THE NATIONAL ACTION PARTY’S (PAN) ORGANIZATION LIFE AND STRATEGIC DECISIONS
Las colecciones de Documentos de Trabajo del CIDE representan un medio para difundir los avances de la labor de investigación, y para permitir que los autores reciban comentarios antes de su publicación definitiva. Se agradecerá que los comentarios se hagan llegar directamente al (los) autor(es).

D.R. © 1997, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, A. C., carretera México-Toluca 3655 (km. 16.5), Lomas de Santa Fe, 01210 México, D. F., tel. 727-9800, fax: 292-1304 y 570-4277. Producción a cargo del (los) autor(es), por lo que tanto el contenido como el estilo y la redacción son responsabilidad exclusiva suya.

NÚMERO 59

Jean-François Prud’homme
THE NATIONAL ACTION PARTY’S (PAN) ORGANIZATION LIFE AND STRATEGIC DECISIONS
During the entire Salinas administration, the National Action Party (PAN) was characterized by the application of a strategy of limited cooperation with the government. In the first chapter I specified that opposition parties' strategies are rarely pure forms of confrontation or cooperation. In fact, they are mixed strategies in which the predominant factor is sometimes cooperation and at other times confrontation. In the case of the National Action Party during the Salinas administration, strategic change was associated with negotiation of the rules of competition and legislative collaboration on important public policy topics. The change was a matter of degree of cooperation. However, I want to emphasize the limited quality of this cooperation, which allowed the National Action Party to condition it on the results obtained.

In the electoral arena, this strategy consisted of negotiation and approval of three reforms proposed by the Executive Branch. In terms of legislative activity in general, limited cooperation could be observed in the PAN's approval of some of the most important constitutional reforms of that administration. In both cases, the PAN's cooperation was conditioned on the later behavior of the government with reference to electoral activity and political performance. The PAN's strategy between 1988 and 1994 can be defined as successful in that this party was able to substantially increase the number of votes it obtained at the national level and achieve important positions in state and local elections without losing its autonomy.

Many observers of Mexican political life explain this unusual legislative collaboration between the oldest member of the Mexican opposition, and the PRI government during the Salinas administration, by the confluence of long-term political demands made by the PAN and the government's neoliberal agenda. According to this explanation, the Salinas administration carried out many of the proposals included in the PAN's political program; in exchange for this and certain elected offices, the PAN supported the PRI during crucial political moments for the government.

Programmatic affinities certainly facilitated collaboration between these two long-time adversaries. It is also the case of the new situation of competitiveness in the party system: PRI did not have the required two-thirds majority in the Congress to carry constitutional reforms necessary for the implementation of the government agenda. Moreover, the appearance of a new and impressive electoral force in 1988, neo-Cardenism, was displacing PAN from its second place in the party system.

1 In the last section of this chapter, I describe the areas of legislative collaboration between the PAN and the government.
Programmatic affinities and the new competitive environment within the party system played an important role in the consolidation of new relations between the PRI and the PAN. In fact, they were necessary conditions. If the PRI did not need the support of another major political formation to have its legislative projects approved, it would have been less interested in PAN's cooperation. If the PRI's legislative projects were at odds with PAN's traditional demands, it would have been difficult for the PAN to vote with the government. However, these conditions are not sufficient to explain the PAN's strategy of limited cooperation with the government. Being an independent opposition party in a hegemonic party system, the level of institutionalization and organizational characteristics of the PAN are also important aspects to be taken into account. Both elements allowed the PAN to make the limited cooperation strategy a successful one in a political environment which was favorable to the party. The high level of institutionalization of this organization and the characteristics of this process made it easier to minimize the risks of internal divisions and cooptation by the government, risks that the type of strategy chosen often entails. In addition, the extension of geographic influence by the PAN's organizational structure and its redirection towards voter mobilization allowed the party to obtain the electoral benefits of limited cooperation.

This chapter explores the effects of the PAN's organizational characteristics on the design of its strategy for negotiation of the rules of political competition. It is divided into three parts. The first considers the institutional context in which the PAN arose and the organization's genetic model. The second examines the link between the search for internal balance within the party's leadership and the characteristics of its institutionalization process. The third links the genetic model, the institutionalization process and the development of external strategies during the Salinas administration.

The Institutional Context and the Genetic Model

The PAN's genetic model and its initial insertion into the national political system promoted the gradual development of a highly institutionalized, autonomous organization with operational rules accepted by the party's principal political figures. Originally, three elements contributed to the explanation of this institutional development. First, as occurred with its principal opponents, the PAN appeared within the context of a presidential election. However, the PAN's first presidential candidate only ran for office twelve years after the party was founded, avoiding in this way the concentration of party power in a single political figure. This factor and the virtual nonexistence of access to

---

3 As mentioned in Chapter II, cooptation by the Mexican government has constituted a permanent feature of its relationship with the opposition. The awareness of this risk is so acute in some opposition forces that they equate dialogue with the authorities with cooptation. As will be shown in the next chapter, this discourse has predominated in the other opposition party, the PRD, during a large part of the Salinas administration. In relation to the use of cooptation by the Mexican government, see José Luis Reyna, “Control político y desarrollo en México”, Cuadernos del CES, México, El Colegio de México, 1974.
elective legislative positions shaped the organization of the PAN. The reward structure, following these constraints, favored initiatives developed within the party more than those originating outside of it, thus allowing the consolidation of a solid organizational culture. Finally, the incipient political organization was constructed on a doctrine that, on the one hand, took on a regulating function in relation to its internal life and, on the other, established its temporal horizon for action in the long term.

The PAN was born in a Constitutional Assembly which took place on September 14 and 15, 1939, during the beginning of President Cárdenas' successor's electoral campaign. Manuel Gómez Morín, the party's founder, brought together three groups: activists from the National Union of Catholic Students (UNEC), who participated in the fight against anti-clerical groups in the university during the nineteen thirties, some professionals and intellectuals who knew Gómez Morín in their student days, and leaders from the entrepreneurial and financial world. Due to the experience, prestige and intellectual ability of its first leaders, the National Action Party manifested features characteristic of parties of notables.

Gómez Morín is an important factor in helping us to understand the confluence of groups that initially converge within the PAN. His own experience embraced all the factions found in the new party. Born in 1897, and a member of the post-revolutionary student elite, he had been the author of the reconstruction of the Mexican financial and fiscal system in the twenties. Then, he had been successively, an important figure in the dissident electoral campaign by Vasconcelos in 1929, the president of the National Autonomous University of Mexico during the struggle to preserve university autonomy and an advisor to a number of financial and entrepreneurial groups during the thirties. Gómez Morín always claimed to be a product of the Mexican Revolution.

PAN was created in 1939 for very explicit reasons: it represented a reaction to the socializing direction of Cárdenas' governmental policies. The agrarian policy of land distribution and collectivization in the countryside, education policy as formulated in the amendments to Article 3 of the Constitution, and governmental control of union activity and obligatory membership in the official party — the Party of the Mexican Revolution — were reasons for the creation of the PAN.

4 Donald Mabry, Mexico's Acción Nacional: A Catholic Alternative to Revolution, Syracuse, N.Y., Syracuse University Press, 1974, pp. 34-35. The first two chapters of Mabry's book constitute the best analysis published to date about the birth of the PAN.

5 On Gómez Morín's life, see the excellent work by Enrique Krauze, Caudillos culturales en la Revolución Mexicana, Mexico, Siglo XXI Editores, 1976, and Carlos Castillo Peraza (ed.), Manuel Gómez Morín, constructor de instituciones, Mexico, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1994. Also, the long interviews done by James W. Wilkie and Edna Monzón de Wilkie: Mexico visto en el siglo XX: entrevistas con Manuel Gómez Morín, Mexico, Editorial Jus, 1978, present a good portrait of Gómez Morín. On the other hand, the study on the professional origin of the PAN's first National Council and National Executive Committee clearly shows its nature as a party of notables: in both organs, over half the members are lawyers, doctors or bankers, and almost all belong to liberal professions. Mabry, 35.

The National Action Party’s (PAN) Organizational Life and Strategic Decisions

(PRM)—were the object of specific criticism by the PAN’s founders. This explains in part why Mexican official political historiography defined the PAN as a reactionary, conservative and Catholic party.

However, behind specific criticisms of certain governmental initiatives, a deeper disagreement existed concerning the direction taken by the post-revolutionary regime. Faced with the policy of mass mobilization followed by the Cárdenas government, the PAN’s founders proposed a policy of citizen participation. For Gómez Morín, the consolidation of the achievements of the Revolution necessitated the application of technical solutions to the country’s problems and the development of Mexican’s civic awareness.

What was at stake, in the words of Gómez Morín himself, was the “revision of the entire political problem in Mexico”.

The idea of creating a political party to carry out this revision was not new. When, in 1928, Vasconcelos told Gómez Morín of his intention to run in the presidential elections of 1929, the latter insisted that to “create a democratic life in Mexico, durable organization and permanent work (must be done) by groups that can acquire sufficient strength to impose themselves on the corrupt political environment and the falsehood to the call (to democracy) itself”.

Later, when in October of 1929, just before the election,

7 A good synthesis of the PAN’s criticism of cardenism can be found in Gómez Morín’s “El informe a la Nación”, dated February 28, 1940. The text is a response to a speech made by Lázaro Cárdenas on February 20, 1940 in Chilpancingo. See Castillo Peraza, Manuel Gómez Morín, pp. 143-154.

8 In a recent commentary Soledad Loaeza emphasizes how, from an officialist perspective, a negative and mythical image of the National Action Party has gradually been created, which does not correspond to reality. Soledad Loaeza, “Acción Nacional, ese desconocido”, Nexos, núm. 219, March, 1996, pp. 49-51.

9 Actually, beginning in the mid-twenties, Gómez Morín centered his criticism of the post-revolutionary regime on these concepts: technique and civic awareness. In his famous essay, 1915, published in 1927, he proclaims his faith in technique, defined as knowledge of reality and of means for action. See Castillo Peraza, Manuel Gómez Morín, pp. 59-60. Also during this period, Gómez Morín justified his support of Vasconcelos’ presidential candidacy based on the need to eliminate military dictators (“barbaric” dictators) and “begin the struggle for the civic preparation of Mexico” Wilkie and Monzón de Wilkie, p. 27). His later denunciation of Cárdenas’ political actions, which he evaluated as a reversal in the revolutionary process, was based on these two factors. On the other hand, although it is true that the conflict between the Catholic Church and the State during the Cárdenas administration weighed heavily on the anti-governmental attitude of the new party’s founders, it should be noted that the UNEC, from which the majority of the Catholic activists in the party came, openly declared its commitment to the Mexican Revolution (Mabry, p. 24).

10 Wilkie and Monzón de Wilkie, p. 55.

11 In a letter addressed to Vasconcelos on November 3, 1928, from which this quote is taken, Gómez Morín clearly defined his position against providential spontaneity defended by Vasconcelos and discussed the role an opposition party should play in Mexico. This letter is reproduced in Castillo Peraza, Manuel Gómez Morín, pp. 126-131. Actually, the need to create firmer political parties was an important topic of discussion during the second half of the twenties in Mexico. See Jean Meyer, Enrique Krauze and Cayetano Reyes.
it became clear that, even if Vasconcelos won, he would not be able to occupy the presidency, Gómez Morín tried to dissuade him from heading an insurrectional movement, and advocated instead, the organization of a party which could “take charge of the future”.

It is worth setting out the arguments Gómez Morín used against the political voluntarism recommended by Vasconcelos: first, political work is a task that requires the habits and procedures of professional politicians; second, political activity needs to be organized collectively, selectively and in a lasting manner in order to achieve growing efficacy and importance; third, in authoritarian contexts, the requisite for efficiency in the opposition’s activities increases; fourth, in case of victory, a group organized around common convictions, not based on one man or a spontaneous movement motivated by negative values, constitutes a better guarantee of an efficient, responsible and democratic government.

In his conception of public activity and the role of parties, Gómez Morín was consistent with his diagnosis of the national “political problem”. For him, organized political group -the party- constituted the best instrument to provide technical (realistic and efficient) solutions to the country’s problems and to strengthen Mexicans’ civic awareness. Such an efficient political organization was by definition selective and relied on members who shared the same convictions. Its strength as part of the opposition, and eventually as a governing party, resided in the continuity and consistency of its political action. Constant effort to convince public opinion constituted its principal weapon. Democratic consultation of, and responsibility to the voters were fundamental for convincing the public. The model of political action against which this party organization was built was that of strong men and spontaneous and ephemeral popular movements.

In his response to Vasconcelos, Gómez Morín argued that even when, as in the case of the anticarranzista movement of 1920, the leader was strong, surrounded by brave men and supported by a broad popular mobilization, the possibilities of falling into irresponsible and discontinuous political action were high. The argument had two elements: one was based on democratic values and the other on the means towards efficient public action. One can imagine that the outcome of the Vasconcelos campaign confirmed Gómez Morín’s convictions with regards to the preferred method for political action. It is also understandable that the decision to create a political party was made during Cárdenas’ administration, a president whose political style expressed many features against which Gómez Morín, years before, had developed his conception of a political organization.

12 Quote taken from El proconsulado by José Vasconcelos reproduced in Krauze, pp. 278-279.
14 Questioned about cardenism, popular mobilization, agrarian distribution and labor strikes, Gómez Morín indicated the source of his opposition to a style of doing politics: “JW: Well, in the concept of Cárdenas it appears he wanted to give the people benefits immediately, without waiting a single minute! MGM: No! He had a primary conception that he who has authority can
Why does the party appear during the transition from the Cárdenas government to the next administration? This requires consideration of two factors: the first has to do with structural characteristics of presidentialist regimes, while the second is related to this specific moment in Mexican history.

In his criticism of presidentialist regimes, Juan Linz states that the existence of elections at established dates (a fixed mandate) introduces rigidity into the political life of presidentialism: the duration of the presidential mandate becomes an important factor, to which all actors must adjust their political assessments. In addition, the quality of zero sum game that the election acquires increases the value of what is at stake, given that the winner takes all for the entire time the presidential mandate lasts. The Mexican presidential regime is no exception to the rule: national presidential elections acquire a visibility which elections that occur during a presidential term do not have. Thus, political forces that want wide dissemination of their programmatic ideas and influence over the definition of the national political agenda during the next administration, have a strong incentive to participate in the presidential campaign.

In the case of Mexico, there is another factor which plays a role, although only partially, in the appearance of the National Action Party. In her study of the PRD, Bruhn defines an empirical approximation ("rules of thumb") for understanding the appearance of political opposition in a hegemonic party regime such as that of Mexico. According to her, in post-revolutionary Mexico, the opposition had its roots in the division of the governmental elite. Presidential elections are particularly favorable periods for the expression of these divisions and, tend to promote the use of elections to manifest opposition to the government: it is the moment when the monopoly of political power is most vulnerable. Division in the governmental elite creates space for opposition activities within the institutional framework; in addition, in these circumstances, citizens are called to partially arbitrate the conflict between the elites, the end result of which is to feed the fire.

Bruhn's model for approximation works well for understanding the appearance of opposition forces which arise directly from splinter-groups that break off from the revolutionary elite, the actual origin of most of the electoral opposition forces in post-revolutionary Mexico. Although, the National Action Party was not born from a split within the governing elite, part of Bruhn's argument can be applied to this case: the division between the governing elites in relation to the succession to President Cárdenas created a structural opportunity which the PAN's founders took advantage of to embark


\[16\] Linz, p. 19.

\[17\] Kathleen Bruhn, pp. 58-68.
on institutional political activity. This leads us to the historically contingent factors linked
to the birth of the party.

Daniel Cosío Villegas analyzes the circumstances surrounding the succession of
President Cárdenas: the climate of social and political mobilization in 1939, the numerous
voices in Mexican society calling for an end to the government’s socializing measures, the
simulation of internal competition to designate the PRM candidate and the enthusiastic
support that General Juan Andrew Almazán’s independent and opposition candidacy
received indicated that, more than a presidential election, what was at stake was the
direction that the post-revolutionary regime would take in the future. The time was
right for a political group opposed to cardenism to try to influence the definition of the
next government’s political agenda. The PAN’s founders took advantage of this situation.

The structure of the presidential competition itself made it necessary to enter a
candidate in the race in order to obtain the most benefits. This was a problem which the
National Action Party recognized from the start. In the National Convention of
September 1939, two tendencies faced off: that of the National Organizing Committee
which proposed electoral abstention and that of the participationists who supported
Almazán’s independent candidacy. Both positions were discussed in depth: González
Luna, one of the party’s principal ideologues, defended the National Organizing
Committee’s position, using the metaphor, “Salvation Technique”, which consisted of
“subordinating the episode to destiny” while the participationists argued in favor of a
conditioned electoral participation. In an 89 to 40 vote, the participationists won
although support for Almazán was more rhetorical than real.

Years later, Gómez Morín explained the PAN’s verbal support of Almazán as an
act that allowed the organization to distinguish itself from what would have been a mere
pressure group and establish itself from the beginning as a true political party. But at the
same time, this support initiated a pattern of political behavior that would repeat itself in
1946: playing at presidential politics in order to obtain benefits from identification with an

---

18 Daniel Cosío Villegas, *La sucesión presidencial*, Mexico, Cuadernos de Joaquín Mortiz,
1975, pp. 45-90.
20 Franz A. von Sauer, *The Alienated Loyal Opposition*, Albuquerque, N.M., University of
New Mexico Press, 1974, p. 102.
21 In an interview with Wilkie and Monzón de Wilkie during the mid-sixties, Gómez
Morín explained the initial support of the “caudillo” Almazán as an act of political pragmatism:
...the National Action Party entered at Almazán’s side, but in a highly conditioned manner.
He was simply the other, the only possible opposition candidate. We said: the official candidate has
been proposed as has General Almazán against him. The opposition will not be divided. Many
proposed that the Party not make a decision at this time about the candidate; but then it would not
have been a party; it would have been born as another academy, as a center for political and social
studies; something that was not what we wanted. We considered the creation of an acting political
party essential. This “...” requires that from the first you must be ready to participate in the struggle,
with punches or hugs; but in contact with the rest of the political forces.” Wilkie and Monzón de
Wilkie, p. 57.
individual without having to pay the costs of a charismatic leadership which tends to monopolize power within an organization.\(^{22}\)

Thus, for the 1946 election, in a political episode which at the very least was unusual, González Luna proposed, without consulting the interested individual (who was not a member of the party), the presidential candidacy of a historical figure of the Revolution, Luis Cabrera. The proposal was approved by the National Convention (115 votes in favor, 13 against) but after a few months during which party leaders tried to convince him to accept, Luis Cabrera declined the proposal: the PAN did not support or propose a candidate for the presidential elections of 1946.\(^{23}\)

In its first twelve years of existence the PAN did not have a presidential candidate from the party's own ranks: it participated in presidential elections and submitted presidential candidacies for internal discussion but did not involve the organization's energies in the support of a single person. If in the short term the episodes of conditioned support of Almazán and the failed attempt to launch Cabrera's campaign could be interpreted as political errors, in the long run not having directed the new party structure towards supporting a single person contributed to the consolidation of the PAN as an institutionalized organization.\(^{24}\) This considerably lessened the incentives for personalized control of the institution in view of obtaining the country's presidency: in other words, it reduced the possibilities that the organization follow a charismatic consolidation model.

However, "imitating the process" through formal discussion of a hypothetical candidacy or of those far removed from the organization allowed the party to maintain its insertion in the country's institutional life. After all, as Gómez Morín insisted repeatedly, the ideal means of political action is the political party organized around people who share principles and are willing to act in a lasting manner to reach their goals. Also, according to the conception held by the PAN's founder, a political party had to face its adversaries in the electoral struggle to distinguish itself from "academic clubs" (or pressure groups). This is where part of the PAN's "institutional debt" lies: one of its \textit{raisons d'être} resides in the existence of elections with features such as those in México. It had to participate in elections to transmit its political message and to disseminate the civic spirit that would contribute to making the country's inhabitants into citizens. This had the effect of

\(^{22}\) Here I make use of Panebianco's idea that parties with a charismatic leadership find it difficult to institutionalize themselves as an organization (Panebianco, pp. 134-137).

\(^{23}\) Calderón Vega, pp. 219-232.

\(^{24}\) In a presidentialist system, as in Mexico, the dynamics of the presidential election tend to deposit the power and actions of party members in a single individual: the party candidate. After the competition, this individual tends to concentrate an important part of the power within the organization, with diverse results, depending on the organization in question. The \textit{PRI} solved the problem with the adoption of the no re-election clause. The topic is discussed in Benito Nacif-Hernández, pp. 44-56. Many opposition parties that were born around presidential candidates did not survive the election (the Revolutionary Party for National Unification, the Mexican Democratic Party, the Federation of Parties of the Mexican People). Likewise, the \textit{PRD} experienced strong tensions provoked by the existence of a charismatic power and the demands for institutionalization of the organization, as will be shown in the next chapter.
consolidating a institutionalized organization, but one that was not directed at winning the country’s presidency.

The context in which the PAN’s participation in legislative and local elections took place beginning in 1943, also contributes to an explanation of the party’s level of institutionalization. In effect, in this period the possibilities of winning seats in the Congress were almost nonexistent. Political representation was based on the “winner take all” plurality formula. Electoral formulas which allow a minority opposition to obtain representation in the houses, such as party deputies, proportional representation or first minority, did not yet exist.\(^{25}\) Control of the elections was in the hands of the government, and this added to the difficulties for access to elected positions created by the plurality representation system.

The first time the party participated in a legislative election, in 1943, the PAN nominated candidates for deputy in 21 districts out of the 147 that existed at the national level, in 1946 it put forward 64 candidates, and in 1949 it named 69.\(^{26}\) However, the results were poor. The PAN did not win a single seat in 1943, and only four in 1946 and again in 1949. In the 1946 election, the party denounced irregularities committed in the elections to the Electoral College, and in vain claimed victories in 27 districts.\(^{27}\) Many of the defeated political figures in the PAN unsuccessfully challenged the results: Gómez Morín, González Luna, Molina Font, Chapela y Blanco, Herrera y Lasso.\(^{28}\)

The fact that electoral arrangements made winning electoral positions difficult meant that until the inauguration of the party deputy system in 1964 the PAN did not have a strong parliamentary wing: until this date it never won more than six seats in the legislature.\(^{29}\)

In addition, very few of its great political figures obtained seats as deputies. The outcome of this situation was to prevent the development of the classic dualism between the parliamentary wing and party leadership, that affects the power balances within political parties. Instead, the particularities of the new party’s institutional context, characterized among other things by non-competitive elections and subsequent difficulty in forming a numerically substantial opposition parliamentary group, meant that the best elements of the National Action Party tried to rise to leadership positions within the party itself.

\(^{25}\) The “party deputy” formula, introduced in the 1963 electoral reform, assigned up to 20 seats in Congress to minority parties that obtained at least 2.5% of the votes, distributed in the following manner: 5 seats for reaching the 2.5% threshold and then, one seat for each 0.5% additional votes until twenty deputies were obtained. The “first minority” formula was introduced in 1994 for senatorial elections: in each state, the winning party elected two senators and the first minority party, one senator.

\(^{26}\) Von Sauer, p. 103.

\(^{27}\) Ibid., p. 109.

\(^{28}\) Calderón, pp. 209-232.

\(^{29}\) The list of PAN deputies in each legislature between 1946 and 1976 appears in the appendix of von Sauer’s book. See Von Sauer, pp. 178-180.
Channeling these human resources towards the organization's interior increased the density and quality of its internal life. It contributed to the consolidation of its own operational rules and favored the development of an organizational culture. In addition, it meant that a strong correspondence existed between the formal structure and the real center of power in the party.

Another element that contributed to the PAN's organizational consolidation is that the party doctrine and the party appeared at the same time. It is not so much the content of this doctrine that interests me, as the role it played in the party organization. It functioned as a code that provides cohesiveness, gives identity and allows arbitration of internal conflicts. It also determined the temporal horizon of party strategy.

Inspired by the social thought of the Catholic Church as expressed in the *Rerum Novarum* and *Quadragesimo Anno* encyclicals and the neo-Thomist and personalist Christian thinkers Jacques Maritain and Emmanuel Mounier, the PAN doctrine can be summarized in the expression used by one of its principal ideologues, Efraín González Luna: "political humanism".

In sum, this political humanism conceived the nation as a natural and historic community with its own personality. The people grouped within natural communities (the family, the municipality, intermediate associations...) constituted its real foundation. The law-abiding state watched over the common good and guaranteed the liberty necessary for achieving peoples' spiritual and material destiny. Freedom of thought, religion, education and initiative constituted rights essential to national development. State intervention was justified through the subsidiary principle, applied when private initiative was impossible or insufficient. The state was also conceived as responsible for seeing that the greatest level of social justice prevails.

In addition to the two short official documents which expound doctrinal principles, the PAN's ideology has been amply expressed in its mass-circulation magazine, *La Nación*, and in collections of texts and speeches by its principal leaders.

However, it is not so much the profusion of the PAN's doctrinal activities as the role of its doctrine in the maintenance and regulation of its party organization that influenced the definition of its original model. Behind the doctrinal principles, one can make out a "moralist conception of the State and politics, which postulates the rule of..."
moral law over political law, over society itself or any other form of human power." This "transcendental [conception] of political activity" was shared by the first members of the PAN. The existence of this shared vision of politics among PAN members has been well used to explain the acceptance of the role of the "tribunal party" that was assigned to the PAN in a political system which almost completely denied access to elected positions.

Nevertheless, the argument deserves consideration from the opposite perspective: that of the National Action Party as an organization. In an institutional context where the ability to redistribute material incentives to party members was low, in this case due to the monopoly exercised by the PRI over elected positions, cohesion of a party organization would be maintained by a great capacity for production of symbolic incentives. Panebianco, in his typology of stimuli available to members of political parties, distinguishes between collective incentives (identity) and selective incentives (status and material rewards). The PAN's organization during the first few years produced incentives linked to collective identity and status and very few material incentives. Therefore, I distinguish between symbolic and material incentives. Without taking into account its contents as of yet, the mere existence of an explicit doctrine within the National Action Party assists in the comprehension of the survival of the party organization as an autonomous opposition force in a hostile institutional context: the doctrine increased the ability for producing collective incentives for its militants.

The conception of political activity implicit in the PAN doctrine, which more than once has been described as naive and fairly unrealistic, was based on a realist appreciation of the party's situation in the Mexican political system. The initial strategy of the PAN's leaders takes into consideration that the party's strong point was its human resources and the institutional context in which the organization acted.

During its beginnings, unable to aspire to winning electoral majorities and not wanting to take power using violence, the PAN channeled its human resources towards the civic education of the Mexican people, and towards disseminating its political proposals. In the long term, the party saw itself as a power alternative while in the short

---

35 Soledad Loaeza, p. 364.
36 Soledad Loaeza, "El Partido Acción Nacional: de la oposición leal a la impaciencia electoral", in Soledad Loaeza and Rafael Segovia (eds.), La vida política mexicana en la crisis, Mexico, El Colegio de Mexico, 1987, pp. 82-83.
37 Panebianco, pp. 25-30.
38 In the words of Gómez Morín, since the moment the party was founded:
We knew very well that it was a program to be presented to the government, to be carried out by us. We knew that many years would go by before we could come to power in a way to achieve a complete program. But we always thought and sustained that you govern from the government or facing the government too, if you are able to create a political force which is sufficient; a political force sufficient to present other solutions. In addition, we had faith in the rationality of politics; in that, by the force of making rational arguments, the Party would have to convince the people and responsible politicians some day. {Wilkie and Monzón de Wilkie, p. 56}.
term it sought to influence government decision-making.\(^{39}\) Thus, inside the party, doctrine provided a pattern of deferred gratification of militant activity (access to elected positions) while at the same time lengthening the temporal horizon of strategic calculation by the organization.

The importance of doctrine in the National Action Party's life can also be appreciated in its internal regulating function. Many strategic decisions made by the party in relation to its environment were justified in terms of doctrine, the first being the decision, mentioned above, to support Almazán's candidacy in 1939. But the internal power struggles were also permanently mediated by matters of doctrine: contenders tended to justify their actions in terms of faithfulness to the party's doctrinal principles.\(^{40}\)

Thus, the initial existence of explicit doctrinal principles which acted as a regulatory code provided the PAN organization with an identity, an internal mechanism for processing conflicts and a long term strategic horizon. It contributed to the creation of a solid and autonomous institution.

In sum, since its beginnings, the National Action Party consolidated around an organizational model which was defined in opposition to the personalization of political activity and the spontaneous character of popular movements. The organized party was perceived as an instrument of political action which was technically superior. This conception of the technical superiority of the party organization would be of great importance in the party's existence, especially with reference to the definition of internal procedures and the consolidation of an organizational culture.

These elements favored the consolidation of an autonomous organization that functioned on the basis of procedures that were explicit, stable and accepted by the members. Factors linked to the institutional context also strengthened this pattern of consolidation of the party. The fact that the party participated in presidential elections, acting "as if" without actually entering a presidential candidate, limited tendencies towards charismatic leadership within the organization. In addition, the subcompetitive nature of the electoral system lead the best elements of the party to define their political career within the organization more than outside of it. The result was the elimination of traditional tensions between the parliamentary wing and party leadership.

Building on the three dimensions used by Panebianco to define parties' genetic models, the National Action Party appeared in the beginning as a party constructed upon a strong foundation of internal legitimation as expressed in the prevailing conception of the organization and the existence of its own doctrine. It was also a party in which the natural tendencies towards charismatic leadership were strongly controlled, and finally, the consolidation of its territorial structure occurred through a mixture of penetration and dissemination, that is, through promotion by central and some regional elites. The first

\(^{39}\) Mabry, p. 39.

\(^{40}\) In the most virulent internal conflicts in the history of the party (1961, 1975, 1992), the antagonists justify their positions in doctrinal terms even if, of course, the interests in play exceed a simple ideologic conflict. I will deal with the issue of conflict regulation in the next section.
two dimensions paved the way for the consolidation of a highly institutionalized organization.\(^{41}\)

**Institutionalization and Conflict Processing**

National Action is a party that underwent early institutionalization. Its high degree of institutionalization allows for diversification of its strategic options in its relations with the hegemonic party's government. The PAN can go from limited cooperation to confrontation minimizing the risks of splits within its organization. In this section I will emphasize two elements which contributed to this institutional solidarity: the existence of operational procedures that are stable but adaptable to the changing environment of the party and a successful history of overcoming internal conflicts.

**Institutional Characteristics**

Given the social origin of its founding members, the National Action Party corresponds to what Duverger calls a party of notables.\(^{42}\) However, as was shown in the previous section, from its beginnings the PAN was a party of notables organized on the basis of explicit operational rules accepted by the majority of its members.\(^{43}\) Between 1939 and 1992, its statutes were reformulated seven times without substantially affecting the party's internal operation model.\(^{44}\) A review of these statutes from 1939 on shows the following organizational characteristics.\(^{45}\)

First, the PAN's internal governmental structures have an organizational model based on a delegated democracy with multiple levels where participation by members undergoes successive filters. This delegated democracy operates on the basis of a strong culture of belonging to the organization, defined in terms of membership: access to the party's decision-making structures is conditioned by required seniority in terms of party membership.

The PAN's fundamental structures have not been modified since its foundation (Table I). Formally, the National Assembly is the supreme authority within the party. The Assembly meets at least every three years, when convened by the National Executive Committee or the National Council. The Assembly's functions include naming and

\(^{41}\) I will explore the third dimension —territoriality— further in the following sections.

\(^{42}\) Duverger, pp. 120-122.

\(^{43}\) PAN is not the only case of a party of notables that manage to develop a high level of institutionalization. Panebianco documents how the British Conservative Party followed a similar path of development (Panebianco, pp. 130-141).

\(^{44}\) Acción Nacional, p. 3.

\(^{45}\) This section is based on a review of the original statutes of the PAN in 1939, and the reforms in 1949, 1959, 1962, 1971, 1979, 1986 and 1992. It is a tedious but necessary exercise given the almost total absence of analysis on PAN's organizational evolution.
revoking members of the National Council, analysis of the National Executive Committee’s or National Council’s report and examining the administration’s general account. The National Assembly is constituted in a National Extraordinary Assembly to approve reforms of party statutes based on proposals submitted by the National Executive Committee or the National Council.

The official delegates to the National Assembly are: the presidents of the State Directive Committees and delegates named by these Committees, members elected by their Municipal Assemblies, members of the National Executive Committee; and members of the National Council. The formula for distribution of votes in the National Assembly is based on the state delegation, which is given 15 votes to begin with, and then additional votes based on the number of electoral districts that the state has, and the performance of the party in the state during the last federal election. The National Executive Committee has the right to a number of votes which is equivalent to the average number of votes of all the state delegations.

These criteria are also used to integrate the PAN’s National Convention, which is the structure for deciding matters of general policy and party political activities. Among its functions are the approval of policy to be followed by the party and its basic program for action, the decision whether to participate in federal elections and the development of an electoral platform, the election of the presidential candidate and the election of federal proportional representation deputy candidates.

The second level of decision-making in the PAN’s organizational life is the National Council. To be a National Counselor one must be an active party member, with at least three years seniority. The Council is made up of the president and general secretary of the National Executive Committee (CEN), CEN ex-presidents, State Directive Committee presidents, Coordinators of federal parliamentary groups, the National Coordinator of local deputies and two hundred fifty Counselors elected by the party’s National Assembly. Candidates are proposed by state delegations based on votes received in their states during the last federal elections. 10% of the candidates are also proposed by the National Executive Committee. Then, a Qualifying Commission develops, based on these proposals, the list of the 250 candidates to be considered, in what ends up being an indirect election, by the National Assembly.

The National Council’s powers include election and revocation, when necessary, of the party president and members of the National Executive Committee, designation of members of various party commissions, approval of annual income and expense budgets, and resolving matters related to the party. The Council has to meet in ordinary session at least once a year.

In point of fact, the National Council is the principal structure for participation in the party’s organizational life. Its relatively reduced dimension, the way its members are selected and the nature of its powers make it the space where the PAN’s dominant coalition takes shape. Within it, the PAN’s political elite is formed and reproduced with its varied groups and tendencies. It should be noted that within the PAN the creation of
factions takes place on the basis of the organization's life itself and not on loyalties established outside of it.

However, the indirect participation structure in the party, with its multiple levels (that in the end operate as selection filters), tends to confine internal conflicts to the party elite and reduce the negative effects of possible splits. This type of party structure tends to discourage the formation of strong vertical loyalties between leaders and party rank and file. Thus, a balance is maintained between the express will to operate with democratic operational rules and the need to maintain party discipline.

A second important organizational characteristic is the party's executive structures, which are designed to ensure National Action's president's effective management of the party. The National Executive Committee (CEN) has from twenty to forty members who, to be elected must have been party members for at least three years. The party president proposes two-thirds of the Executive's members while the other third is proposed by national counsellors. The CEN's powers are, among others: legal representation of the party, surveillance of observation of statutes and rules, complying with and enforcing compliance of agreements made by its deliberative bodies, formulating and approving its rules and activity programs, convening deliberative organs and veto — after analysis— of decisions made by regional structures. The Executive Committee members' mandate lasts three years.

The president of the party is elected by the National Council, enjoying a three years mandate. The winning candidate must receive a qualified majority of 66% that, in principle, guarantees a solid foundation of support in the party. The same majority applies for removal. In addition to the Executive Committee, the president also presides over the National Assembly, the National Convention and the National Council. Presidential attributes include: being an ex oficio member of all commissions that name the National Council or the National Executive Committee, maintaining relations between the CEN and territorial executive structures and coordinate their work, promoting and reviewing correct party direction, maintaining and promoting necessary relations with the federal and state powers, proposing party rules and activity programs (approved by their deliberative structures) to the CEN, in urgent situations, taking steps judged necessary by the party under the condition that he or she inform the CEN at the first opportunity so this structure can make its rightful decision.

The CEN's instruments for influence and control of the internal life of the party are numerous: they range from membership regulation to the right to veto decisions of the party's territorial deliberation structures.

The National Executive Committee has the power to admonish and deprive PAN members of their posts and party commissions. It can request the party's Order Commission to suspend the rights of (for a period of up to three years) or to exclude party members. It also has the power to ratify and remove State Directive Committees and their members. In fact, until the statutory reform of 1978-1979, presidents and members of State Directive Committees were designated by the CEN based on proposals by the Regional Councils.
The Executive Committee has the power to influence the operation of the party’s deliberative structures: both the National Assembly and the National Convention are convened by this Committee. They cannot be held without the presence of the majority of Executive Committee members or its delegation. In terms of the State and Municipal Assemblies, the Executive Committee has the supplementary power to convene them when it deems necessary. It can also veto -within thirty days- the decisions made by the deliberative and executive regional organs (state or municipal).

Also, the influence of the executive in the formation of the National Council should not be taken lightly, given that a substantial part of the 250 Counselors are indirectly designated through approval from a list of candidates developed by a Qualifying Commission which includes three members of the CEN (out of seven total members of this Commission). A similar mechanism operates for forming lists of proportional representation deputies, where the CEN has the right to propose up to 50% of candidacies per proportional representation district.

In sum, the PAN’s statutes provide the Executive Committee with the necessary instruments to ensure that the activities of its members and its regional components conform with the party’s general political position. The mechanisms for constituting the party’s deliberative structures are designed to allow the Executive Committee to influence the composition of their members. Similar procedures operate in the designation of the party’s candidates for proportional representation deputy, which ensures the executive structure a certain degree of control over the makeup of the parliamentary group. Given that the party president has the power to designate two thirds of the CEN, his or her ability to manage the internal life of the National Action Party is great. In addition, the requirement of a qualified majority of two thirds of the votes for his or her own election guarantees a solid foundation of support in the party. The combination of the elements mentioned provides the PAN’s leaders with sufficient normative resources to reduce the possibilities of factionalism in the party and if it does occur, to limit its dissemination.

The study of the varied amendments to the National Action Party’s statutes reveals a third organizational characteristic that reflects the growing territorial extension.
of the party: the importance given to regional structures in its procedures and operation. Initially, the regional organizations were created by friends of Gómez Morín: where the party members knew few people, regional structures took longer to emerge. During the forties, the PAN had Directive Committees in 83% of states. Entering a presidential candidate in the 1952 election promoted the creation of Directive Committees in all the states of the Mexican Republic. The quality of these regional organizations vary from one state to another. However, their growing consolidation means that regional components acquire more importance in the party's life. This evolution is particularly noticeable in relation to the decision-making powers of these regional entities, as well as in terms of their integration into the national party structures and into internal voting mechanisms. The growing autonomy of the PAN's territorial structures in terms of decision-making is a first indication of the gradual regionalization of its party structures. In 1939, the original party statutes mention the Regional Committees without specifying their operation: given the available information, it can be assumed that the Regional Committees were closer to political clubs of friends than well structured organizations.

The 1959 reform specifies that the Regional Councils are autonomous in matters which concern them. However, the Regional Counsellors continue to be named by the party president on recommendations made by the regional, district and municipal committees. The same disposition applies to the Regional Directive Committees and their heads, which are designated by the CEN president based on the Regional Counsellors' proposal. In both cases, these nominations can be revoked by the president of National Action. The party's regional structures constituted in conventions have the power to designate candidates for local elections. However, in urgent situations the president of the CEN can decide the PAN's participation in local and state elections and designate the corresponding candidates.

The 1971 statute reform gave additional autonomy to the party's territorial structures in recognizing their right to elect members of their deliberative and executive structures. The Regional Counselors are elected by the Regional Assemblies based on proposals made by the State Directive Committees. In turn, these are elected by the Regional Councils based on nominations by the District and Municipal Committees. In both cases, members of these organizations can be dismissed by the National Executive Committee.

In spite of this growing delegation of decision-making powers to regional structures within the PAN, the national executive continues to hold the power to change decisions made by lower territorial structures: the 1992 statutes maintain the right of the CEN to veto decisions made by State Assemblies.

The evolution of mechanisms for forming the PAN's national structures (National Assembly, Convention and Council) provides a second illustration of the regionalization
Prud'homme: The National Action Party’s (PAN) Organizational Life and Strategic Decisions

of party structures. In the 1939 statutes, participation by these structures was based on individual membership. Regional delegations were recognized in the 1959 statute as the basis for the formation of National Assemblies and National Conventions: the members who participated in these structures were designated by the Regional Directive Committees and by the National Executive Committee.

In 1962, the formula for constituting the National Council also began to take the party’s regional base into consideration. The presidents of the party’s Regional Directive Committees automatically became members of the Council. In addition, Regional Directive Committees acquired the right to present a number of candidates to the Council equal to the number of federal electoral districts in their respective states. However, the party Executive Committee reviewed the candidacies and developed the list of national counsellors to be submitted for approval by the National Assembly. Furthermore, the CEN itself had the right to propose its own candidates within the limit of planned vacancies for necessary membership in the Council. Thus, regionalization was introduced as a principle of the most important deliberative structures in the National Action Party, without however eliminating control by the highest level of the party leadership over designation of candidates for counselor.

This situation changed with the 1971 statutes reform. The power of the CEN to designate candidates was reduced to a number equivalent to that of the one state with the right to the largest number of candidates, and it ceded the power to develop the list of candidacies to a Commission designated by the party’s National Assembly. Beginning in 1992, the number of candidates that State Directive Committees may nominate is determined by the state’s electoral districts and on the party’s electoral performance in that state. In this way, the party’s territorial structures acquire a determining influence in the make up of the PAN’s National Council. This regionalization of structures also implies a regionalization of the PAN’s elite (or dominant coalition).

The last element illustrating the gradual regionalization of the National Action Party structure is its internal voting mechanisms. In 1939 voting was based on individual membership. In the 1959 statutes, voting in the party’s National Assemblies and Conventions attributed five votes to each regional delegation, plus one vote per electoral district. Within this plan, the National Executive Committee had the right to the same number of votes as the delegation with the largest number of votes. To maintain voting cohesion in the large states’ delegations, the dissident regional vote is awarded when over 20% of the members of the delegation vote in opposition to the majority of its members. In 1971, the number of votes granted the regional delegations increased, but the same electoral formula was maintained. However, the number of votes the CEN had a right to was reduced to the average number of votes in all the state delegations. In addition, the expression of the minority regional vote was stimulated, with a reduction in the threshold to 10%.

The 1978-79 statutes - this voting formula is still in force- increased the number of votes to which the delegations have an automatic right by thirty, but also introduced a measure which punishes, in terms of number of votes, delegations that do not provide the
amount of delegates they have a right to, in order to limit the influence of regional minorities without real political strength. The reform also specifies a complex formula for designating candidates to the new post of proportional representation deputy, on which regional structures have influence. Finally, the 1992 reform adds incentives, associated with the party's regional performance in the states, to the electoral formula.

Thus, a review of the evolution of the PAN's statutes demonstrates a regionalization of the party's organizational structure in aspects such as decision-making ability of lower-level territorial organs, integration of national bodies and mechanisms for internal voting. However, the National Executive Committee maintains the powers necessary to veto decisions by these regional structures, and to reject their proposed members. The effects of the regionalization of the structures - which in turn corresponds to the process of real growth of the National Action Party - would be felt above all in the constitution of the party's dominant coalition and the internal alignments to which it gives rise.

The last organizational characteristic of the National Action Party was institutionalized in the 1992 reforms. In the procedures for the formation of the party's national structure and for internal voting, performance in federal elections is rewarded. Party structures in states where the party obtains more votes receive benefits in terms of the number of candidates they can propose for membership in the deliberative structures of the party and the number of votes in the National Assemblies and Conventions. This reflects an aspect of reality: the regional inequalities in the growth of the PAN vote. But it also constitutes an incentive to increase voter mobilization activities: delegations in states with greater electoral success can have greater influence in the party. Thus, the internal life of National Action becomes formally linked to the party's electoral performance.

In sum, the examination of the different statute reforms in the PAN shows the existence of an organizational structure based on stable operational rules that gradually adapt to the characteristics of the party's growth. The product of this evolution is a highly institutionalized organization - given the Mexican party system - in which the risks of a division are minimized.

Thus, the PAN's organization reproduces the features of a delegated democracy with multiple levels where participation by members in the deliberative structures undergoes successive filters. Participation is based on a strong culture of belonging to the party defined in terms of membership. The National Council constitutes the structure where the dominant coalition in the party is constructed. The delegative nature of participation in National Action's internal life tends to limit conflicts to the party elite, preventing personalized control by members of the dominant coalition over the party rank and file.

Currently, the statutes allow the National Executive Committee and its president to use instruments for managing party life in an efficient manner. In addition, the fact that the president must have a qualified two-thirds majority to be elected guarantees a solid support base in the party during his or her mandate. Here too, the risks of a split are reduced.
Finally, the evolution of the National Action Party’s statutes shows the ability to adapt to the new reality created by the party’s growth. Through the years, the PAN’s structure has adapted itself to greater geographic penetration by the party and to its unequal but growing political strength. These elements are reflected in its operational rules: they manifest an organization which is sensitive to changes that occur in its environment.

Conflict Resolution

The solidity of the PAN’s institutionalization process can also be perceived in its history of successful solution of internal conflicts. On three occasions in time during its more than fifty years of existence (1961, 1975 and 1992), the PAN faced crises that put its survival as an organization in danger. As mentioned in the previous section, in each of these crises, the conflict was defined in doctrinal terms. However, it is interesting to note the coincidence between the appearance of the PAN’s internal conflicts and problems in the organization’s growth.

The 1961 conflict occurs in relation to the desirability of the transformation of the organization into a Christian democratic party, but it arose in the context of protests by the PAN over frauds committed in the 1958 legislative election. The 1975 conflict between doctrinaires and neopanista members, that ended with the decision to not run a presidential candidate in 1976, occurred when the PAN had reached the allowed limit for party deputies some time ago. Finally, the conflict in 1992 between the PAN leadership and the Democratic and Doctrinal Forum was also expressed in terms of following the National Action Party’s doctrinal principles. However, it coincided with the introduction of a strategy of limited cooperation between the party and the government related to electoral legislation that did not show immediate results in electoral performance.

The coincidence between internal conflicts and the organization’s growth suggests that confrontations explained in doctrinal terms hide more substantial difficulties. Problems with the organization’s growth can be perceived in the relation between electoral support and representation in Congress. When the first two crises mentioned here occurred, the PAN’s growing electoral support was not translated into an increase in its representation in Congress. This correlation has been used to explain periods when the use of confrontational strategies by the National Action Party increased. It has also been used to interpret the timing of electoral legislation reform as an adaptation of the hegemonic party system to the pressures in its environment: the reform is perceived as an adjustment in the size of the “optimal opposition”.

50 Juan Molinar, p. 52-54.
When referring to the conflict at the end of the fifties and beginning of the sixties within the PAN, Mabry suggests the existence of a relation between frictions within the party elites and electoral performance. Hence internal frictions in 1959 were seen as responsible for the PAN’s electoral collapse in 1961.\footnote{Mabry, p. 69-70.} I prefer a contrasting conception of this relation: the problems in National Action’s growth as a opposition political formation in a hegemonic party system led to the creation of difficulties concerning the rearrangement of its dominant coalition (or party elites) and adaptation of its internal operational rules to changing reality. This put the ability of the organization to adapt to its environment to the test.

These problems came to light in the form of doctrinal conflicts. Here, I am interested in emphasizing that the National Action Party was able to face these crises of rearrangement of elites successfully. The three largest conflicts in the party’s history resulted in internal splits with few consequences for the survival of the organization. In none of these cases did the schisms end in the creation of a solid political organization that could compete for the same electoral clientele. Instead, the successful experience of solving serious internal crises contributed to the institutional consolidation of the party and broadened its space for maneuvering on strategic options. To support my argument, here I examine the two crises previous to that of 1989-1992, which is analyzed in the next section of this chapter.

As mentioned in the previous section, the first dominant coalition within the party was based on three groups of members: activists from Catholic associations, Gómez Morín’s disciples and ex-students and liberals linked through business. President Alemán’s policy of opening towards the private sector beginning in 1946 considerably reduced business’s support towards the PAN. When Gómez Morín left the party presidency in 1949, the succession was secured by leaders whose previous political experience was limited to their participation in lay Catholic associations. The 1949-1962 period was characterized by a greater rapprochement between the PAN and Catholic activists.\footnote{Mabry, p. 50.} The conflict concerning the conversion of the PAN into a Christian democrat party that culminated with the expulsion of youth leaders in 1962 is a good expression of the ideological climate in which the debates within this political organization take place.

This period witnessed growing electoral support for the PAN, but without substantial gain in terms of political representation: from 1949 to 1958, the percentage of the national PAN vote grew from 5.6\% to 10.2\% while the number of deputies only grew from 4 to 6.\footnote{The available figures on PAN votes do not coincide although they reflect the increase in the PAN vote. Mabry, based on non-official figures, documents the following percentages: 8.9\% (1949), 7.8\% (1952), no data (1955) and 9.5\% (1958) (Mabry, p. 69). Molinar, partially based on official results, gives the following results: 5.6\% (1949), 8.7\% (1952), 9.2\% (1955) and 10.2\% (1958). These figures allow him to calculate a growing decrease in the proportionality of the PAN's representation (Molinar, p. 50-53).} In July, 1958, Luis H. Alvarez, the PAN’s young presidential candidate, and
the National Executive Committee denounced governmental electoral fraud. The National Council, assembled July 12 and 13, culminated in “the declaration of invalidity of the elections and the removal of the party from all electoral structures so as not to sanction with its presence the falsification of the citizens’ will”. The CEN also decided that elected deputies would not occupy their seats: 2 of the 6 elected deputies observed the orders given by the highest structure within the party; the rest were expelled from the PAN. Conflicts in later state elections such as in Yucatán in December, 1958 and above all in Baja California in August, 1959 when the PAN’s candidate for governor, Rosas Magallón, was denied his victory, increased the tension with the government. Not until 1960, when the government apologized for irregularities committed in some elections, was PAN reincorporated into the Federal Electoral Commission.

It was in this context that the internal struggle in relation to the PAN’s ideological direction took place. Although before the creation of the party several of its founders had maintained close links with figures that were to become Latin American Christian Democratic leaders, such as the Chilean Frei and the Venezuelan Caldera, it was not until the mid-fifties that the conversion of National Action into a Christian Democratic party was proposed. In 1956, the president of the National Action Party, Ituarte Servin, encouraged the leaders of the party’s recently created Youth Organization to fight for the creation of a Christian Democratic platform. Therefore, youth leaders in the PAN such as Gutiérrez Vega and Rodríguez Lapuente began national tours and published a number of articles in the party press, all in favour of Christian Democracy.

In 1959, González Torres, who defined himself as a Christian Democrat, was elected to the party presidency. During his administration, the party began rapprochement with the Christian Democratic movement at the international level, particularly with the COPEI in Venezuela and the Italian and German Christian Democrat parties. In 1962, the National Action Party came close to becoming part of the Christian Democrat International. The party platform developed in 1961 built on many proposals for social reforms that were close to the positions held by the international Christian Democratic movement such as profit-sharing or denuclearization of the great powers.

The struggle to redefine doctrinal direction was combined with disagreements concerning the strategy that should be followed in relation with the government and the expression of provincial members’ discontent towards national structures in the National Action Party. These conflicts were made public in the National Convention/Assembly in March, 1959. The party’s Youth Organization played an important role in the radicalization and polarization of the terms of the debate: its support allowed a victory by González Torres by a slim margin; its alliance with regional forces led to a losing battle against the party founders to reduce the powers of the president and the National

56 Von Sauer, p. 127.
57 In point of fact the re-incorporation of the PAN into the Federal Electoral Commission in 1960 paved the way for the 1964 electoral reform that introduced the post of “party deputy”, allowing a substantial increase in the opposition’s representation in Congress.
Executive Committee; its rejection of the use of moderate tactics in relations with the government forced the re-writing of the final report by the Assembly in order to give it more strategic vigor. 58

Many of the tensions in the National Action Party converged on the Youth Organization lead by Gutiérrez Vega and Rodríguez Lapuente. This was the probable cause of the following declaration in an interview in 1967 by the party’s founder:

Maybe the movement that came closest to an effort to break party unity, was that of a group that tried, within the party and without proposing it as a proposition for discussion in the appropriate structures, to adopt the Christian Democratic platform with all its consequences. The reaction of the great majority of members was immediate and for many good reasons: National Action had its own principles and has platforms well rooted in the concrete reality in Mexico and consistent solutions that are based on Mexican means, possibilities and opportunities. 59

This rather cryptic declaration of Gómez Morín about the “concrete reality in Mexico” alluded to two important historical factors. First, since the middle of the nineteenth century, the relation between the state and the Catholic Church have been a very sensitive issue that provoked two wars of religion: the Liberal Conservative war of 1857 and the Cristero war of 1927-28. The Constitution of 1917, through its article 130, prohibited the political involvement of the Church. If the PAN had explicitly adopted a Christian Democratic platform, it would have given a very powerful weapon to its adversaries in the government. Second, the electoral law of 1946 prohibited the association of national political parties with foreign powers. It made national parties affiliation to an international association virtually impossible. Indeed, both factors could have led to the immediate cancellation of PAN’s party register.

The internal conflict that grew out of this flirting with Christian Democratic doctrine had negative effects for the PAN: in the 1961 elections both the number of PAN candidates and the number of states where candidates ran decreased (from 139 candidates in 30 states to 95 candidates in 19 states). In addition, the percentage of votes for the party decreased to 7.6%. But the negative effects of this doctrinal debate within the PAN should not be attributed solely to the content of the ideology which could have been adopted. The debate had a negative effect for the organization because it took place at a time when there was no place in the party for an opening of the party elites PAN’s power structure did not allow room for the emerging regional elites in decision-making. Moreover, the party’s electoral under-representation was closing what could have been a useful escape valve under similar circumstances: the distribution of electoral offices in order to create an equilibrium between the feuding factions.

The election of Adolfo Christlieb Ibarrola to the party presidency in 1962 put an end to the Christian Democrat episode. In April, 1963, the movement’s leaders, Alejandro

58 Mabry, p. 60-62.
59 Wilkie and Monzón de Wilkie, p. 135.
Aviles, Hugo Gutiérrez Vega, Manuel Rodríguez Lapuente and some of their followers, who insisted on defining National Action as a Christian Democrat party, were expelled. The later attempt by these ex-members to create a Mexican Christian Democrat party did not constitute a real threat to the PAN and the effects of the split were not felt by the party rank and file.

Throughout his presidency, Christlieb Ibarrola would pursue a skillful policy of dialogue with the government while keeping some of the Christian democratic proposals that had been supported by the excluded members. Christlieb Ibarrola's political ability and modifications to the party statutes in 1959 and 1962 allowed the party to reestablish the balance in the dominant coalition. The introduction of a system of limited proportional representation of minority parties in 1964 helped the PAN to substantially increase its participation in Congress to 20 deputies in 1964. The first institutional crisis in the PAN was successfully overcome.

The second crisis took place in the mid-seventies. Again, it appears as a doctrinal debate, against a background of electoral growth and stagnation in political representation, opposition between the center and periphery and discussion about the party's external strategy.

The 1963 political reform significantly increased the overall proportionality of the Mexican electoral system. However, the "party deputy" system did not correct the PAN's under-representation in the Congress. In 1964, this party obtained 11.5% of the votes as compared to 9.5% of the seats, in 1967 these figures reached 12.4% and 9.4%, respectively; in 1970, 13.9% versus 9.4% and in 1973, 14.7% versus 10.8%. This meant that while the proportion of the PAN vote increased, its participation in Congress did not rise proportionately: the bias in the representation that acted against the PAN grew from -2% to -3%, -4.5% and 3.9%. Even the 1973 electoral reform that increased the number of party deputies from 20 to 25 could not substantially reverse this trend. If the frauds perpetuated against the PAN in local elections in Sonora, Baja California and Yucatán at the end of the sixties are added to this picture, it is not surprising that the anti-participationist tendencies were much stronger in the 1970 and 1973 party conventions.

---

60 It is interesting to note that Mabry reports that: "The departure of the two youth leaders was also a result of their believing that they had not been properly rewarded for their party activity" (Mabry, p. 220).

61 Mabry, p. 74.

62 Christlieb Ibarrola had been a PAN representative in the Federal Electoral Commission that Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, then the Minister of the Interior and later President of the Republic, presided. The authorship of the "party deputies" formula is generally attributed to Christlieb Ibarrola.

63 From 1964 to 1973 the index of proportionality of political representation in Mexico was above 90% (Molinar, p. 84).

64 Molinar, pp. 82-84.

The conflict that emerged at the convention for the election of the PAN's national presidential candidate in October, 1975, was the greatest threat of a split that the organization has ever faced.66

In February, 1972, José Angel Conchello was elected president of the PAN. Closely linked to entrepreneurial circles and an advocate of the use of aggressive opposition tactics, Conchello wanted to make the PAN the electoral alternative of everyone on the right who was unsatisfied, even if they did not fully support the National Action Party's doctrine. Conflicts that led the government and entrepreneurs to face off during the last years of President Echeverria's administration provided the ideal context for putting this new style of politics to the test.

Conchello's administration divided opinion within the party. In March, 1975, Conchello was defeated by Efraín González Morfin. The election revealed a high level of polarization within the party: after five rounds in which González Morfin, with a majority, could not reach the required 65% of the vote, Conchello withdrew. Even so, on the final ballot where he was the only candidate, González Morfin barely obtained 66% of the vote.

Polarization within the PAN went deeper than the expression of preferences towards one individual or another for the party presidency. Efraín González Morfin was the son of Efraín González Luna, the PAN's founder and ideologue. His political program reflected the "solidarity" tendency that was quite strong in the party during the sixties and emphasized social reform. Strategically, González Morfin wanted a return to the PAN's focus on its members instead of seeking to widen its electoral base. For many political analysts, González Morfin represented the traditional PAN as compared to Conchello's neopanista tendency.67

This division became even more evident when Conchello, outstripping party timing, proposed Pablo Emilio Madero as a presidential pre-candidate and began a promotional tour requesting that the convention that would decide the PAN's participation in the 1976 presidential campaign be convened early. This attitude led the party CEN to take disciplinary actions against Conchello. The convention, in October 1976, took place in a climate of extreme tension. After three rounds of voting, none of the three proposed pre-candidates—Madero, Rosas Magallón and Alarcón Zaragoza—received 80% of the vote.

---


67 This interpretation, initially sustained by analysts such as Loaeza and Arriola, has been broadly used to explain the PAN's internal life in the last twenty years. Traditional PAN members would more closely follow party doctrine and their conception of political action would be more directed towards civic education than taking power. The neopanistas would be new arrivals to party militancy, many originally from entrepreneurial associations, and would see the party as an instrument for coming to power. However, a detailed examination of the re-alignments that took place in the last twenty years within the PAN shows that the constitution of the internal cleavages in the organization corresponded to a more complex combination of factors.
votes, necessary to be confirmed as the PAN presidential candidate. The party president supported by the National Council decided to postpone the election.

Behind the inability to achieve a qualified majority for the election of the PAN’s presidential candidate, there were also difficulties adapting to the organization’s new environment. The integration of new elites into the party provoked a crisis both in internal procedures—in this case mechanisms for selecting the presidential candidate—and program orientation. The organization did not appear to have the necessary internal resources for reestablishing balances. In addition, as was mentioned previously, the PAN’s under-representation in the Congress and the noncompetitive nature of the party system made the use of external resources difficult, such as the distribution of electoral posts to provide a solution to the crisis.

The search for new equilibria in the PAN would be a relatively long process that included both organizational readjustments and modifications in the party’s environment. Thus, two months after the failed convention in October, González Morfin resigned. In his place, Manuel González Hinojosa, who had been party president at the end of the sixties, was elected with a mandate to consolidate party unity.

In January 1976, after seven rounds of voting in the National Extraordinary Convention failed to produce the necessary 80% support for a national presidential candidate, the National Executive Committee decided not to enter a candidate in the 1976 presidential election. The National Council ratified the decision. But, it did not support the CEN’s decision to ask Conchello, Madero and Bernardo Bátiz—party secretary during Conchello’s administration—to leave the party voluntarily after having their rights suspended for a two year period. Instead, a compromise was reached and Conchello, Bátiz and Madero continued within the party. In July 1976, electoral support for the National Action Party barely reached 8.5%, a six point drop compared to the previous election.

The discussion concerning the 1977 political reform, which allowed a substantial increase in representation of opposition parties through proportionality, contributed to a regain balance within PAN’s dominant coalition. González Morfin and a small group of followers were opposed to the reform, arguing that it made the parties dependent on the government, and legitimized the existing system. A strong anti-participationist tendency existed in the PAN at time. However, in 1978, in his last speech as the party president, González Hinojosa proposed acceptance of the opportunities offered by the new law. González Morfin and his followers left the party. The majority of party members supported the participationist option.

In the 1979 legislative elections, the PAN vote recuperated slightly, rising to 10.8%. The effects of the reform were felt in the number of PAN deputies, which grew from 25 to 43.68 Although the mid-seventies crisis left its mark on the party until the early

---

eighties, once more party dissidence was unable to establish itself as a competitive alternative.

In February, 1978, Abel Vicencio Tovar was elected party president. In October of the same year and in March, 1979, the party statutes were reformed. The bank nationalization in 1982 and the severe economic crisis that affected the country beginning that year allowed the PAN to broaden its social alliances and gain electoral terrain in the prosperous Northern states.

For some analysts, the outcome of the relatively severe organizational crisis in the National Action Party was the triumph of the neopanista option and the transformation of the party in a broad electoral protest movement without organizational solidity. The first claim is partially true: Pablo Emilio Madero was named the party's presidential candidate in 1982 and received the greatest electoral support the PAN had ever achieved to that time. Then, in 1984, he was elected party president. However, as the following section will show, what could be interpreted as the victory of a neopanista tendency in the party during the mid-eighties, turned out by the mid-nineties to be a successful adaptation process by the party as an organization, an adaptation that went far beyond the destiny of one of its parts.

The same argument can be used to respond to the second affirmation. The outcome of the PAN’s mid-seventies crisis was the adaptation and consolidation of the party organization, incorporating new elites into its dominant coalition, broadening its social alliances and increasing its electoral support base without losing its identity or radically changing its operational rules. The following section shows how the National Action Party ended up prevailing over its internal tendencies: this is what happens in organizations with a high degree of institutionalization. The denouement of the serious internal crisis that threatened to disintegrate the PAN can be interpreted as successful survival by the organization.

In sum, the argument expressed in this section is that, contrary to some specialists' interpretation, the National Action Party is a highly institutionalized organization in the context of the Mexican party system: the high degree of institutionalization is reflected in the existence of stable but flexible procedures and a successful history of overcoming serious internal conflicts. This high allows the PAN to broaden its strategic options in its relations with the regime and to minimize the risks of a split within the organization. The National Action Party can successfully move from confrontation to limited cooperation with the government (and move in the opposite direction as well), based on the prevailing conditions in its political environment.

69 This is what specialists such as Loaeza maintain, “El Partido Acción Nacional: de la oposición leal a la impaciencia electoral”, pp. 93-94, and Arriola Ensayos sobre el PAN, pp. 47-65 maintain. For Soledad Loaeza, the result of the internal conflict that occurred during the mid-seventies was the PAN’s transformation into an organization receptive of all types of dissatisfaction with the government, a greater lack of determination in the definition of the organization’s structures and contours and in the crystallization of social alliances with old and new supporters such as entrepreneurs and the Church.
The review of the party's statutes shows how internal procedures are maintained and adapted through the years. Acceptance of these operational rules contributed to the consolidation of an organizational culture with deep roots in the party elites. These rules helped to process conflicts within the dominant coalition. In this sense, the PAN is a highly institutionalized party.

In addition, the National Action Party's institutionalization has specific characteristics that ease adaptation of the organization to its environment. A review of the evolution of the party statutes allows the observation of four of the organization's fundamental characteristics.

First, participation in party life is based on a system of delegated democracy that undergoes successive filters and values membership in the organization. The outcome is the promotion of the creation of an active but relatively limited elite. The advantage of this is the resulting circumscription of conflicts within this elite.

Second, the instruments of control in the hands of the president and his executive committee allow effective management of the organization's internal life.

Third, the National Action Party's structure and operational procedures reflect a gradual adaptation of the organization to its growing regional penetration.

Fourth, and lastly, the internal operation of the organization explicitly awards electoral success in its territorial structures.

All these organizational elements favor, in my view, the successful adoption of a strategy of limited cooperation with the government, based on electoral performance during the 1988-1994 period.

The two major conflicts that affected the PAN before the nineties were solved successfully. In both cases, conflict was framed in doctrinal terms. In reality, it reflected problems related to the organization's growth linked both to the integration of new elites in the party's dominant coalition and the reduction of representative spaces in the political system. In both cases, the resolution of conflict allowed successful adaptation of the organization to its new environment. The splits were limited to a very reduced sector of the elite, and did not result in the consolidation of electoral alternatives that represented a real threat to the PAN. The National Action Party's organizational history provides it with the necessary internal resources for facing strong tensions that arise from its environment. The successful experience of solving serious internal conflicts constitutes an important resource for broadening the PAN's space for maneuvering in its relations with the regime.

**Institutionalization and Decisions Concerning Strategy**

In previous sections, I presented the elements that in my view make the PAN a highly institutionalized party. Both the party's original model and the characteristics of its institutionalization process point towards the consolidation of stable but adaptable rules that govern the relations among the party elites. This situation lessens the risks of a harmful split within the party and increases the space for strategic maneuvering in its relations with the government.
In this section I explore the relationship between institutionalization and strategic decision making associated with limited cooperation with the PRI regime. Therefore, I first examine the conflict that resulted in PAN’s approval of the first electoral reform in the Salinas administration. Then, I seek to elucidate the concrete foundations for the strategic assessment carried out by the PAN leadership. However, before this, I will turn to the strategic dilemma between confrontation and limited cooperation with the regime that has marked the history of the National Action Party since its founding assembly in 1939.

The fundamental question that opposition parties ask themselves in political regimes characterized by a hegemonic party systems is the following: Why participate if the outcome of the elections is known beforehand? This question leads directly to a second question: Wouldn’t it be better to operate outside the political institutions given that actions within these structures can be interpreted as legitimizing them?

What appears as a theoretical concern to political scientists interested in studying party systems has been a topic of debate and a source of real tension in the PAN since its beginning. Actually, a review of debates about electoral participation in the National Action Party provides an array of arguments in favor and against participation that political scientists would later formalize in their studies about non-competitive electoral systems.

Previous sections list the points in time when this topic -electoral participation- provoked important debates within the National Action Party. In 1939, the essence of the participationists’ arguments was expressed in the debate over Almazán’s candidacy. The discussion was repeated in the 1943 and 1946 conventions, although the idea of participating in elections had gained ground in the party. Later, electoral fraud in 1958 provoked the resignation of both the PAN’s elected deputies and the party from the Federal Electoral Commission. We have also seen how the topic of electoral abstention monopolized discussion at the National Convention/Assembly in March 1959. Frauds in state elections in the late sixties once again placed the topic of electoral participation on the PAN’s agenda for internal discussion. The debate would culminate at the end of the seventies with the resignation of González Morfin and his followers over approval of the 1977 political reform. This issue which still has not been definitively resolved in the National Action Party. Therefore, it is not surprising that article 37 of the PAN’s current statutes mentions that it is within exclusive powers of the Convention “to decide about the PAN’s participation in federal elections.”

In an article that has become a classic in Mexican political science, Soledad Loaeza outlines the PAN’s dilemma. Loaeza uses the concept of “loyal opposition” to describe the role that the National Action Party plays in the Mexican political system. According to her, it is “a politically organized force that defends the interests of a...”

These questions have been addressed partially by Hermet, Rouquié and Linz in their book quoted in Chapter III, although their findings do apply to independent opposition parties. I know of undergoing research comparing the cases of Mexico, Taiwan and Paraguay but their results have not been published yet.

Acción Nacional, Principios de doctrina, p. 16.
participating minority, but within the institutional framework in which it acts. By accepting the established rules of the political game, it never challenges the operation or constitutional foundations of the system, tacitly and explicitly contributing to its stability and legitimization.72

According to this interpretation, the PAN performs a "tribunal function" that consists of organizing and institutionally directing the interests of the opposition minorities without putting the rules for the reproduction of the system in danger. This type of insertion in a political system where electoral results are known beforehand has produced repeated conflicts in the party between a participationist option and an anti-system opposition option. The problem with the second choice is that a more aggressive form of political opposition would put the legal survival of the party at risk.

Soledad Loaeza's argument emphasizes an important aspect of the dilemma that the PAN (and any independent opposition party in Mexico) faces with its participation in semi-competitive electoral competitions. From the perspective of the reproduction of the political system, the argument for indirect legitimization is completely valid. However, it is only one dimension of the problem: when emphasizing systemic dimensions one can fail to take into account the National Action Party's own options and motives, which is what finally counts for PAN members.

It should be remembered that the PAN came into being due to a criticism of the lack of transparency and confidence in the mechanisms for democratic legitimization of the regime. From the start, one of the principal reasons for its existence was the fight to establish electoral democracy in Mexico. Since the hegemonic party system with its semi-competitive elections offered it the opportunity to compete, it was difficult for the National Action Party to deny itself participation, as unequal as that may be. Participation became an instrument for publicizing fraud.

In addition, as was indicated in the beginning of this chapter, the conception of political action that inspires the creation of the party disqualified from the start mass mobilizations as an effective means for change. But above all, in its origin, as a party of notables, the PAN did not have the necessary strength to have an appreciable impact on national political life. It required the opportunity of mobilizing electoral support to be able to exercise a certain level of influence on the political system.

Later, as shown by its gradual but growing electoral progress and its difficult but also growing occupation of electoral posts, the National Action Party progressed in the political arena, along with its consolidation as an organization. In this sense, its strategy was relatively successful. When the PAN's electoral progress stagnated, the growth crises that occurred in the party affected the operation of the political system in general. The crises in 1958-61 and 1975-76 were followed by major electoral reforms that resulted in a substantial increase in the PAN's political representation. The rules of competition did not change fundamentally, but the space for the PAN's participation was increased to an tolerable level in relation to its consolidation as a political organization. Thus, although it

is true that with its participation in elections the PAN contributed to the legitimization of a semi-competitive system, this participation increased its power to "blackmail" the PRI regime. The relations established between the PAN and the regime, as asymmetrical as they may have been, acquired characteristics of mutual dependence in this way.

Third, as mentioned by von Sauer and Mabry, through its legislative activities, the National Action Party had the possibility of influencing the legislative agenda. Actually, in many fields, including education, rural policy, elections, municipal activities and labor relations, the National Action Party has been able to exert influence in the formulation of Mexico's laws. However, given the limited number of times that results were immediate -they can only be appreciated in the long term- this influence could not always be capitalized on politically by the PAN in terms of authorship of the initiative. Later, I will discuss how legislative collaboration became an important element in the limited cooperation between the PAN and PRI during the Salinas administration.

Finally, the incentives for the PAN's participation increased with the gradual incorporation of greater levels of competitiveness in the political system. There are two reasons for this. First, there is a point of inflection where the ability to "blackmail" the government can be converted into capacity to substantially change the rules of the game. Second, insofar as the party was able to increase its share of the vote and achieve more elected posts and positions of power in the state and municipal governmental structures, it was more difficult for the party to adopt a strategy in which confrontation with the regime predominated.

How is the dilemma between participation and non-participation, cooperation and confrontation set forth in the PAN during the 1988-1994 period?

At the beginning of the Salinas administration, legislative collaboration with the PRI and specifically the adoption of a limited cooperation strategy in terms of electoral legislation was unexpected. Since 1983, electoral races had constituted fertile soil for the radicalization of the PAN. Proclamations of frauds committed against the National Action Party in municipal and state elections, followed by post-electoral mobilizations had given rise to a civil resistance strategy. In the 1988 elections, the PAN's presidential candidate, de la Madrid government adopted a closed attitude towards the PAN's electoral progress, particularly in states in the northern part of the country. The PAN’s post-electoral mobilizations at the municipal and state levels during the 1983-1988 period are well documented. At the municipal level, see Arturo Alvarado (ed.), Electoral Patterns and Perspectives in Mexico, San Diego, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California-San Diego, 1987, Carlos Martínez Assad (ed.) Municipios en conflicto, Mexico, UV Editores-Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales-UNAM, 1985; and Jorge Pádua and Alain Vanneph, Poder local, poder regional, México, El Colegio de México CEMCA, 1986. At the state level, Chihuahua in 1986 was the situation with the most repercussions. See Alberto Asiz.
Manuel J. Clouthier, dedicated the last weeks of his campaign to denounce the expected fraud. The redirection of PAN strategy began in July, 1988 during the long period of review and formal approval of the legislative and presidential elections and was consolidated a few days before the inauguration of President Salinas in December of the same year.

July 6, 1988, Manuel J. Clouthier jointly signed the Call to legality, with two other opposition candidates, in protest of the fraud committed in the elections which took place that same day. The PAN candidate called for civil resistance and convened a march with 100,000 participants in downtown Mexico City. On this occasion, he states that “he did not venture to affirm who had won, nor did he recognize Cárdenas” victory because the elections had been so irregular that a winner could not be identified. The same day, Cárdenas declared himself the winner in the elections; this declaration did not promote strategic rapprochement between the PAN and the National Democratic Front. From this moment on, it was clear that the PAN and PRD could coordinate their protest activities but each political organization had its own strategy.

The PAN’s position consisted of proposing a referendum about the validity of the elections and a call for new elections. This resolution was confirmed in a meeting of the National Council on July 23 and 24. During the entire month of July, Clouthier headed acts of civil resistance in different parts of the Mexican Republic. At the same time, the National Action Party took advantage of the institutional structures for certifying the elections to contest the legality of the electoral process. The party presented 159
challenges to the Electoral Contest Tribunal, the largest number of complaints presented by a single political organization. Twenty-three of them were recognized as grounded. This action had the effect of modifying the results in the PAN’s favor in two districts. Also, in the Federal Electoral Commission, Diego Fernández de Cevallos, the PAN’s representative, in collaboration with Jorge Alcocer, the National Democratic Front’s (FDN) representative through the Mexican Socialist Party (PMS), very skillfully carried out an opposition strategy against the PRI and the government.

In August, 1988, when the Electoral Colleges were inaugurated in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, the first indications of change in the National Action Party’s strategy came to light. When designating the new coordinator of the parliamentary group, Luis H. Álvarez, the party president, declared that in the next legislature the PAN would do the impossible to change the electoral law. It is in this sense that the idea of collaboration with the opposition was maintained. During the Electoral Colleges and later during the qualification of the presidential election in September, the National Action Party continued to defend its new electoral victories. In the first case, it was able to change the results in its favor in six districts, and in the second, it voted against the Congressional certification of the presidential election.

Nevertheless, when it began to concentrate its energies on a future electoral reform, the National Action Party accepted as a given the inauguration of Carlos Salinas as the president of the Republic: it was a tacit recognition that Salinas would be the de facto president, although not legally.

Various factors explain the PAN’s decision. First, the hurried self-proclaimed victory by Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas emphasized the difference in the strategic objectives of the PAN and the FDN. Second, the undisciplined attitude and lack of coordination by the deputies in the FDN coalition in the Electoral Colleges—a coalition that began to fall apart—pointed out the limits of coordinated legislative action with other opposition forces. Third, the opening of a line of dialogue on the part of the government by naming Manuel Camacho, the PRI leader most disposed for a dialogue with the opposition, gave a hint of the possibility of progress through institutional means. Camacho formally called for a

---

80 Ibid., pp. 182-184.
81 In an interview with a reporter from the weekly Proceso, the PAN’s president stated that “Salinas’ administration is a de facto government, but it is the reality we have to live with.” Proceso, No. 630, November 28, 1988.
82 The first day the Electoral College for the Chamber of Deputies was installed, August 15, a great deal of disorder and verbal confrontations between deputies from the FDN member parties and the PRI took place. Only the PAN deputies were calm. According to newspaper description of the period, in response to the question from the press about the curious impassivity on the part of the PAN parliamentary group, Deputy Gerardo Medina, veteran editor of the PAN’s official paper, La Nación, answered: “It is a matter between you... We are waiting to see the cadaver of our enemies go by...”, ibid., p. 227. The anecdote gives an idea of the consciousness of their own interests that existed in the PAN.
national Agreement between political parties on September 6.\footnote{According to an ex-advisor to Manuel Camacho, his appointment to be general secretary of the PRI at the end of July 1988 was a result of the fact that Camacho was the only PRI militant who maintained dialogue with the opposition candidates during the entire campaign. After his appointment, he sought to carry out an agreement with the two principal opposition forces: conversations with the FDN failed while those held with the PAN gave rise to what would be a sustained and difficult limited cooperation. Personal communication, June, 1996.} Finally, the PAN's ability for sustained extra-institutional mobilization was more limited than for the left-leaning opposition.

But above all, the fact that the PAN had been displaced as the second political force in the country weighs heavily in the party's strategic re-direction: alliance with the charismatic FDN candidate, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, could not benefit the party. Instead, the analysis the PAN leadership conducted at this point indicated that the party could gain more by taking advantage of the government's lack of legitimacy. Therefore, it was a wager, assuming the new president would have to find support in a new relationship with the opposition parties and especially with the one most willing to collaborate.\footnote{Leticia Barraza and Ilán Bizberg, "El Partido Acción Nacional y el régimen político mexicano", in Jorge Alonso, Alberto Asiz and Jaime Tamayo (ed.), El nuevo estado mexicano II. Estado y política, Mexico, Universidad de Guadalajara Nueva Imagen, CIESAS, 1992, p. 107.} On November 16, fifteen days before Carlos Salinas took office, the National Action Party published a document, National Commitment to Legitimacy and Democracy, that outlined the features of the PAN strategy for electoral reform.

The new balance of power created in the party system, the absence of a qualified majority (two thirds of the House) — needed to carry out constitutional reforms — on the part of the governmental party, and the inclusion of PAN's traditional demands in the Salinas administration's agenda facilitated the initiation of limited cooperation with the government. However, the strategic change of direction by the PAN was made possible by the level and characteristics of the party's institutionalization. The conflict that occurred with the transition from a confrontational strategy to one of limited cooperation did not endanger the survival of the PAN.

The change in the PAN's strategy for electoral reform at the beginning of the Salinas administration provoked the third critical internal conflict in the history of the organization. Once more, the conflict was interpreted as a confrontation between doctrinaires and neo-PAN members. The former created the Doctrinal and Democratic Forum that was opposed to the leadership of the party's president, Luis H. Alvarez. They criticized the National Executive Committee for straying from the party's doctrinal principles, his rapprochement with the government on electoral reform and his lack of respect for democratic principles in decision-making.

In my interpretation, the use of categories such as traditional panismo and neopanismo does not adequately explain the dividing lines within the party or the conflict's dynamic. Instead, I maintain that the development and outcome of this conflict are better explained in terms of the struggle for power in a highly institutionalized
organization. The interests in play and the groups that confront each other are not constituted outside the party. Rather, they are the result of PAN's internal institutional life.

To understand the conflict that the change in the PAN strategy provoked we must go back to February 1987, and the election for party president. After three rounds of voting in which no candidate reached the 66% qualified majority necessary to win, Pablo Emilio Madero, outgoing party president, declined his candidacy in favor of his adversary Luis H. Alvarez. At that time, Luis H. Alvarez was identified with neiopanista tendencies. A substantial part of his support came from entrepreneurs from the northern part of the country, who were recent party members. In programmatic terms, Alvarez wished to lessen the trend towards centralization in decision-making and in the development of party strategies. In particular, he defended the radical “civil resistance” strategy in the face of the more moderate attitude of the party leadership under Pablo Emilio Madero.

Luis H. Alvarez was the mayor of the city of Chihuahua from 1983 to 1986 but, above all, he had just been a prominent protagonist in the PAN’s “civil resistance” during the governorship campaign in the state of Chihuahua during 1986. However, the identification of Alvarez with neiopanismo is rather curious given that he was a long-time PAN militant who was a candidate for governor in 1956 and the presidency in 1958.

On the other hand, Pablo Emilio Madero, party president from 1983 to 1986 and candidate for the national presidency in 1982, had just presided over an important period of expansion by the party. Years before, he had been at the center of a controversy concerning the PAN’s presidential candidacy in 1975. It should be remembered that, at this time, his electoral pragmatism and that of the ex-president of the party, José Angel Conchello had been criticized. The traditional sectors of the party criticized Madero and his group for being tools of entrepreneurial groups foreign to the party and of straying from party doctrine. According to PAN experts, they were the first neiopanistas.

In November 1987, the party’s National Convention elected Manuel J. Clouthier in the first round, with over 70% of the votes, as the party’s candidate for the national presidency. Clouthier, a prominent entrepreneur from Sinaloa, a state in the northern part of the country, had been a member of the PAN for barely three years. He was a well known at the national level for having been the president of two important employers organizations: the Employer’s Confederation of the Mexican Republic (Coparmex) and

---

85 In the second round of voting, Luis H. Alvarez obtained 98 votes against 88 in favor of Pablo Emilio Madero. The other candidate, Eugenio Ortiz Gallegos, declined after obtaining only 3 votes in the first round (Presidencia de la Republica, p. 32).

86 In 1985, Luis H. Alvarez organizes a “Caravan for Democracy” in protest of the new state electoral law in Chihuahua that overly favors the PRI. In the summer of 1986, he goes on a hunger strike to protest the fraud committed in the election for state governor. It should be noted, however, that Alvarez himself had been defeated in the State Convention to designate a PAN candidate for governor, losing to Francisco Barrio, the mayor of Ciudad Juarez and identified with radicalism and local neiopanista tendencies (Orozco, pp. 51-68).

87 See the previous section for a description of this conflict.

88 On this topic, see Arriola, pp. 29-46.
the Entrepreneurial Coordinating Council (CCE). His adversaries, Jesús González Schmall and Salvador Rosas Magallón (a replacement for Eugenio Ortiz Gallegos), also from the north, represented more traditional tendencies in the party. Clouthier's election and Álvarez' one to the party presidency were at the time as a radicalization of the PAN.

The PAN seemed divided between a radical leadership and presidential candidate and a more moderate group that had been defeated in two internal processes. In November 1988, the opposing poles within the National Action Party appeared to switch positions.

Beginning with the presentation of the National Commitment for Legitimacy and Democracy, the National Action Party pursued a mixed strategy in its relationship with the government: it denounced all the irregularities that occurred in local and state elections but also maintained a constant line of negotiation with the government.

The PAN's National Council, convened on February 25, 1989, approved what will be the party strategy throughout the Salinas administration. This strategy emphasized: first, the professionalization of leadership and staff officers; second, maintaining constant dialogue with other political forces to carry out a substantial electoral reform; third, accepting use of public funds to which it had a right by law; fourth, undertaking initiatives that promoted the democratization of the political system. In this way the National Action Party clearly opted in favor of political action carried out predominantly within the institutional framework.

The new PAN strategy emphasizing limited cooperation with the government was concretely expressed for the first time in October, 1989 when most of the PAN parliamentary group voted in favor of constitutional amendments to allow the elaboration of a new electoral law (but 32 deputies voted against, while 20 were absent, out of a total of 101). In the same process, the PAN leadership published a “letter of intent” that implied an agreement with the government about the contents of the future electoral law.

The vote inflamed tensions within the National Action Party that were not expressed solely in the division of the parliamentary group. Two issues produced criticism of the party leadership: the content of the reform and the lack of communication between the leadership and the parliamentary group. The first criticism was expressed in a document signed by long time PAN militants that warned that the PAN could have obtained much more in negotiations with the government. Pablo Emilio Madero, ex-party president, joined in this criticism. The second criticism involved the question of internal democracy in the party and was a reaction to last minute negotiations with the government (including a meeting with President Salinas) that changed the PAN

89 Reynoso, p. 137.
91 La Jornada, October 21, 1989. I examine the details of the negotiations and the contents of the different electoral reforms in Chapter VI. Here I am interested in the negotiations' repercussions on the PAN's internal life.
parliamentary group’s decision of non-approval of the constitutional reform. In the National Council meeting held November 18 and 19, 1988, over 30% of party counsellors voted against the leadership’s decision to approve the constitutional reforms while a unanimous vote supported the conception of the constitutional reform as only a first stage, with insufficient results, in the implementation of a truly democratic electoral reform.93

Both groups’ arguments were summed up very well in the political commentaries that deputies Bernardo Báñez and Carlos Castillo Peraza published weekly in the newspaper La Jornada. For Báñez, who would later have an important role in the dissident Doctrinal and Democratic Forum, “a great dose of optimism is required to state that the above (constitutional reforms) constitutes a political reform”.94 According to him, “they let the opportunity get away”.95

Meanwhile, Castillo Peraza defended the PAN strategy from the vantage point of political realism. He affirmed that the National Action Party had to think of its actions from the standpoint of a political transition. This implied taking on responsibility for political change: “growing towards disputing power”. It also meant recognizing that the PAN was both an opposition party and a governmental party (in the recently won governorship in Baja California and important cities) which conferred on it the role of privileged interlocutor with the government, a role that can be denied only with difficulty. Finally, Castillo Peraza concluded that in this process of change, it was important to commit the government to the dynamic of transition.96

The approval of constitutional reforms took place against a background of competition for the party leadership, with internal elections planned for February 1990. The principal figures who opposed the PAN’s negotiation strategy were identified with groups that were defeated in the last election for the party presidency and in the selection process for the PAN’s presidential candidate.97 It should be noted that in the fall of 1989, Manuel J. Clouthier died in an automobile accident, leaving the interpretation of his future position in the conflict up for speculation.98

93 The description of the details of the negotiations with the government throughout 1989 can be found in Proceso, 689, January 15, 1989.
94 La Jornada, October 18, 1989.
95 La Jornada, October 25, 1989.
96 La Jornada, October 22 and 30, 1989.
97 Actually, there were a series of conflicts on the sidelines not associated with the strategy of limited cooperation with the government that occurred within some state level sectors of the party; for example, in September of 1989 the expulsion of eight state deputies from the PAN in Nuevo León, where Madero presided the party and, in 1990 and 1991, the difficulties for election of leaders and selection of candidates in Mexico City where Conchello acted as the maximum party leader.
98 I mention this because Clouthier’s attitude towards the electoral reform continues to be an enigma. Letters by him dated during the previous summer implied that he would have adopted a more combative attitude in negotiations with the government. Some of his political advisors confirm this supposition. If this had been the case, the dynamic of the conflict within the PAN would have been different, given that one of the winners would have been on the side against limited cooperation with the government. But this is pure speculation.
The February, 1990 internal election came down to a race between Luis H. Alvarez and Gabriel Jiménez Remus, a long-time PAN militant. Jiménez Remus, was initially part of a group that supported a future candidacy by Madero. His designation was considered a gesture of conciliation by the opposing sides in the National Action Party. On February 24, after four hard-fought rounds of voting, Luis H. Alvarez attained the minimum 66% required by the PAN’s statutes. However, friction in relation to the application of procedures and the membership of the new National Executive Committee led those defeated to leave the session, affirming their refusal to work with the party leadership.

Weeks later they announced the creation of the Democratic and Doctrinal Forum seeking recognition as a vertical movement within the party. This group objectives included: first, promoting a new projection of the party’s doctrinal principles; second, reforming the party statutes to allow decentralization and democratization of decision making; third, broadening the PAN’s proposal about the new federal electoral code. Its members belonged in part to what years before had been identified as the traditional PAN, and in part to leaders of what were then called the neopanistas.

As of this moment, relations between this group and the PAN leadership were tense, with a brief truce during the meeting of the National Council in September 1990. For over two years, contentious issues included the refusal to formally recognize the group as a tendency within the party, elections to the Regional Council of Mexico City, the approval of the Federal Code of Electoral Institutions and Processes (Cofipe) (with the dissident vote of around twenty PAN deputies), the designation of the candidates for the 1991 legislative elections and the negotiation to solve the electoral conflict in the state of Guanajuato in August 1991.

Faced with the refusal to consider separately their proposal for the reform of the party statutes in the Extraordinary National Council convened in September of 1992, members of the Doctrinal and Democratic Forum announced their resignation from the National Action Party and their intention to create a new political party. In March, 1993, the Democratic Forum Party was created. When unable to obtain a registration of

100 *Proceso*, No. 696, March 5, 1990.
101 Reynoso, p. 140.
103 In a declaration in which they denounce the undue rapprochement with the government and support of State policy, the growing interference by entrepreneurs in the life of the PAN, internal authoritarianism, bureaucratization of the party, the uncompromising attitude of different groups and opinions and the abandonment of the party’s doctrinal principles, nine members of the Doctrinal and Democratic Forum announced their resignation from the National Action Party and their intention to create a new political party. Among them are José González Torres, Pablo Emilio Madero, Jesús González Schmall, Bernardo Bátiz, Jorge Eugenio Ortiz Gallegos, all prominent party militants. (*Proceso*, 832, October 12, 1992. It is worth noting that many of the criticisms of the party leadership were the same ones that years before were directed against Pablo Emilio Madero’s group by doctrinaire PAN members at that time.
its own for its candidates (due to reasons related to timing) in order to compete in the 1994 elections, they formed an alliance with the PRD: they did not obtain even one electoral position. Also in March 1993, Carlos Castillo Peraza was elected president of the PAN in a close competition in which the strategic orientation of the party was not a topic for debate. The next fall, after a single round of voting, Diego Fernández de Cevallos was elected the National Action Party’s candidate for the national presidency. In the August, 1994 elections the PAN obtained 27% of the vote, by far the best electoral result in its history.

In sum, the conflict created by the change in the strategic direction taken by the PAN was a type of conflict inherent to a highly institutionalized organization. The high level of institutionalization in the party organization allowed it to adapt to the changing conditions in its environment in order to obtain the greatest possible benefits from a limited cooperation strategy.

Although it is true that the decision concerning whether or not to cooperate with the government was the spark that set off the conflict between Luis H. Álvarez’ leadership and the forum members, the conflict had begun to grow before the approval of the constitutional reforms related to elections, in 1989. It is noteworthy that the moderate/radical alternative was inverted depending on which of the adversaries controlled the power structures in the party. More than the decision about the attitude that should be taken in terms of electoral reform, what was at stake was power within the party organization. The struggle between Álvarez’ leadership and the forum members took place in terms of the organization’s procedures and issues.

Along the same line of reasoning, it should be noted that the division between neopanistas and traditional panistas is no longer a valid explanation for the conflict within the National Action Party. The 1989-1992 conflict shows that, behind the party president Luis H. Álvarez, both new and long-time party militants can be found. Likewise, the common denominator that united the forum members was not so much their faithfulness to traditional party doctrine —many of them were on opposite sides in 1975-1978— as it was their exclusion from internal power structures in the party.

This leads me to assert that the coalitions and divisions within the PAN took place in relation to procedures and issues linked to the organization’s life as such, for example internal elections and candidate selection. The issue of limited cooperation with the government magnified already existent internal opposition. The previous history of alignments within the party confirms this tendency, but its analysis is beyond the scope of this work.

It is noteworthy that the PAN’s internal conflicts took place within the organization’s formal rules and procedures. As Victor Reynoso remarks, “...it stands out that the Forum members did not protest the breach of the party’s written norms but wanted changes in them.”

In the Mexican party system, this situation is unusual at the very least.

104 Reynoso, p. 149.
Thus, the level of institutionalization in the National Action Party influenced its adoption of a strategy of limited cooperation with the government in that this strategy allowed for the survival and growth of the organization. That is, the PAN’s characteristics as an organization allowed it to adapt to a change in its environment and benefit from a political opportunity. The measure of the National Action Party’s success can be perceived in the fact that the internal conflict that the change in strategy provokes did not put the survival of the organization at risk, nor did it promote the appearance of a successful political organization that constituted competition. It can also be appreciated in terms of success in obtaining government positions at the state and local level, elected positions at the national level and notable progress in terms of electoral support.

I insist in my emphasis on the organizational variable because it has received less attention in the explanation of the adoption by the PAN of a dominant strategy of limited cooperation with the governmental party during the Salinas administration. The traditional explanation of the PAN-PRI relationship during this period, is based more on system characteristics such as a deficit of governmental legitimacy, the programmatic agreement between the PAN and the government in terms of economic policy and the government’s need for legislative support to obtain the qualified, two thirds majority required for approval of constitutional reforms. Of course, all these factors are important in that they constitute the environment in which the PAN’s strategic assessment was developed but they are not sufficient conditions.

Programmatic agreement resulted in legislative collaboration to modify the Constitution in matters of importance such as the privatization of the financial sector, changes in the land ownership regime (article 27) and amendments to the article that governed the relations between the government and the Church (article 130). All these governmental initiatives coincided with demands traditionally made by the National Action Party. In this way, the possibility for establishing trade-offs between the government and the PAN was created in the public policy arena formulation.

The argument used by PAN’s leadership to justify this collaboration was that they were having their traditional demands implemented without having to pay the cost for it as a governmental party would. By contrast, it can be argued that the PAN had no choice given that the PRI was “stealing” its program. However, if necessary, legislative bargaining would have always made it possible for the PAN to criticize and vote against proposals that were close but not equal to its traditional political demands. This collaboration was also tactically used to facilitate the acceptance of PAN’s victories in gubernatorial elections: during their campaigns, both Ernesto Ruffo in Baja California and later, Francisco Barrio in Chihuahua, emphasized their agreement with the main features of Salinas’ administration politics.

However, the important factor is that the arena for limited cooperation between the PAN and the Salinas government exceeded the domain of electoral reform. In terms of potential political exchange, the possibilities of developing a relationship of trust expanded. This was a clear advantage the PAN had over the other opposition party, the PRD. It had leverage to force the government to fulfill its commitments. In addition, for
the government, the party discipline exhibited by the PAN constituted a guarantee that legislative collaboration would be effective: except for the divided approval of the electoral constitutional reforms of 1989, PAN’s delegation in the Congress voted in a disciplined way.

The National Action Party’s electoral situation was another important factor in the strategic decisions by the party leadership. The party’s geographic penetration, the consolidation of its apparatus for mobilizing votes and its electoral results in general led to the expectation of good results in an environment of relatively fair electoral competition. The success of PAN strategy can be measured in the party’s electoral progress.

Serious analysis of electoral behavior is still scarce in Mexico. However, the few available studies point out that the PAN’s main constituency is basically urban and highly educated. According to Dominguez and McCaan’s survey analysis, the PAN’s support is especially strong among younger, better educated and nonunionized voters. Surprisingly for a party that has long been labelled as conservative, neither religion nor economic issues are correlated with support for the PAN. The northern states and Mexico City are its main strongholds although, in 1988, the PAN started showing indications of becoming a national party.

Even though statistics show an impressive increase in its support in national contests (Table II), the PAN’s electoral progress took place first at the state level with the victory in the race for the governorship of Baja California in the summer of 1989: it was the first time in the history of the current regime that an opposition victory in a gubernatorial election was recognized. Then in 1992, Francisco Barrio won the governorship of the state of Chihuahua.

Actually, one of the PAN’s strengths is the geographical distribution of its support. It has high probabilities of winning local and state electoral offices. Results of the federal legislative elections show the electoral support for the PAN in the states tends to grow, especially after 1991: from 1988 to 1994, the number of states where the National Action Party obtained over 20% of the vote grew from 13 to 23; during the same time period, its absolute vote grew in 31 states. (Tables III and IV)

According to Table V, during the Salinas administration the PAN experienced the highest increase among the political parties in the number of state deputies and municipal governments it controlled: between the first and second terms of state legislative and municipal governments of the sexenio, the number of PAN deputies increased by 29%, that of the PRD by 24% and that of the PRI by just 3%. The number of PAN controlled municipalities increased by 132%, as opposed to a growth of 17% for the PRD and a

decline of 4% for the PRI. Now, if we turn to the data provided by the PAN, in 1988 there were just 18 mayors from that party in the nation and 680 municipal councillors; in 1994, there were 128 mayors and 1,864 municipal councillors. In 1988, there were just 95 state deputies from the PAN, in 1994, they numbered 176. This means that the characteristics of the PAN’s geographic presence allowed it to progress in elections, winning positions in the government at the local and state level.

However, the 1991 legislative election, with stagnation in the percentage of the PAN vote, backsliding in the number of members of the parliamentary group and conflicts due to electoral fraud in concurrent elections for governor in San Luis Potosí and Guanajuato put the strategy of limited cooperation with the government at risk. However, later the PAN won another victory in an election for governor in 1992, in elections for mayor in a number of important cities and the impressive progress by the party in the 1994 legislative and presidential elections (almost 10 points higher in comparison to the previous elections), all of which seems to confirm the accuracy of the evaluation the PAN leadership made of its possibilities to grow in electoral terms.

It was also no secret for most observers of Mexican party politics that the PAN had invested a great deal of resources in the formation of its own team of electoral experts that travelled from one contested state election to the other in order to support the party’s candidates. That initiative rested on a belief in the mobilization of votes and in modern techniques of electoral campaigning that were still an oddity in the context of Mexican opposition politics. This is an aspect of the PAN’s strategy that was coherent with its efforts at cleaning the electoral process through reform and limited cooperation with the government. Even though I did not research this aspect of the PAN’s organization in depth, I had the opportunity of closely watching the PAN’s electoral SWAT team, the Brigada Azul, when I was covering the Chihuahua state election for the political magazine Este País in 1992. In the 1988 post-electoral environment, the PAN was the opposition party most prepared to progress in unequal electoral competitions.

Summary

Every three years, there are state legislative and municipal elections in Mexico. Given that they are held at different dates depending on each state’s electoral calendar, I decided to group them under the rough categories of first and second period. The PRD’s high figures of growth can be explained by the fact that it started to compete as a party one year after the 1988 election. Earlier, the neo-Cardenist candidates were competing under the banner of the small parties. It should be noted that during the 1988-1994 period, the major parties increased their number of deputies and municipalities controlled at the expense of the small parties.

Data obtained from the PAN’s Secretary of Electoral Action in February of 1996.

In 1991, elections for governor in San Luis Potosí and Guanajuato gave rise to post-electoral anti-fraud mobilizations. In both cases, a political solution to the conflicts was reached with the resignation of the elected PRI candidates and the naming of interim governors. In Guanajuato, a PAN member was designated interim governor. This topic is dealt with in greater detail in chapter VI.
In sum, the argument developed in this chapter is that organizational characteristics of the National Action Party allow it to make a change in strategy in its relation with the regime in such a way as to minimize internal costs and increase benefits. The high level of institutionalization of the PAN and organizational characteristics that favor adaptation to changes in its environment allowed it to adopt a strategy in which limited cooperation with the government (specifically the Salinas administration) predominated, without putting at risk the party’s survival as an autonomous organization.

To understand the National Action Party’s institutionalization process, it is important to refer to its genetic model. Since its creation in 1939, a very clear conception has existed that the party organization constitutes the most efficient means to carry out political action. Later, the adverse institutional context in which the PAN initially grew forced its militants to invest in the internal consolidation of the organization.

The organizational characteristics of the PAN are reflected in the evolution of party statutes that constitute constant but flexible rules for managing relations within the organization. The study of the evolution of the organization’s statutes reveals a party where participation takes place through successive filters. The party president and the National Executive Committee have the necessary tools to control the PAN’s internal life. The place where the party’s dominant coalition is formed is the National Council. This concentration of the internal sources of power in an elitist and numerically limited structure tends to reduce the damage caused by schisms. The capacity to manage internal conflict is not only reflected in the rules that govern the organization. A successful history of conflict solving also constitutes an important resource within the organization to face threats of internal divisions.

The PAN’s high degree and type of institutionalization allowed the party, at the beginning of the Salinas administration, to undertake an important strategic change of direction and take advantage of a political situation that was potentially favorable but also contained high risks for the organization’s survival.
División de Administración Pública

Mariscal, Judith, *Telecommunications Reform in Mexico: An Institutional Perspective*. AP-103

Cabrero Mendoza, Enrique, *La acción pública en municipios urbanos. Una Propuesta de marco teórico*. AP-104

Bracho González, Teresa, *Desigualdad social y educación en México. Una perspectiva sociológica*. AP-105

Ramírez, Jesús y Edgar, Ramírez, *Génesis y desarrollo del concepto de nueva Gestión Pública. Bases organizacionales para el replanteamiento de la acción administrativa y su impacto en la reforma del gobierno*. AP-106

Carter, Nicole, y Leonard, Ortolano, *The Role of Two NAFTA Institutions in Developing Water Infrastructure in the U.S.-Mexico Border Region*. AP-107


Nava – Campos Gabriela, *Fiscal Implications of Mexico’s 1994 Banking Crisis and Bailout*. AP-109

Baltazar Macías, Atzimba y Juan Pablo, Guerrero Amparan, *La reforma municipal en Tlaxcala*. AP-110

Baltazar Macías, Atzimba y Juan Pablo, Guerrero Amparan, *La reforma municipal en Oaxaca*. AP-111

División de Economía

López Calva, Luis F. y Juan, Rosellón, *On the Potential Distributive Impact of Electricity Reform in Mexico*. E-223

Villagómez, Alejandro, *La subcuenta de vivienda y el INFONAVIT*. E-224

Del Ángel, Gustavo y Bernardo, Batiz -Lazo, *Collaboration and Strategic Alliances among Competing Financial Intermediaries. Cases in British and Mexican Banking (1945-1975)*. E-225


Ramírez, José Carlos y Rogelio, Sandoval, *Patrones no lineales en los rendimientos de las acciones de la BMV: una prueba basada en cadenas de Markov de segundo orden*. E-227

Brito, Dagobert L, y Juan, Rosellón, *A General Equilibrium Model of Pricing Natural Gas in Mexico*. E-228

Ramírez, José y Juan, Rosellón, *Pricing Natural Gas Distribution in Mexico*. E-229

Brito, Dagobert L y Juan, Rosellón, *A Solar Power Project in Mexico for the California Electricity Market*. E-230

Cordourier, Gabriela y Gómez-Galvarriato, Aurora, *La evolución de la participación laboral de las mujeres en la industria en México: una visión de largo plazo*. E-231
División de Estudios Internacionales

Borja Tamayo, Arturo. Materiales para la docencia: el marco conceptual básico de la disciplina de las Relaciones Internacionales. EI-78.

Trubowitz, Peter. Structure and Choice in Foreign Policy Analysis. EI-79.

Trubowitz, Peter. The Bush Administration and Future of Transatlantic Relations. EI-80.

Schiavon, Jorge A. Sobre contagios y remedios: la heterodoxia económica del New Deal, la política exterior corrección de Roosevelt y su impacto sobre la administración cardenista. EI-81.

Jones, Adam. The Russian Press in the Post Soviet Era: A Case-Study of Izvestia. EI-82

Jones, Adam. Genocide and Humanitarian Intervention: Incorporating the Gender Variable. EI-83

Minushkin, Susan y Charles W. Parker III. Government – Financial Sector Relations and the New Financial Structure in Mexico. EI-84


Velasco, Jesús. Caminando por la historia intelectual de Seymour Martin Lipset. EI-86

Chabat, Jorge. The Combat of Drug Trafficking in Mexico under Salinas: The Limits of Tolerance, EI-87

Chabat, Jorge. Mexico’s War on Drugs: No Margin for Maneuver, EI-88

Schiavon, Jorge A. International Relations and Comparative Politics: Cooperation or Conflict?, EI-89

División de Estudios Políticos


Negretto, Gabriel. Does the President Govern Alone? Legislative Decree Authority and Institutional Design in Brazil and Argentina. EP-133.


Colomer, Josep M. Reflexiones sobre la reforma política en México. EP-141

Negretto, Gabriel. Diseño constitucional y separación de poderes en América Latina. EP-142

División de Historia

Pipitone, Ugo, La decadencia previa, o de cómo Inglaterra dejó de ser el centro del mundo. H-01.

Pipitone, Ugo, ¿Hacia el fin del ciclo americano? H-02.


Prieto, José, Las uniones creativas. H-09.


Rojas, Rafael, El espacio público de la Independencia. H-12.


Favre, Henri, Chiapas 1993: intento de análisis de una situación de insurrección. H-14

Pipitone, Ugo, La región europea en formación. H-15

Meyer, Jean, Guerra, Violencia y Religión. H-16

Meyer, Jean, Guerra, religión Y violencia, el contexto salvadoreño de la muerte de Monseñor Romero. H-17