This paper suggests that there is no single institutional design that works best for presidentialism. Rather it is the case that for each country setting, taking into consideration a variety of institutional and non-institutional factors, different mechanisms help prevent gridlock in the relationship between congress and executive. This is not intended as a defense of presidentialism, but rather as an attempt to offer some explanation regarding the relative success of recent presidential experiences.

Given a particular international context, currently conducive to democratic advancement, it would appear that gridlocking situations are actively avoided by the political actors of presidential systems. Gridlock can be avoided either through cooperative means (i.e. compromise or delegation of power), or through institutions which allow gridlock to be circumvented altogether. Regarding the former, cooperation is the result of both institutional arrangements and non-institutional incentive structures which push actors in contexts of divided government to work together. And regarding the latter, there are institutional means by which executives in presidential systems can override or evade the congress. This is arguably a “democratic” trade-off, but in balancing the two sides of the trade-off, we must consider the survival of democracy. Moreover, given that it is very unlikely that the

---

29The 1993 plebiscite was accorded in 1988 as a popular decision mechanism to decide the nature of the Brazilian political system, but it was above all an extraordinary foundational mechanism to legitimize the transition process. The 1988 Constitution does provide for the mechanisms of referendum, plebiscite and popular initiative as more routine mechanisms of public decision-making, however, these have not yet been regulated by normal legislation, nor have they been used. Moreover, the constitution is unclear as to the distinction between the three mechanisms.
Latin American countries will move towards parliamentary forms of government, the point is to strengthen the viability and durability of presidentialism with a view to democratic consolidation.

The paper does not aim to justify the problems of “delegative democracy”, but rather to understand more fully those institutional and non-institutional mechanisms by which presidential democracy can be made to work. Moreover, the object has not been to identify specific institutional mechanisms which ensure presidential stability, but to highlight that different combinations of institutional mechanisms in different country settings can yield governable presidential democracy. A suggested future research agenda is a systematic and formalized examination of these institutional combinations.

The challenge for presidential democracies in the long term lies firstly, in the internalization of minimum levels of cooperation among political actors such that they become the only alternative in dealing with gridlock or critical moments which naturally will beset any democratic process; and secondly, in the effective implementation of those institutions which limit the perils of gridlock and facilitate the government and policy-making process. What we may be witnessing currently in Latin America is precisely the routinization of both processes which are necessary for the survival of presidential democracy.
Domingo and Morgenstern: The success of presidentialism?

Bibliography


Baldez, Lisa A. and John M. Carey, unpib. “Pinochet’s Constitution and Executive Agenda Control, Budgetmaking in Chile”.

CQ Almanac. 1995, “Clinton Leads Mexico Bailout Effort”.


Domingo and Morgenstern: The success of presidentialism?


Lujambio, Alonso. 1995, Federalismo y Congreso en el Cambio Politico de México. México, UNAM.


Power, Timothy. forthcoming, “The Pen is Mightier than the Congress: Presidential Decree Power in Brazil”. In Carey, John and Matthew Shugart. Calling in the Tanks or Filling out the Forms: Decree Authority in Presidential Democracies. Cambridge University Press.


Power, Timothy. forthcoming, “The Pen is Mightier than the Congress: Presidential Decree Power in Brazil”. In Carey, John and Matthew Shugart. Calling in the Tanks or Filling out the Forms: Decree Authority in Presidential Democracies. Cambridge University Press.

Power, Timothy. forthcoming, “The Pen is Mightier than the Congress: Presidential Decree Power in Brazil”. In Carey, John and Matthew Shugart. Calling in the Tanks or Filling out the Forms: Decree Authority in Presidential Democracies. Cambridge University Press.


Documentos de trabajo de reciente aparición

División de Administración Pública

Mariscal, Judith. *Telecommunications Reform in Mexico: An Institutional Perspective*. AP-103

Cabrero Mendoza, Enrique. *La acción pública en municipios urbanos. Una Propuesta de marco teórico*. AP-104


Nava-Campos Gabriela. *Fiscal Implications of Mexico’s 1994 Banking Crisis and Bailout*. AP-109

Baltazar Macías, Atzimba y Juan Pablo, Guerrero Amparan. *La reforma municipal en Tlaxcala*. AP-110

Baltazar Macías, Atzimba y Juan Pablo, Guerrero Amparan. *La reforma municipal en Oaxaca*. AP-111

División de Economía


Ramírez, José Carlos y Rogelio, Sandoval. *Patrones no lineales en los rendimientos de las acciones de la BMV: una prueba basada en cadenas de Markov de segundo orden*. E-227

Brito, Dagobert L. y Juan, Rosellón. *A General Equilibrium Model of Pricing Natural Gas in Mexico*. E-228

Ramírez, José y Juan, Rosellón. *Pricing Natural Gas Distribution in Mexico*. E-229

Brito, Dagobert L. y Juan, Rosellón. *A Solar Power Project in Mexico for the California Electricity Market*. E-230

Cordourier, Gabriela y Gómez-Galvarriato, Aurora. *La evolución de la participación laboral de las mujeres en la industria en México: una visión de largo plazo*. E-231


División de Estudios Internacionales

Borja Tamayo, Arturo. Materiales para la docencia: el marco conceptual básico de la disciplina de las Relaciones Internacionales. EI-78.

Trubowitz, Peter. Structure and Choice in Foreign Policy Analysis. EI-79.

Trubowitz, Peter. The Bush Administration and Future of Transatlantic Relations. EI-80.

Schiavon, Jorge A. Sobre contagios y remedios: la heterodoxia económica del New Deal, la política exterior corrección de Roosevelt y su impacto sobre la administración cardenista. EI-81.

Jones, Adam. The Russian Press in the Post Soviet Era: A Case-Study of Izvestia. EI-82

Jones, Adam. Genocide and Humanitarian Intervention: Incorporating the Gender Variable. EI-83

Minushkin, Susan y Charles W. Parker III. Government - Financial Sector Relations and the New Financial Structure in Mexico. EI-84


Velasco, Jesús. Caminando por la historia intelectual de Seymour Martin Lipset. EI-86

Chabat, Jorge. The Combat of Drug Trafficking in Mexico under Salinas: The Limits of Tolerance. EI-87

Chabat, Jorge. Mexico's War on Drugs: No Margin for Maneuver. EI-88

Schiavon, Jorge A. International Relations and Comparative Politics: Cooperation or Conflict?. EI-89

División de Estudios Políticos

Negretto, Gabriel. Does the President Govern Alone? Legislative Decree Authority and Institutional Design in Brazil and Argentina. EP-133.


Colomer, Josep M. Reflexiones sobre la reforma política en México. EP-141

Negretto, Gabriel. Diseño constitucional y separación de poderes en América Latina. EP-142

Negretto, Gabriel y Josep, Colomer. Governance with Divided Powers, EP-143

Bataillon, Gilles, Guerra y Asamblea. EP-144