THE REVOLUTIONARY LEVIATHAN; POLITICAL SURVIVAL AND THE FOUNDATION OF A SINGLE HEGEMONIC PARTY IN MEXICO
Las colecciones de Documentos de Trabajo del CIDE representan un medio para difundir los avances de la labor de investigación, y para permitir que los autores reciban comentarios antes de su publicación definitiva. Se agradecerá que los comentarios se hagan llegar directamente al (los) autor(es).

D.R. © 2000, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, A. C., carretera México-Toluca 3655 (km. 16.5), Lomas de Santa Fe, 01210 México, D. F., tel. 727-9800, fax: 292-1304 y 570-4277. Producción a cargo del (los) autor(es), por lo que tanto el contenido como el estilo y la redacción son responsabilidad exclusiva suya.
This paper analyzes one of the most significant institutional innovations in Mexican political history: the foundation of the National Revolutionary Party (PNR). The PNR rapidly gained control over the vast majority of public offices and provided the basis for the development of a powerful and unrestrained presidency with the capacity to introduce radical policy changes. This paper addresses three questions related to the PNR formation: 1) why did the vast majority of legislators join the new political party?; 2) what were the new party's instruments to coordinate legislators?; and 3) how did the formation of the PNR affect executive-legislative relations? To answer these questions the paper looks at how the structure of career incentives drove the consolidation of a large number of local political parties into a national single-party organization.

Este artículo analiza uno de las innovaciones institucionales más importantes de la historia política de México: la fundación del Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR). El PNR ganó rápidamente control sobre la gran mayoría de cargos públicos y estableció las bases para el desarrollo de una presidencia poderosa con la capacidad de introducir cambios radicales de política. El artículo aborda tres cuestiones relacionadas con la formación del PNR: 1) ¿por qué la gran mayoría de los legisladores se incorporaron al nuevo partido?; 2) ¿cuáles fueron los instrumentos del nuevo partido para coordinar a los legisladores?; y 3) ¿cuál fue el efecto de la formación del PNR en las relaciones ejecutivo-legislativo? Para responder estas preguntas el artículo analiza la forma en que la estructura de incentivos de carrera llevó a la consolidación de un gran número de partidos políticos locales en un solo partido nacional.
Introduction

The 1920s is a foundational period in Mexican political history. The politics of post-revolutionary Mexico is the source of practices and organizations that have been able to endure and prevail over changing circumstances. In particular, there are two long-lasting aspects of Mexican politics that came into being in the late 1920s—single-party dominance over the vast majority of public offices—and high levels of cohesiveness in the party's delegations to the federal Congress. These patterns of political behavior changed substantially the functioning of the Mexican government, providing the foundations for the development of a powerful and unrestrained presidency with the capacity to introduce radical policy changes.

The years running from 1928 to 1930 are perhaps some of the most studied periods in Mexican history, and yet its complexity is still intriguing. The period covers three peculiar administrations. The interim administration of Emilio Portes Gil, which lasted 14 months; the administration of an elected presidency, Pascual Ortiz Rubio, which aborted at the end of its second year, and the emergency administration of Abelardo Rodríguez. Even more, three legislatures were elected in these years each of them operating under different circumstances.

Despite this variety, Mexican historiography classifies these years as part of the same period known as the Maximato (Dulles, 1972; Meyer, Segovia and Lajous, 1978; Lajous, 1979; Garrido, 1982 and Medin, 1982). Ex-president Plutarco Elias Calles (1924-1928) appears as the main political protagonist. He is the Jefe Máximo or the Supreme Boss of the revolutionary family, possessing enormous political influence and the ability to prevail over the president of the Republic even though he was not the chief executive. Some historians describe the political situation of the period as a "diarchy" pointing out to the co-existence of an independent source of political authority—ex-president Calles—with that of the presidency of the Republic (Meyer, 1978). Other historians emphasize not so much the power of ex-president Calles as the weakness of incumbent presidents (Medin, 1982). According to Medin the ascendancy of the Supreme Boss is nothing but the history of an undermined presidency.

The account of Mexican politics during the period as centered on the personal power of ex-president Calles too often rests on functionalist interpretations of political events. The decisions of a multiplicity of actors are construed as responding to a single and pervasive influence—the power of the Supreme Boss. These interpretations dwell substantially on journalistic chronicles and the memoirs of influential politicians.¹ Very little empirical evidence is provided regarding the

¹ Most influential among historians are the memoirs of José M. Puig Casauranc (1938), Emilio Portes Gil (1941), Alberto J. Pani (1950).
weakness of incumbent chief executives—a key factor in the historical interpretations of politics during the period. However, recent research on the law-making process (Weldon, 1997) has produced interesting data showing that the “weak” presidents of the period were in fact growing in their ability to gain congressional support to pass executive-initiated legislation.

One of the most significant institutional innovations of the period was the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR). The foundation of the PNR in 1929 inaugurates a long-lasting period of “unitary government” in which the presidency and the law-making majorities in both chambers of the Congress have been controlled by a single political party. Why did the vast majority of legislators join the new political party? How did the new institutions that the PNR brought about change the career strategies of legislators? Which were the new party’s instruments to coordinate legislators? How did the structure of the PNR affect executive-legislative relations? This paper addresses these questions by analyzing four aspects of the congressional politics of the time: firstly, the structure of career incentives that legislators faced; secondly, the logic of the consolidation of local parties into a national single-party organization; thirdly, the operation of PNR congressional contingents, and finally the way in which the renewal of the presidency of the Republic affected congressional politics.

The Structure of Career Incentives

The goals that legislators pursue are the key to understanding their political behavior. The strategies of cooperation of members of Congress depend on the objectives that they seek to advance. Particularly in the analysis of executive-legislative relations it is important to consider the way in which legislators can be affected by the president in the realization of their goals. For analytical purposes we can separate out the political goals of legislators from other ends. The most observable goal that we have in politics is the achievement of public office (Schlesinger, 1991). Of course politicians also pursue other goals of more substantive nature such as changes in public policy. However, in explaining the strategic behavior of politicians there are two reasons why we can assume that purely goals have a pre-emptive significance. Firstly, while policy goals are oriented to the production of “collective goods”, by achieving public office politicians obtain a private benefit. Secondly, accomplishing policy ends often involves the gaining and holding public office (Schlesinger, 1991).

The institutional arrangement regulating access to elective office molds the career advancement strategies of legislators. Accordingly, the starting point to analyze the structure of incentives that Mexican legislators faced in the 1920s is the system of single-member districts (SMD) through which members of Congress were elected. To achieve office legislators had to win the plurality of votes in their
respective constituencies. This type of electoral system has important implications in terms of the incentives for legislators to cooperate with political parties. SMD systems create incentives for legislators to cultivate a direct “electoral connection” with their local constituencies limiting the electoral influence of national political parties. As SMD systems link legislators to their local constituencies they promote particularism in Congress and restrain the formation of cohesive coalitions at the national level (Shugart and Carey, 1992). Party leaders in Congress have limited instruments to sanction dissidence and reward cooperation.

There is very little information about elections in the 1920s. We know that the chambers of the Congress were renewed every two years as prescribed by the Constitution through elections organized by municipal governments (García Orozco, 1989). Historians describe elections as regular but fraudulent processes, often controlled through violence by local political bosses (Dulle, 1972; Garrido, 1982). The political situation of post-revolutionary Mexico hardly allowed for free electoral competition for public office.

The only available data on elections during the period are the names of the candidates running for the Congress that gained the plurality certificate (constancia de mayoría) from the electoral district board. In the 1920s Mexican legislators were allowed to run for reelection without any restrictions. Thus, available information throws some light on the career paths of legislators before the 1933 constitutional amendment that prohibited reelection in consecutive terms. The data presented in Table 1, show that prior to the introduction of non-consecutive reelection both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate were highly unstable bodies. On average, seven out of ten deputies elected between 1926-1934 were freshmen. The Senate had a more stable membership, but only because the senatorial term lasted four years, twice as much as that of the Chamber of Deputies. However, the Senate’s turnover rates in elections were even higher than the Chamber’s. As Table 2 shows, the average turnover rate in the Senate during the 1926-1934 period was 80 percent.

A more accurate indicator of the ability of legislators to retain their positions is the rate of reelection, measured as the percentage of outgoing congressmen who managed to return to office after elections. Table 3 shows that reelection rate for members of the Chamber of Deputies varied from 35.2 percent to 16.9 percent during the period, with this variation being partly related to the reduction in the number of office opportunities in the Chamber. Indeed, the overall number of Chamber districts was cut from 280 to 153 from 1928 to 1930.

As this change came into effect, reelection rates dropped to its lowest level during the period (16.9 percent). In the upper chamber the percentage of outgoing legislators achieving reelection was even lower on average—less than 20 percent—.

Table 1
Composition of the Chamber of Deputies, 1926-1934
Mexican legislators had persistently lower reelection rates than U.S. congressmen during the same period. Members of the House of Representatives achieved reelection at rates varying from 83 to 62 percent. The contrast with the Mexican Chamber of Deputies is even more striking if we take into account that reelection rates for U.S. representatives in the 1920s were the lowest of the 20th century. Reelection rates in the U.S. Senate varied from 78 to 53 percent in the period...
remaining at substantially higher levels than the Mexican upper chamber. In fact, even in the mid-19th century, the period of greatest membership instability in the U.S. Congress, reelection rates were not as low as those achieved in the Mexican legislature during the 1920s.

Available information on reelection for Mexican congressmen is still incomplete. We do not know the percentage of legislators actually seeking reelection. However, persistently low reelection rates indicate that for the vast majority of Mexican politicians serving in the Congress reelection was not the most significant career goal. Reelection was either inaccessible or unattractive. As it is unlikely that Congress was a political dead-end, we can presume that holding office in the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate was a brief career experience serving as a stepping-stone towards higher office in state and national politics. Low reelection rates also suggest that politicians serving in the Congress faced uncertain career prospects and that their chances of surviving in politics depended on actors outside the legislature controlling access to office opportunities. If we take into account actual career patterns of legislators, it is less surprising that they passed legislation curtailing their own chances of achieving reelection, such as the suppression of 130 seats in the Chamber of Deputies in 1927 and the constitutional banning on consecutive reelection in 1933.

Politicians seeking and holding office in the Congress advanced their political careers amid much uncertainty. Uncertainty was reflected in the recurring changes in electoral regulations shaping their prospects of career advancement. In fact, the three legislatures elected from 1926 to 1934 operated under different conditions of career incentives. The 279 members of the Chamber of Deputies took office in September 1928 knowing that nearly half of them would see their districts disappear, as the previous Legislature (1926-1928) had passed an initiative reducing the size of the lower chamber to 150 seats coming into effect in 1930. Even more, 50 deputies and 7 senators were removed from office on charges of supporting the armed rebellion against the government led by general Gonzalo Escobar in 1930, shortly after the first year of session finished (Meyer, Segovia and Lajous, 1978). As the rebellion failed, these legislators not only lost their offices but the possibility of continuing their careers in Mexican politics. In 1933, the 35th Legislature (1932-1934) voted through a constitutional amendment bill drafted by the National Executive Committee of the PRN to prohibit outgoing members of the Congress to

---

2 The initiative was introduced by general Álvaro Obregón, ex-president of the Republic (1920-1924) and then running for a second term in the presidency. It still remains unclear the reason why members of the Chamber of Deputies voted for an initiative further reducing their chances of reelection. The fact is that the Obregónista Bloc in the Chamber overwhelmingly prevailed over the Labor Bloc in the roll-call vote with 190 votes for the constitutional amendment and 12 votes against it (Diario de los Debates, Cámara de Diputados, 21/5/1928).
run for reelection in consecutive terms. By approving this initiative, they renounced to any chances of returning to office and reshaped their options of career advancement.

The Consolidation of Local Parties

The Constituent Assembly of 1917 did not consider political parties as necessary instruments for the Constitution to work. Accordingly, this type of associations was not even mentioned in the constitutional text. Even more, the Constituent Assembly drafted an electoral system that prevented the development of cohesive party organizations at the national level. On the one side, the elective organs of government were subject to different electoral cycles. Up to 1928, the presidency was renewed every four years. The 1928 constitutional amendment extended the presidential term to six years, but the system of different electoral cycles was preserved. Senators kept serving for a four-year term going to the polls by halves in staggering two-year cycles. All seats in the Chamber of Deputies were renewed every two years. All in all, there were two mid-term elections in the course of an administration with the potential to destroy presidential coalitions in Congress.

On the other side, the arrangement of electoral institutions clearly linked the political careers of politicians seeking and holding office in the Congress to their local territorial constituencies. In accordance with the SMD system, controlling elections in federal states and districts allowed politicians to control turf in the national legislature. Besides, the nomination by a national political party was not necessary to run as candidate for the Congress. In fact, the presidency of the

---

3 The National Executive Committee of the PNR organized the 1st Extraordinary National Convention to discuss and approve its proposal to prohibit the consecutive reelection of federal and state legislators along with municipal presidents and councilors. The Convention met in October 1932 and approved the National Executive Committee's proposal by unanimity. The proposal was then sent to the Congress, where the National Revolutionary Bloc voted it into constitutional law (Lajous, 1979).

4 The first electoral law of post-revolutionary Mexico was issued in 1918, shortly after the promulgation of the Constitution. The 1918 federal electoral law established minimal requirements to formally constitute political parties. But political parties were not granted any special rights. The "constitutionalization" of political parties in Mexico took place in 1964 with the introduction of party seats in the Chamber of Deputies by constitutional amendment. However, in practice, political parties have been part of the Mexican constitutional system since 1946 as changes in electoral law provided to political parties the exclusive right to nominate candidates for elective office in the federal government (Paoli Bolio, 1985).

5 The initiative to extend the presidential-term from four to six years was part of a package of constitutional amendment to strengthen the presidency which also included a bill permitting the reelection of presidents after a break out of office of one term. Both amendments to the Constitution passed in 1927 as the campaign to reelect general Álvaro Obregón, who had served as president from 1920 to 1924, gained widespread support in the Congress.
The Revolutionary Leviathan: Political...

Republic was the only federal office responsible to a nation-wide constituency requiring a campaign organization surpassing state limits.

The only incentive to form national electoral coalitions was that of capturing the benefits associated with the presidency of the Republic. Federal chief executives had a substantial amount of patronage to reward supporters and allies as all positions in the federal administration, from the army to the foreign service, were filled by presidential appointment. In fact, the “national” political parties organized in the 1920s were all dependent on presidential patronage. President Álvaro Obregón initially favored the Partido Liberal Constitucionalista (PLC), and in the second part of his administration supported the Partido Nacional Cooperativista (PNC) and the Partido Nacional Agrarista (PNA). President Plutarco Elías Calles (1924-1928) promoted the Partido Laborista Mexicano (PLM) led by his appointed head of the Federal Department of Industry, Commerce and Labor, Luis N. Morones. These political parties went into disarray as they fell out with the incumbent president, as in the case of the PLM and PNC, or the administration on which they depended came to an end (Fuentes Díaz, 1972).

The main weakness of national political parties was lack of control over the nomination of candidates to the presidency of the Republic. There were no institutions regulating the ambitions of aspiring politicians seeking to capture the presidential office. Politicians, especially those with successful careers in the revolutionary army ran for the presidency by organizing political movements independently of existing political parties. As these movements succeeded, as in the case of Obregón, political parties moved into power with their members collecting the spoils of the victory. However, parties died away as the political movements that led them into power lost momentum and the competition for the presidential office rose giving way to new movements.

Historians have remarked the proliferation of local political parties as one of the defining characteristics of Mexican politics in 1920s (Dulles, 1972; Meyer, Segovia and Lajous, 1978; Loyola Díaz, 1980; Garrido, 1982; Medin, 1982). In discussing the context in which President Plutarco Elías Calles (1924-1928) put forth the proposal to form the PNR in his last state-of-union speech, Segovia and Lajous say: “Mexico was not wanting political parties; there were too many of them” (Meyer, Segovia and Lajous, 1978, 22). We know that local political parties were in fact the building blocks for the formation of the PNR. The PNR came into being as a loose confederation of parties. Garrido (1982) describes how local political parties survived within the PNR up to 1933 taking part in the competition for nominations as separate structures. The National Executive Committee of the PNR managed to pass a

---

6 Alvarado (1990) argues that the initiative inviting existing political organizations to join the PNR spawn the formation of parties as a strategy of politicians to advance their interests within the new party organization. Corporate affiliation to the PNR was the predominant strategy over individual affiliation for it improved chances of gaining the PNR’s nomination to elective offices.
resolution in the 2nd National Convention of 1933 forcing affiliated party organizations to dissolve under the threat of expulsion.

What still remains unaccounted for is why local political parties were the prevailing form of political organization in 1920s. Part of the answer lies in the arrangement of electoral institutions drafted by the Constituent Assembly of 1917. The Constitution created a complex of elective offices in each federal state linked by overlapping territorial constituencies—federal states—federal electoral districts, state electoral districts and municipalities. The main incentive prompting the organization of political parties was the office opportunities disputed within the state territories—state governor—senator, federal deputy, state deputy and municipal president and city councilor.

According to the existing electoral framework, elective office opportunities within federal states were contested separately in single-member constituencies. Each elective office allowed for the formation of what Schlesinger calls a party "nucleus". There were incentives for individual politicians to consolidate these party nuclei, but in the 1920s the development of larger party organizations was still incipient. The proliferation of political parties was such that in various federal states there were many municipal parties and regional parties. However, in some federal states local politicians managed to solve coordination problems and built state parties consolidating into a single organization a group of individuals seeking office in separate single-member constituencies.

State governors were in key strategic positions to organize parties at state level. State governors had at their disposal powerful organizational instruments. To begin with, control of access to patronage positions in the state administration allowed governors to recruit political cadre, reward the loyalty of party supporters, and sanction dissidence. State governors had the power to dispense other clientelistic goods to mobilize large social groups. They were in charge of implementing land reform, which allowed them to organize the land-less peasantry for political purposes (Córdova, 1973).

Despite these powers, state governors faced important restrictions. As they could not run for reelection, the unity of state parties in government was under threat. For state parties to survive as institutions, they had to deal with complex collective action problems such as controlling the conflict of ambitions between contending aspirants. Often state parties were easy prey of destructive factionalism as the administration approached its end. Another important restriction came from the constitutional power of the federal Senate to remove state powers including governors, legislatures and judiciaries. These powers were often used during the 1920s (González Oropeza, 1983). Finally, state governors had to deal with

7 The Senate had the ability to issue a "disappearance of powers declaration" for a particular state by simple majority and then appoint an interim governor choosing from the three-candidate pool put forward by the president of the Republic.
unicameral legislatures having limited constitutional powers to check and balance their authority. In some respects, state constitutions preserved the arrangement that prevailed under the federal Constitution of 1857. Mechanisms to protect executive authority such as bicameralism and the power of chief executives to veto legislation passed by the Congress were not incorporated into state polities. Local constitutions had therefore that tendency to annul executive authority which Emilio Rabasa termed “cameralism” in his critique of the federal Constitution of 1857 (1976 [1912]). Even more, lame-duck governors faced legislators who had the ability to run for reelection and the prospect of a legislative career well beyond the life of the administration. Within this context, it is not surprising that state governments were often paralyzed by inter-branch conflicts. Frequently during this period, state legislatures disowned governors prompting the intervention of the federal government, a practice known as “camarazo” in the political jargon of the times (Meyer, 1978).

These restrictions notwithstanding, where they developed, state parties were organized by governors using the resources of the administration. Such was the case of the most widely known local party of the 1920s—the Partido Socialista Fronterizo—which dominated politics in the federal state of Tamaulipas and was headed by governor Emilio Portes Gil who later became interim president of the Republic. But there were other important instances as well of dominant state parties: the Partido Socialista de Trabajo in the state of Mexico ran by governor Abundio Gómez; the Partido Socialista Radical Tabasqueño, identified with governor Tomás Garrido Canabal; the Partido Socialista Veracruzano, organized by governor Adalberto Tejeda; and, the Partido Socialista del Sureste, linked to the governor of Yucatán state, Salvador Alvarado. The ascendancy of these parties in state politics confirms that single-party politics at the state level was not an alien practice before the formation of the PNR. In fact, there is anecdotal evidence that the Partido Socialista Fronterizo served as inspiring model for the constitution of the PNR (Puig Casauranc, 1938).

The underlying causes of low reelection rates in the federal Congress are probably related to the way state and local parties operated. To some extend the instability of the federal Congress reflected the instability of local politics. After all, local parties were fragile organizations linked to the political fortune of state governors. As governors were not able to run for reelection, the renewal of the gubernatorial office affected state delegations to the federal Congress. Besides, it was not at all uncommon during the period for governors to be deposed long before the gubernatorial term was completed. Also, rotation of office in the federal Congress could have been part of a strategy to reward local political cadres and

---

8 Puig Casauranc, president Calles’s private secretary, describes the Partido Socialista del Trabajo as a “political organ of the State”, an expression that later was commonly used to describe the PNR and its successors.
maintain the unity of state parties. After all, the strategy of rotation of office serves to contain the conflict of ambition among members of the same party.9

There was a link between state and national politics that was a source of instability regularly threatening the survival of local parties. As the competition for the presidency of the Republic gained momentum, local politicians had to decide for which candidate they would campaign. Naturally ambitious politicians would prefer to support the candidate having the highest chances of winning. However, there were no sure bets in the politics of the 1920s. The race for the presidency involved the use of military force. But, given the dispersion of military power, it was highly uncertain which candidate would end up gaining the backing of the most influential generals in the army. And the stakes in the race for the presidency were high. Losing in the presidential-succession game could entail the end of a party’s dominant position in local politics or its destruction. The political defeat of a presidential candidate was followed by huge political purges and the persecution of those who publicly supported him.

Local political parties faced a typical collective action problem. Certainly the potential payoffs for participants in the race were high. However, even winners would be better off if they could prevent recurrent civil war. By guaranteeing that losers would share in some of the benefits of politics, winners could enjoy the spoils of victory without a costly military campaign against the opposition. To gain the cooperation of competing parties a cooperative arrangement preventing pre-emptive strikes and restraining the power of winners was necessary. This arrangement was to take the form of a nominating mechanism with the capacity to coordinate relevant political actors (the outgoing president, the army, state governors and influential congressmen) and the power to persuade politicians seeking office independently that their chances of succeeding were nil.

The key to the success of the PNR was its ability to solve the collective action problem associated with the renewal of the presidential office. The PNR was devised as an instrument to coordinate the vast majority of existing “parties” to collectively support a single presidential candidate. Its first immediate task was to prevent ambitious politicians with the potential to launch a serious presidential campaign from running for the presidency. In fact, it can be argued that the initial strength of the PNR was reflected not so much in the overwhelming electoral victories of its presidential candidates —Pacual Ortiz Rubio in 1929 and Lázaro Cárdenas in 1934— as in its capacity to restrain the presidential ambitions of their most relevant opponents —Aarón Sáenz and Manuel Pérez Treviño, respectively—.

Another important game for the PNR to control was that of the nomination of candidates to the Congress. We know that later on in the mid-1930s the PNR managed to introduce some form of central control over the nomination of

9 Regarding the use of rotation of office by local parties in the U.S. during the 19th Century and its impact on congressional careers see Kernell, 1997.
candidates to the Congress by replacing local parties as the prevailing vehicle of career advancement (Nacif, 1997). However, the period from the formation of the PNR to the dissolution of affiliated local political parties was essentially a transitional period; the PNR's National Executive Committee had very little control over the nomination of candidates to the Congress. Candidates were selected at the local level and frequently state governors controlled the nomination for all the federal elective offices disputed within the state territory.

The PNR statutes approved in the 1st National Convention of 1929 established nominating procedures for party candidates to the Congress based on state and district conventions. The system was put into practice for the first time in the 1930 federal elections. Apparently, the parties dominating local politics controlled nominating conventions and imposed their candidates (Alvarado, 1990). The non-conformity of opposing parties was an important source of conflict and violent confrontation prompting the intervention of the PNR's National Executive Committee. Garrido (1982) mentions that in the congressional elections of 1930 there were districts where more than one candidate ran for the same office under the PNR label. The National Executive Committee could only prevent this problem through the intervention of the federal department of Gobernación. The most important power of the PNR's National Executive Committee to intervene in the nomination of candidates was its authority to disown nominating conventions. However, as the chair of the National Executive Committee discovered in 1930, frequent intervention could back fire putting into question its own authority. In the 1932 congressional elections the PNR replaced nominating conventions with primary elections. This change sought to restrain the power of local parties over the nomination of candidates. However, the introduction of primaries did not change prevailing practices as state governors and local parties had the capacity to manipulate them (Alvarado, 1990).

In the journalistic jargon of the 1920s the expression carro completo (the full ticket) was used to describe the practice whereby state governors filled all elective offices contested in the state territory with candidates of his own choice (Lajous, 1979). The carro completo practice became one of the main limitations to the power of the PNR's National Executive Committee. It restricted the influence of the Nacional Executive Committee in the nomination of candidates. After the 1932 congressional elections, ex-president Calles referred to the practice of carro completo as the most important problem of the PNR, warning about the necessity to open up access to PNR candidacies to politicians seeking elective office independently. To deal with this problem Calles put forward an initiative to increase the circulation in elective office of the PNR's political cadre (Lajous, 1979). Calles' resignation of Basilio Vadillo as chair of the PNR's National Executive Committee in April 1930, two months after taking office—responded to the conflicts produced by his intervention in the nomination of candidates to the Congress.
The Constitutional Amendments Prohibiting Consecutive Reelection: Part I

The no reelection constitutional amendments were drafted by the PNR's National Executive Committee and approved by the 1st Extraordinary National Convention in 1932. The National Revolutionary Bloc (NRB) in the Congress simply ratified the initiative. Non-consecutive reelection reshaped career paths both at the local and national levels. By removing incumbent politicians from office non-consecutive reelection forced them to seek promotion to other offices in order to survive in politics. This changed the strategies of career advancement as local politicians grew more dependent on the national party organization of the PNR to develop successful and long careers. In fact, it could be argued that non-consecutive reelection was intended to weaken local political parties. A fast and regular rotation of office enhanced the ability of the PNR's National Executive Committee to intervene in the nomination of candidates.

The constitutional amendments prohibiting consecutive reelection were part of a larger strategy to centralize power in the National Executive Committee of the PNR. No sooner had consecutive reelection been prohibited by constitutional law, the National Executive Committee of the PNR drafted an initiative to dissolve local parties affiliated to the PNR. This initiative was approved by the 2nd National Convention of the PNR which met in November 1933. If non-consecutive reelection ended long political careers at the local level, the dissolution of local parties dismantled the vehicles through which this career path was pursued.

The Congressional PNR: the BNR

The National Revolutionary Bloc (BNR) was formed during the first period of session of the 33rd Legislature (1928-1930), shortly before the Constituent Assembly of the PNR convened in March 1929. However, both events are directly connected. The BNR was formed to coordinate deputies and senators supporting president Calles' initiative to form a national political party agglutinating incumbent politicians holding office in federal, state and municipal governments. In sum, the BNR was constituted to operate as the congressional agent of the PNR.

The formation of blocs in the Mexican Congress was a practice that preceded the BNR. The formation of congressional parties or blocs can be traced back to the first legislature formed under the 1917 Constitution. The congressional bloc of the Partido Liberal Constitucionalista (PLC) controlled the 29th Legislature (1920-1922). In the next legislature, the Partido Cooperativista Nacional (PCN) had an

11 Diario de los Debates, Cámara de Diputados, 20/3/1933.
overwhelming majority. Both parties were originally supported by president Álvaro Obregón (1920-1924) but soon after came into open confrontation with his administration (Dulles, 1972).

The direct precedent of the BNR was the National Obregonista Bloc (BNO) formed in the 32\textsuperscript{nd} Legislature (1926-1928). A large majority of deputies and senators joined the BNO. BNO members were united around a central political goal—promoting the campaign of Álvaro Obregón for a second term in the presidency of the Republic. The overwhelming BNO majority in the Congress allowed them to remove the main impediment in Obregón’s way to the presidency—the constitutional provision—limiting presidents for life to a single term in office. Also, the BNO passed other constitutional amendments with a view to strengthening the forthcoming Obregón administration such as extending the presidential term from four to six years, turning the Mexico City municipality into a federal department and reducing the size of the Chamber of Deputies (Loyola Díaz, 1980).

The reelection of general Obregón reinforced BNO’s dominance in the Congress. The opposition to the BNO during the 32\textsuperscript{nd} Legislature—the Laborista Bloc—disappeared completely from the Congress after the 1928 elections. The killing of Obregón shortly after he had been declared president elect produced great uncertainty and anxiety over the future of Mexican politics. However, within the Congress there was no “power vacuum”, as the BNO led by deputy Ricardo Topete formed the governing body of the Chamber of Deputies, the Gran Comisión, and organized the committee system.

Even more important, by controlling the majority in the Congress, the BNO was in control of the Electoral College. Therefore the BNO leadership was placed in a strategic position to coordinate the appointment of the president interim. However, a fast move organized by outgoing president Calles and a group of influential congressmen led by Marte R. Gómez, Gonzalo N. Santos, Melchor Ortega and Manuel Riva Palacios managed to unseat Ricardo Topete as chair of the Gran Comisión and leader of the BNO (Dulles, 1972; Loyola Díaz, 1980). As Topete stepped down, the group of legislators led by Calles gained control over the selection of president interim. The change in the BNO leadership also meant that the BNO would get directly involved in the formation of the new party as announced by Calles. Anticipating the formal constitution of the PNR the BNO dissolved itself to give way to the National Revolutionary Bloc (BNR).

The main collective goal of congressional blocs was that of capturing positions of influence within the Congress. Gaining the majority in the Gran Comisión was the first target. The Gran Comisión operated as the governing body of both chambers of the Congress, staffing standing committees and organizing the chambers for business. The Gran Comisión was formed by representatives of state delegations. The chair of the Gran Comisión was in practice a source of weak congressional leadership. Gran Comisión chairs did not last in office more than a
single congressional term, and used their position as a stepping-stone to other political stations.

The Permanent Committee of the Congress constituted another important group of influential positions. It was formed by 14 senators and 16 deputies. The legislative authority of the Permanent Committee was of little significance. It met during the long period when the Congress was not in session and had the authority to call for extraordinary congressional sessions. In practice, however, the Permanent Committee had substantial leverage as in the 1920s it had the power to rule on cases of disappearance of constitutional powers in federal states and appoint interim governors (González Oropeza, 1983). It was therefore a powerful political instrument and its composition at the end of the ordinary session was a source of conflict between competing congressional factions.

The BNR was more successful than the previous congressional parties. Shortly after its constitution in August 1929, it managed to get rid of the opposition in the Congress through the purge of legislators, accused of supporting the armed rebellion of general Escobar. Even more, in the elections of 1930—the first elections in which the PNR took part—the BNR managed to block the opposition, becoming the first congressional party in agglomerating the totality of legislators. In fact, tolerance of the opposition in Congress was only reestablished in the 1940s.

Despite its monopolistic position in the Congress, the BNR was not more cohesive and disciplined—at least during the period from 1928 to 1932—than the congressional blocs that dominated the Congress in the past. Certainly, passing controversial legislation such as the non-reelection constitutional amendments of 1933 was an outstanding exercise in party discipline. However, the BNR in 1927 managed to put together a large congressional majority to pass more controversial constitutional amendment to allow the reelection of Álvaro Obregón.

Perhaps the most important evidence about the lack of internal cohesiveness within the BNR was the development of party factionalism. At the end of the 33rd Legislature (1928-1930) a faction sprang within the BNR known as the Blancos and formed by politicians identified with president Pascual Ortiz Rubio (1930-1932). The Blancos were competing for the BNR leadership and control over the governing bodies of the two chamber of the Congress against the more experienced group of politicians known as the Rojos. With Ortiz Rubio’s support, the Blancos became the majority in the Senate and fought hard to gain control over the Permanent Committee of the Congress, just before the congressional elections of 1930 (Meyer, Segovia and Lajous, 1978). However, the Blancos were delivered a harsh blow as Basilio Vadillo was forced to resign as chair of the PNR National Executive Committee less than two months after having taken office. Vadillo’s resignation substantially reduced the influence of president Ortiz Rubio over the PNR. From then on the National Executive Committee supported the Rojos and this faction regained its dominant position in both chambers after the 1930s congressional elections. The
history of the Blancos ended with the resignation of president Ortiz Rubio in September 1932. In the 35th Legislature (1932-1934) factionalism disappeared only to revive in 1935 as part of the conflict between president Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940) and Plutarco Elías Calles.

What rendered the BNR potentially different from congressional blocs dominating the Congress before were the disciplinary powers of the PNR's National Executive Committee. The BNR leadership was lacking effective instruments to sanction uncooperative behavior. Its powers were limited to the assignment of positions of influence within the Congress and control over the legislative agenda. However, since legislators did not pursue long congressional careers, the significance of this kind of political promotion had little significance in terms of career advancement. On the other hand, the PNR's National Executive Committee soon developed some instruments to influence the career advancement prospects of politicians serving in the Congress.

One of them was the power to expel legislators from the party. The PNR membership soon became a key factor for the political survival of legislators. The threat of expulsion was therefore a powerful disciplinary instrument. There were cases in which the National Executive Committee resorted to the expulsion of legislators from the party to solve conflict within the BNR. Manuel Pérez Treviño issued the expulsion of nine senators and eight deputies from the PNR in January 1930. In December Lázaro Cárdenas expelled from the PNR a group of senators that openly criticized president Ortiz Rubio. In both cases, expelled legislators were readmitted to the PNR.12

Another important instrument that the PNR's National Executive Committee used to maintain discipline was its incipient powers over the nomination of candidates. The effective influence of the National Executive Committee over the nomination of candidates to the Congress was still limited. Actually, it was not until the local parties dissolved and the non-consecutive reelection came into effect that the PNR's National Executive Committee established some centralized control over the nomination process. However, the intervention of the National Executive Committee in the selection of candidates already began in the congressional elections of 1930. To the extent that the National Executive Committee gained control over the nomination of candidates to elective offices, the dominant strategy among congressmen became that of discipline and cooperation with the party.

Another significant aspect in the consolidation of the PNR was the relationship between the National Executive Committee and the leadership of the BNR in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. During the period in which the Blancos and the Rojos dominated the contest for leadership positions in the BNR, the PNR's National Executive Committee operated as an arbitrator. Meyer, Segovia and Lajous (1978) show that it was not an impartial arbitrator and that its intervention

---

12 For the history of the expulsions see Meyer, Segovia and Lajous, 1978.
was decisive to the victory of the Rojos. The competition for the BNR leadership between contending factions indicates the degree of autonomy of congressional politics with respect to the National Executive Committee. The BNR leadership was responsible to the factions formed within the Congress. This practice led to the formal regulation of the relationship between the BNR and National Executive Committee. The rules provided that the BNR leadership take into account the opinion of the National Executive Committee before deciding on issues affecting the unity of the party such as impeachment, removing legislators from office and cases of disappearance of powers in federal states.

However, the subordination of the BNR to the National Executive Committee still took some time to be completed. The institution of non-consecutive reelection was a key factor in this process. As it allowed the National Executive Committee to control access to the Congress, and rid legislators of their capacity to effectively take part in the selection of congressional leaders. The leaders of the congressional PNR became mere agents of the National Executive Committee (Nacif, 1997). Another important aspect that contributed to the subordination of the congressional party to the National Executive Committee was the fact that the president of the Republic gained control over the National Executive Committee in 1935. The independence of the PNR’s National Executive Committee from the president of the Republic during the period from 1929 to 1935 was one of the main sources of factionalism in the BNR.

The Presidential Succession and the Congressional Parties

The role of the presidency of the Republic changed substantially over the period from 1928-1934 as a consequence of the formation of the PNR. The PNR operated from the beginning as a mechanism to regulate the struggle for the presidency and contain the political activism and faction-building prompted by the presidential succession. In this respect, the PNR strengthened the executive power as it prevented that the loyalty of congressional factions moved away to the main contenders for the presidency. However, the fact that the PNR’s National Executive Committee operated independently from the executive deprived the president of the Republic of a crucial source of political power: control over the presidential succession (Medin, 1982).

To understand the problem generated by the presidential succession in the 1920s it is necessary to analyze the effects of the constitutional provision that limited presidents to a single term in office. The no presidential reelection clause was introduced by the Constituent Assembly of 1917, and had an immediate impact on the functioning of the executive branch. No reelection weakened the presidency of the Republic by limiting the period in which presidents could effectively lead the administration. It is a bit of a paradox that the enormous task of reconstructing the country after the civil war was trusted to lame-duck chief executives. Formally, an
administration lasted for four years, but in practice, the ability of presidents to lead the country ended much sooner because of the constitutional prohibition to run for reelection.

An administration lost its *momentum* as soon as the problem of the presidential succession moved political attention away from the president to the would-be presidents. No reelection in a context in which there were no controls over the nomination of candidates to the presidency, was probably the institutional source of what some historians have called “diarchy”—the coexistence of a parallel power besides the president of the Republic—limiting and sometimes prevailing over the Chief Executive (Meyer, Krauze and Reyes, 1977). The strength of this parallel power was related to his real chances of capturing the presidency of the Republic and was enhanced as the incumbent administration approached its end.

The factionalism and the political uncertainty generated by the presidential succession paralyzed the first administration formed under the Constitution of 1917. President Carranza (1917-1920) was prey of the struggle generated by the presidential succession. His attempt to prevent the presidential campaign of general Obregón led to a civil war and the destruction of his administration. Obregón was more successful as a general than as a politician. He was not able to stop the presidential campaign of his appointed head of the Department of Finance, general de la Huerta. De la Huerta had the support of the majority of congressmen agglomerated in the Partido Cooperativista Nacional (PCN). Obregón suppressed the armed rebellion led by de la Huerta and imposed Calles in the presidency but at the expense of a destructive civil war. Calles as president of the Republic avoided confrontation with general Obregón and the movement to reelect him represented in the Congress by the BNO. However, this strategy exacted a price—a substantial loss of authority during the second half of his administration—.

The response to the loss of presidential authority generated by no reelection was to extend the presidential term. The constitutional amendment extending the presidential term from four to six years sought to strengthen the presidency by enlarging the effective life of an administration and postponing the destructive political activism generated by the presidential succession. The advantages of an extended presidential term, however, were not effective immediately. The assassination of president elect Obregón frustrated the first six-year administration before it was formed. The constitutional implications of this crime were complex. The Constituent Assembly of 1917 removed the office of the vice-president of the Republic and established an intricate procedure to reconstitute the executive power. Firstly, it was necessary that a single majority in the Congress selected an interim president. Secondly, the interim president had to organize elections within the following eighteen months to elect a president substitute to complete the 1928-1934 presidential term. In the absence of institutions regulating the struggle for the
presidency and mechanisms coordinating stable majorities in the Congress, this constitutional procedure was potentially explosive.

The initiative to form the PNR addressed this problem directly. Given the support that it gained from the vast majority of politicians, the PNR had an immediate impact on the politics of presidential succession. One of the first consequences of the PNR was that of protecting the emergency administration formed after the killing of Obregón. By absorbing the BNO in the Congress, President Calles and the leading group behind the PNR initiative allayed the fears of violent confrontations in the selection of president interim. Even more, the formation of the PNR prevented splits within the BNO as a consequence of the selection of Portes Gil. Certainly, the 1929 extraordinary presidential elections were preceded by factionalism and the Escobarista rebellion. However, the PNR kept the vast majority of congressmen united around the presidential campaign of Ortiz Rubio. The greatest success for the PNR came with the succession of Abelardo Rodríguez (1932-1934). This was achieved without the usual factionalism in the Congress and, above all, the competing candidates for the party presidential nomination did not dispute the outcome of the nomination process.

The most significant change introduced by the PNR was that of regulating and containing the political movements aroused by attempts to capture the benefits associated with the presidency of the Republic. Even general Escobar, head of the 1930 armed rebellion, did not openly campaign for the presidency. His campaign was more military than political; in fact it was more of a conspiracy than a campaign. There was no political group in the Congress organized to support the presidential bid of general Escobar such as the PLC backing Obregón in 1920, the PCN supporting de la Huerta in 1924 and the Obregonista and Laborista bloc in 1928 supporting Obregón and Morones respectively. By reducing the number of relevant contenders to the presidency to a single candidate, the PNR solved the problems generated by the presidential succession in the Congress.

Greater control over the presidential succession strengthened the president of the Republic at least in his relation with the Congress. The empirical evidence recently published by Weldon (1997) shows the changing role of the president in the legislative process during the late 1920s—the Chief Executive overcame the Chamber of Deputies as the main source of legislation. This change was the result of two combined tendencies: the growth in the number of initiatives introduced by the executive and a reduction in the legislation introduced by members of the Chamber of Deputies.

Another important change in the law-making process was the growth in the success rate of legislation introduced by both members of the Chamber and the president (Table 5). The number of initiatives being effectively debated, voted upon and approved by the Chamber grew substantially from 1922. This change was probably due to better organization of congressional blocs, since the success rates of
initiatives introduced by legislators was the first to pick up. It rose to 90 percent during the 32nd Legislature dominated by the BNO. The rise in the success rates of presidential initiatives reflects a better understanding between the executive and the Chamber, at least in legislative matters. After the creation the PNR the success rates of executive bills rose significantly.

Table 5
The law-making process in the Chamber of Deputies, 1917-1934

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Session</th>
<th>Legislature</th>
<th>Deputies</th>
<th>President</th>
<th>Apporved bills</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bills</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Bills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917-1918</td>
<td>XXVII</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918-1920</td>
<td>XXVIII</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920-1922</td>
<td>XXIX</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922-1924</td>
<td>XXX</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924-1926</td>
<td>XXXI</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>75.6</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926-1928</td>
<td>XXXII</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>90.1</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928-1930</td>
<td>XXXIII</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930-1932</td>
<td>XXXIV</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932-1934</td>
<td>XXXV</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Weldon, 1997

The aspect that most clearly reflects changes in the law-making process after the PNR formation is the control over the legislative agenda of the Chamber of Deputies. The degree of control over the legislative agenda exercised by the executive branch can be estimated by comparing the number of executive bills approved by the Chamber against the amount of legislation introduced by legislators that passed through the Chamber. Before the formation of the PNR, presidential control over the legislative agenda was limited. Executive bills faced the competition of legislation initiated within the Chamber to get reported to the floor and voted upon. In fact, members of the Chamber of Deputies were the main source of the approved legislation, with the presidency managing to pass a similar amount of legislation in two Legislatures (1922-1924 and 1926-1928). However, from the 34th Legislature (1930-1932) onwards, the Chamber approved 3.4 times more executive bills: a significant increase in the control over the legislative agenda.

The success rate of president Obregón rose substantially during the second half of his administration despite the conflict with the PCN majority concerning the presidential succession (Table 5). The truth is that his relationship with the party that dominated the previous legislature—the PLC—was not good either, and this is probably why his legislative proposals performed badly in the Congress.
initiated legislation than bills introduced by its own members. This rate doubles in the following legislature. This change indicates the overwhelming control over the legislative agenda of the Chamber gained by the president of the Republic after the formation of the PNR.

Although the executive branch became much stronger in its relations with the Congress, there was a structural limit to the power of Mexican presidents during the period from 1928 to 1934 —the independence of the PNR’s National Executive Committee—. For practical purposes this restricted the ability of incumbent presidents to intervene in the selection of their successors in office. The role of president-maker was played by ex-president Calles and his circle of influential politicians controlling the PNR’s National Executive Committee. Medin (1982) argued that this arrangement gave way to an unstable equilibrium and a conflictive relationship between the PNR’s National Executive Committee and the president of the Republic during the administration of Ortiz Rubio. The PNR’s National Executive Committee was able to impose restrictions upon the president limiting his control over the presidential cabinet and his capacity to influence politics in the federal states. In fact, the resignation of president Ortiz Rubio was preceded by increasing political isolation coordinated by the PNR’s National Executive Committee, which ended up in the collective resignation of all members of the presidential cabinet.

During the administration of president Abelardo Rodíguez the separation between the presidency and the PNR leadership seemed to work better. However, the arrangement limiting presidential influence on party affairs and particularly on the presidential succession was not sustainable (Medin, 1982). As ex-president Calles went into political exile in 1936 and his supporters in the Congress and state governorships were purged from office, President Cárdenas gained control over the PNR and subordinated the National Executive Committee to presidential directives. This change unified all political institutions around the leadership of the president of the Republic and completed the process of political centralization that began with the PNR foundation in 1929.
Conclusions

The foundation of the PNR in 1929 brought into being the practice of "unitary governments" within the Mexican presidential constitution as the president's party gained control over decision-making majorities in both chambers of the Congress. Unified governments are expected to increase inter-branch cooperation and diminish the risks of governmental paralysis and deadlock in presidential democracies (Linz and Valenzuela, 1994). Certainly, neither pre-1929 Mexico nor the resulting single party regime qualifies as democracy. However, the unification of government through the PNR brought about significant changes in the functioning of Mexico's presidential regime. The amount of legislation passed by the Congress grew and the success rate of executive initiated bills soared. The exacerbated presidentialism that has prevailed in Mexico for decades was still not consolidated, although the grounds were established in the period from 1928-1934.

It still remains unclear, however, whether the "divided government" characterization is any useful to analyze the practice of presidentialism in Mexico before 1929. Congressional parties were then loose and fragile coalitions. Even more, Mexican presidents before 1929 were, in fact, supported by the majority bloc in the Congress. This notwithstanding, the relation between chief executives and congressional parties was often conflictive. Inter-branch conflict before the PNR formation sprang from the clash of factions competing for the presidential office.

The organization of congressional parties in the 1920s was shaped by electoral institutions which gave local political clienteles control over access to offices in the Congress. This is why congressional parties were weak and unstructured organizations. Another important aspect of the operation of the Congress was the lack of membership stability. Despite the fact that there were no legal restrictions on the reelection of legislators, only a relatively small number of members of the Congress returned to office. A position in the Congress was more of a stepping-stone toward higher offices. The absence of stable career paths in the Congress rendered legislators highly vulnerable to executive patronage with their chances of surviving in politics depending primarily on their ability to join the winning party in the struggle for the presidency.

Local party organizations were the vehicles for politicians to gain office in the Congress. Existing local parties controlling access to the complex of public offices provided the building blocks for the creation of a national all-inclusive party. In fact, the PNR was originally a loose federation of local parties and these parties continued to control access to office in the Congress even after the PNR was founded.

The unity of the PNR's congressional bloc—the BNR—resulted from the ability of the National Executive Committee to control the presidential succession. This control depended on the PNR's capacity to prevent the open confrontation of
relevant presidential aspirants by persuading them that seeking the presidency independently of the PNR bear no chances of succeeding. The effective military repression to those seeking to capture the presidency through armed rebellions did part of the job. The rest was a matter of providing assurance to loosing candidates in the race for the PNR’s presidential nomination that they would share the spoils of office as long as they cooperated with the party.

Reducing the effective number of presidential candidates to one solved a collective action problem that local parties faced during the presidential succession. In the absence of institutions restraining the power of winners in the race for the presidency, the political survival of local parties was at stake during the presidential succession. The PNR provided the institutional framework for local parties to cooperate in the presidential succession, preventing the destructive confrontation of the past. This is the reason why the president Calles’ initiative to constitute a single all-inclusive national party gained the widespread support of existing local parties.

The formation of the PNR contained the tendency toward factionalism and confrontation that paralyzed government as the political activism associated with the presidential succession awoke. By restraining the presidential ambitions of potential candidates, the PNR protected the administrations formed after 1929 from the destructive effects of the struggle for the presidential office. Accordingly, the unity of the congressional party increased and the cooperation between the branches of government improved.

The foundation of the PNR brought about improvements in terms of political stability and governability, but at a high price. In the short run, the PNR’s control over the race for the presidency involved the suppression of any relevant opposition. In the long run, the price was even higher. The centralization of political power that the PNR brought about allowed for the introduction of comprehensive institutional changes such as the no reelection constitutional amendments of 1933 which inhibited the development of organized opposition to the PNR and guaranteed the persistence of single party politics in Mexico.
Bibliography


Lajous, Alejandra, 1979, Los orígenes del partido único en México, México, D.F., Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.

Linz, Juan and Arturo Valenzuela, 1994, The Failure of Presidential Democracy, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press.

Loyola Díaz, Rafael, 1980, La crisis Obregón-Calles y el Estado mexicano, México, D.F., Siglo XXI.


Portes Gil, Emilio, 1941, Quince años de política mexicana, 2 ed., México, D.F., Ediciones Botas.

Puig Casauranc, José M., 1938, Galatea rebelde a varios pigmaliones, México, D.F., Ediciones Botas.


Sánchez García, Alfonso, 1984, El círculo rojo y negro, Toluca, Universidad Autónoma del Estado de México.


Jasso Villazul, Javier, *Los sistemas de innovación como mecanismos de innovación y de transferencia tecnológica*, DTAP-76.

Tamayo Flores, Rafael, *The Differential Impact of International Integration on Local Economies: How are lagging Mexican regions performing?*, DTAP-77.


Ramírez, José Carlos y John Goddard, *Aprendizaje con información incompleta en modelos de consumo con múltiples atributos*, DTE-173.


Unger, Kurt, *La globalización del sistema innovativo mexicano: empresas extranjeras y tecnología importada*, DTE-175.

Ramírez, José Carlos, *Los efectos del TLCAN sobre el comercio y la industria en México*, DTE-176.


Scott, John, *PROGRESA una evaluación preliminar*, DTE-178.


División de Estudios Internacionales

Meyer, Jean, ¿Se puede hablar de extrema derecha en Rusia?, DTEI-45.

Sahni, Varun, Brazil, India and South Africa: Three Pathways to Regional (In)Security, DTEI-46.

Sahni, Varun, Realismo periférico versus interdependencia compleja: dilucidando las políticas exteriores de Argentina y México desde 1989, DTEI-47.


Minushkin, Susan y Arvid J. Lukauskas, Explaining styles of Financial Market Opening in Chile, South Corea and Turkey, DTEI-49.


Sahni, Varun, Three and a Half Centuries of the Westphalian State System, DTEI-52.

Sahni, Varun, Pruebas nucleares en el sur de Asia: las razones y las repercusiones, DTEI-53.

Sahni, Varun, Coexistence, Consensus, Competition, Conflict: Interservice Contestation in Military-Dominated Argentina, DTEI-54.

Borja, Arturo, El TLCAN y la inversión extranjera directa: el nuevo escenario, DTEI-55.


Chabat, Jorge, Mexico and Drug Trafficking: The Sovereign Dilemma, DTEI-57.

Kahhat, Farid, The Interpretation of Meaning in Social Sciences, DTEI-58.

División de Estudios Políticos

Trejo, Guillermo, Mobilizing Ethnicity: A Theoretical review with applications to the “Fourth Wave” of indigenous mobilizations in Latin America, DTEP-107.


De Remes, Alain, Elección regional, cultura y estructura: tres aproximaciones para el análisis de los fenómenos políticos y sociales, DTEP-109.

Langston, Joy, A Patchwork Quilt: Why Different Mexican States Have Different Types of Governors, DTEP-110.

Langston, Joy, No More Local Leviathans: Rebuilding the PRI’s State Party Organization, DTEP-111.

Mizrahi, Yemile, Las elecciones en Puebla: la continuidad de la dominación priista, DTEP-112.


Nacif, Benito, El sistema de comisiones permanentes en la Cámara de Diputados de México, DTEP-116.

Buendía, Jorge, El elector mexicano en los noventa: ¿Un nuevo tipo de votante?, DTEP-117.
