Alain De Remes

THE CAUSES OF JUXTAPOSITION: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY MUNICIPAL AND STATE ELECTIONS IN MEXICO
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Introduction

Specialists in Mexican Politics seem to coincide in agreeing that the advent of democracy in Mexico requires two conditions: Clean elections and checks on the metaconstitutional powers of the president. However, this analysis tends to focus on the actions that should be taken at the national level but neglects how local processes contribute to the democratization of the political system. Municipal and state elections in Mexico illustrate that democratizing an authoritarian regime based on an hegemonic party system requires a top-down and a bottom-up approach. The top-down analysis is generally concerned with issues such as the evolution of the party system, changes in institutions that may bolster the overall political plurality, and with the rise or development of pacts among the most important political and social groups (or élites) at the national level. Meanwhile, the bottom-up approach analyzes how local politics and especially how local electoral processes can step by step, and little by little, add up and contribute decisively to the democratization of the country.

This paper discusses some of the possible research strategies to analyze subnational politics. I posit that different methods need to be used in order to capture the macro and micro dimensions of the phenomenon of juxtaposition. Thereafter, I define more precisely what is meant by juxtaposed governments and look at some plausible hypotheses that may explain this phenomenon. I also review several contending theories which may illustrate why some municipalities experience the phenomenon and others don’t. Towards the end of this chapter, I posit a model to explain the macro dimension of the phenomenon and look at problems concerning the operationalization of the variables. I also establish some of the plausible alternative explanations to my model (especially at the micro level) and delve into problems of colinearity inherent to this model.

The traditional meta-constitutional powers of the Mexican president until the Salinas administration were: the possibility of controlling the PRI through the appointment of its leader; the president had the power to “nominate” and remove state governors; the president had a complete control over the bureaucracy and he was also able to control the members of his party in Congress. Indeed, the most important meta-constitutional power of the Mexican President was to appoint his successor.

In the following section I will discuss in length what constitutes the phenomenon of juxtaposition. However, let me offer a brief definition to clarify this paragraph. The phenomenon of juxtaposed governments occurs when a well defined territorial sub-unit (such as a state or a municipality) is controlled by a party that is different from the party that controls the larger unit (such as the state or the federation).
Analytical Strategies: macro vs. micro levels

The study of local electoral processes can be performed using different methodologies and paradigms. Nonetheless, choosing one strategy over others may leave aside aspects of the phenomenon which are also relevant. Furthermore, different paradigms rest on assumptions and methods which are not always compatible. This subsection discusses some of these aspects.

I have decided to study local electoral processes using municipalities as the unit of analysis, partly because municipalities tend to be more homogenous units than states, regions or even electoral districts. Although the unit of analysis is not a complete novelty, most scholars that have analyzed subnational politics in Mexico—and especially municipal conflicts—tend to rely on case studies rather than on aggregated data. This can be partially explained by the difficulty of finding information at the municipal level and also because the task of studying more than 2,442 units tend to be strenuous and time consuming.

Although case studies tend to be very rich in the type of information they provide, the conclusions that can be derived from this method cannot be generalized to other regions or cases. Thus, in Mexico there is a niche for quantitative (aggregated data) studies on municipal elections that may create a complementary approach to case studies, and perhaps, a more solid basis for comparisons and generalizations.

Another advantage of using municipalities as the unit of analysis is that it is possible to increase the sample size (as there are more cases) and thus make better inferences about the population. Lastly, focusing on municipalities is perhaps the best way to perform ecological analysis that links socio-economic characteristics with the way the electorate (not the voter) casts its vote. In other words, analysis of municipal elections may greatly enhance the understanding of the interaction between social and political structure.

Ecological analysis is also useful to retest causal connections posited long time ago by structural theories, such as those found in the modernization literature, now often and perhaps too quickly discredited in academia. As Smith (1995) asserts, "modernization theory has shown signs of coming back to life. One of its central percepts—the postulation of a systematic relation between economic development and political democracy—appears to have gained a broad support from the process of liberalization in Eastern Europe and Latin America, and elsewhere in the world". However, these types of structural theories have been now been posited in more careful terms than ever before. As shown by the works of Seligson (1980) and Arat...
(1988), economic development may be necessary, but not sufficient condition for democracy.4

Structural theories are macro theories well suited for universalizing comparisons,—aimed at establishing that every instance of the phenomenon follows essentially the same rule—variation finding comparisons,—which focus on a few key variables that explain particular outcomes—or individualizing comparisons (also known as contrast of context) which tend to emphasize intra-regional diversity (Tilly, 1984). Nonetheless, one of the main critiques to structural theories is that there is no place for human volition in this type of paradigms. As stressed by Tsebelis, “in system analysis, structuralism, functionalism and modernization theory, explanations of social or political phenomena are given in holistic terms... The existence of individuals and their actions is not denied but considered secondary”.5

However, electoral outcomes and mass voting behavior have also been analyzed by two other traditions that depart from structural principles (Cox, 1997). The first tradition uses analytical tools derived from social, and public choice theories (Arrow, 1951; Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Muller, 1989) and from spatial voting theory (Downs, 1957; Enelow and Hinich, 1990). In most of these paradigms, the individual (or some sort of aggregate that acts like a rational actor such as a committee, an interest group, etc.) provides the ultimate unit of analysis. The second tradition comes from the realms of sociology and politics and tends to be less formal (but not lacking from theory). This tradition does not rely on methodological individualism and is more concerned with the analysis of real world problems and the consequences of different institutional designs, such as the advantages of adopting a presidential vs. a parliamentary system, (Linz and Valenzuela, 1993; Shugart and Carey, 1992) or the consequences of using a majoritarian vs. consociational constitutional arrangement (Lijphart, 1984, 1992).

In Mexico, there are still very few electoral studies that have used methodological individualism as a means to analyze and predict electoral outcomes. However, in the case of municipal and state elections it is perfectly possible to hypothesize that electoral outcomes are the product of individuals casting their vote in particular ways. As Huckfelt and Sprague assert:

4 In fact, these authors suggest that the relation between economic development and democracy is curvilinear rather than linear. This means that democracy is most likely to flourish in countries with extremely low or relatively high economic development, and in countries with middle range development the outcome might be uncertain (or even contrary to what was postulated by the original modernization theory).

(...), the reality of a national election is played out in countless specific locations across the nation, and the behavior of individual voters is often best understood within these subnational locales (...).  

There are two key aspects of this statement that need to be highlighted. First, elections are multidimensional and they are held at a variety of levels, which justifies using small units of analysis such as municipalities or counties to get a more precise picture of the aggregated outcome. Second, the behavior of individuals may be best understood at a subnational rather than a national level.

Lastly, in Mexico the study of electoral outcomes as the product of institutions or electoral designs has been expanding rapidly (Lujambio, 1995; Alvarado, 1996; Casar, 1997). Yet, there are still important holes at the subnational level in issues such as the variation of electoral laws within Mexican states and their consequences.

To conclude this section, let me argue that a study of electoral outcomes at the municipal level needs to take two different approaches: a macro and a micro level of analysis. Concerning the macro level, structural theories should be used as a first cut approach to study the interaction among social and political structure, and to determine which factors may impinge on the direction of the vote. Yet, electoral outcomes are not only the product of structural factors, but also of individual behavior. A micro level of analysis could help to elucidate issues such as why voters decide to split their vote between different levels. Moreover, a micro-level of analysis is particularly well suited to find causal mechanisms (and especially opening up black boxes) that may provide a fine-grained, as well as tight coupling between explanans and explanandum (Hedström and Swedberg, 1998).

Nonetheless, a micro-level approach needs the use of tools such as polls, information on campaign finance, or partisan spatial coverage which are not always available for all municipalities or states and years. Therefore, it becomes necessary to reduce the size of the sample to states in which this type of data is available. Again, the trade-off in this strategy is losing the big picture and it also impinges on capacity to draw conclusions that will be valid for others municipalities and regions.

To recapitulate, let me stress again that the study of municipal electoral outcomes has the potential problem of using different levels of analysis which require different methods and premises. Furthermore, not only is there a tension among different levels of analysis (macro vs. micro), but the study of outcomes at subnational levels entails dangers of colinearity with the national level which are not always easy to avoid and they might even be more difficult to correct. As correctly pointed out by scholars, changes at the national level may affect the subnational

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level and vice-versa. Last, but not least, the joint effects produced at both levels may be also difficult to disentangle and measure.

Definition

The phenomenon of juxtaposed governments occurs when a well defined territorial sub-national unit (such as a state or a municipality) is controlled by a party that is different from the party that controls the larger unit (such as the federation or the state). In this manuscript, juxtaposed governments will designate municipalities that are controlled by a party which is different from that which controls the state government.

It is important to clarify that a juxtaposed government is different from what Mexican scholars have often labeled “opposition government”, and it is also different from the concept of “divided government”. The term “opposition government” in Mexico generally refers to those municipalities that are not controlled by the PRI. In other words, all municipalities and state governments controlled by the PAN, PRD, or any other party which is not the PRI are labeled opposition governments (Mizrahi, 1994, 1997; Rodriguez and Ward, 1994; Bruhn, 1997).

Juxtaposed government is also different from what the literature on American politics calls “divided government” (Mayhew, 1974; Fiorina, 1992; Jacobson, 1992). Divided government generally implies a situation in which a legislative majority is held by a party that is different from that of the president. Hence, divided government is more concerned with the division of power among co-equal branches, while juxtaposed government is more concerned with how power is dispersed among different territorial units which do not have the same weight. The difference between the two phenomena lies in the way in which the power is dispersed. Divided government is concerned with how power is dispersed among central authorities while juxtaposed governments respond to the phenomenon of federalism.

There is a third phenomenon that some Mexican scholars have labeled “divided government” which also differs from the preceding definition. For some Mexicanists, divided government designates a situation in which the municipality is run by a municipal council (consejo municipal) composed of members of several parties. These cases often occur when the post-electoral protest mobilization is so

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7 Although there is not a single and unique definition for federalism, perhaps one of the best definitions is the one provided by Daniel Eleazar. For Eleazar, federalism means self rule and shared rule. This definition entails that federalism has some kind of contractual linkage that 1) provides for power sharing; 2) cuts around the issue of sovereignty; 3) supplements but does not seek to replace or diminish prior organic ties. For further information on the subject, see Daniel J. Eleazar, Exploring Federalism, Tuscaloosa, University of Alabama Press, 1987, p. 12.
intense that the contending parties "negotiate" some sort of coalition government that will be in charge of the municipality (Eisenstadt, 1997). These cases, for example, were very frequent in the 1989 elections in the state of Michoacán. Therefore, "negotiated" government or even "coalition" government should be a more appropriate label for this type of situation than divided government.

In short, juxtaposed government is a more encompassing phenomenon than opposition governments as it allows a priista municipality to become juxtaposed to a state government controlled, for example, by the PAN or PRD (and vice-versa). This entails that the concept of juxtaposed governments is less concerned with specific party affiliation than the term opposition government. Moreover, juxtaposition also differs from divided governments in the fact that the power is not dispersed among co-equal branches of government. Juxtaposition should be thought as a nest in which three different territorial units of unequal power coexist: the federation has more resources and power than states, which in turn rank higher than municipalities in endowments and capacities. Although capacities and resources are greater at the federal level, a minimum degree of autonomy should prevail at lower echelons to legislate, take binding decisions and implement policies.

The concept of juxtaposed governments may also be assuming that there are different constituencies for different levels of governments. As Sprague and Huckfelt (1995) assert, "Politics in a democracy revolves around the decisions of individual citizen, but individual citizens make their choices at particular times and places located in multiple environments operating at a variety of levels". Indeed the concept of juxtaposition tries to captures some of this multilevel plurality, although I need to be careñil as juxtaposition may be also the product of "artifacts"—such as electoral rules— rather than different constituencies voting oppositely for different levels of government. This point shall be expanded in the following section.

3 Alfonso Hernández stresses that the literature on Federalism doesn't always analyze in depth the power and policy implications of a federal system. According to Hernández, for the most part federal constitutions tend to be vague and "do not specify what issues come the jurisdiction of what governments. The Mexican Constitution, for example, mentions that one way in which the people can exercise his or her sovereign power is through states, in all that relates to their internal affairs". However it does not always specify what those affairs are. Moreover, the Mexican constitution is also relatively vague on the functions and capacities that municipalities should perform. It is also blurry on the resources that municipalities should have to perform their functions. This implies that most of these issues must be solved through intergovernmental bargaining. For further information on this subject see Alfonso Hernández, *Political Autonomy and Local Democracy in Latin America: Bargaining, Political Parties and Regional Politics in Federal Systems of Government* (unpublished typescript, 1997)
Theories and hypotheses

Juxtaposition at the municipal or state level may be the result of four distinct types of variables: 1) structural variables which help to establish correlations between socio-economic indicators and the direction of the vote; 2) exogenous shocks, such as economic crisis which alter voting behavior; 3) micro-behavioral variables such as changes in voters' preferences and/or party organization which alter electoral outcomes and; 4) the product of electoral rules (or institutions) that affect the incentives of voters and candidates.

Following these four lines of inquiry there are several literatures from which it is possible to draw important causal links to explain the phenomenon of juxtaposed governments such as the literature on modernization theory, the literature that deals with partisan dealignment and realignment and those "classical" readings on divided government developed by the American Politics literature. The following paragraphs will explain which aspects of these three literatures might shed some light on the phenomenon.

Modernization literature

As aforementioned, the modernization literature tried to establish a causal link between economic development and democracy. The main argument was that economic development fostered the surge of middle class sectors, which in turn, "embraced democracy, as a way to gain power and/or as an expression of enlightened values (the difference did not seem to matter at the time)". Yet, the modernization school was rapidly challenged in its theory and empirical findings. As demonstrated by the dependencia approach, Latin America economic development was different from the one experienced by Europe and the US in the fact that it came late and was "dependent" from capital, technologies and markets from developed countries. Moreover, the type of development was characterized by a dynamic of high inequality which produced high benefit for those sectors involved in the world market while denying them to others groups. Under these circumstances, elites were faced with the choice of pursuing economic growth (which entailed, repressing labor to hold down wages and inflation and attracting capital) vs. democracy. The multiple military coups that were held in Brazil Argentina, and Chile during the 1960s and 1970s, as well the spread of many authoritarian regimes in the region gave a strong empirical support to the "dependentist" theory.

Despite of having being widely criticized, there are a number of important electoral studies in Mexico which have tried to test the modernization theory in the Mexican case (Cornelius, 1969; Estévez and Racaño, 1985; Lima and Robert, 1988).

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It is beyond the scope of this manuscript to analyze in full detail all these studies with all their nuances. However, let me summarize briefly the main arguments and conclusions of this literature. Most of these studies have focused their attention on measuring political mobilization (the dependent variable) which is often divided in two components. First, mobilization tries to measure the overall competitiveness of the system by counting the total votes for the opposition parties minus the votes obtained by the PRI divided by the total votes. Generally this methodology is only applied to single member districts which allows some longitudinal analysis.

The second component of the mobilization process which is often analyzed as a dependent variable is the electoral participation which is operationalized as the number of total votes divided by the electoral list. The independent variables most commonly studied are economic development (generally operationalized as a compound index which measures degree of urbanization, proportion of employment in the secondary and tertiary sectors and literacy), class structure (generally operationalized as socio-economic categories) and traditionalism (generally measured as the percentage of population that does not speak Spanish). Most studies found that there was a positive correlation between economic modernization and the vote for opposition parties. However, their results were ambiguous regarding economic development and participation. In fact, most studies found that a higher level of economic development was not strongly associated with a higher turnout — at least until the late 1980s.

Modernization theory offers insights about variables that may be relevant in explaining the phenomenon of juxtaposed governments. Nonetheless, a caveat should be made. The main goal of this manuscript is not to explain socio-economic modernization and civic participation, but instead what is causing the phenomenon of juxtaposed government.

The first independent variable in the modernization literature that seems relevant for the concept of juxtaposition is the degree of urbanization. It is possible to hypothesize that there are higher probabilities of juxtaposed governments in urban settings than in rural ones. Following the modernization theory, this means that urban settings possess two characteristics which are absent (or at least not well developed) in rural settings: communications and information. This in turn may


11 Some additional studies stating the same hypothesis and using the same methodology need to be performed for the 1991 and 1994 elections to assess if this result is still valid.
change the direction of the vote. Furthermore, several studies have posited that the emergence of political patrons (or caciques) and "traditional" methods of political control are less likely to prevail in urban settings.\(^{12}\)

Many municipal elections throughout the entire Mexican Republic seem to validate this hypothesis. Most of the moderately and highly urban municipalities have switched from concurrent to juxtaposed governments between the 1980s and 1990s. Furthermore, several electoral studies have shown that opposition parties have begun to establish their electoral hegemony in urban settings during the last two decades (Magar, 1994). However, I still need to be cautious as I may also have a significant number of "unintended" juxtaposed governments in rural areas, like in the Chihuahua "sierra". In rural Chihuahua, for example, the PRI continues to obtain a very high turnout — almost 70% of the total votes — but in 1992, the PAN was able to capture the vote of the most important and urbanized cities of the state for the gubernatorial race. Thereby, rural municipalities became "unintentionally" juxtaposed to the state government. One way to deal with this problem is to set some sort of threshold of competition and disregard those "juxtaposed municipalities" which have a very high turnout for the PRI (or for any other party as well).

A second variable which also seems relevant for the phenomenon is the level of education. In general, the northern region of Mexico — which traditionally has obtained a high score of literacy — was the first region to experience a "massive outburst" of juxtaposed government at the beginning of the 1980s. It was also the northern region of Mexico which brought the first opposition governor to power and the first region to experience a divided government at the state level (Mizhari, 1995, 1997). Moreover, as Joseph Klesner reports, higher levels of illiteracy or very rudimentary education (typical of rural areas) tend to increase the PRI’s electoral advantage, which decreases the chances for the advent of juxtaposed governments.\(^{13}\)

I propose to include a variable measuring the number of years of schooling. Participation — which is generally treated as a dependent variable in the modernization literature — may also be relevant factor in producing the phenomenon, although a great deal of thinking needs to be done on this issue. There are somewhat anomalous results regarding participation at the federal level. Several

\(^{12}\) However this doesn't mean that clientelism does not prevail in urban setting. Wayne Cornelius asserts that urbanism per se does not inhibit clientelism or the emergence of patronage among low income settlers. In fact the formation of slums in the biggest cities of Latin America provide new opportunities for patronage. For further information on this subject see Wayne Cornelius "Leaders, Followers and Official Patrons in Urban Mexico" in Schimdt et. al, Friends Followers and Factions, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1982, p. 383. Also see Joan Nelson, Access to Power: Politics and the Urban Poor in Developing Nations, Princeton, Princeton U. Press 1979.

studies have demonstrated that, until the 1988 election, high degrees of urbanization, economic development and literacy were not correlated with high turnouts. In fact, it was quite the opposite, greater degrees of "modernization" tended to produce low turnouts (and low turnouts in urban areas favored the PRI). However, this relation seems to be changing, especially after the 1991 election when high turnouts began to be associated to higher degrees of urbanization. Moreover, it seems that this trend did continue for the 1994 election.

At the state and local level there are few studies that would help to validate the hypothesis concerning participation. Without any doubt, participation is one of the most difficult variables to measure as many Mexican municipalities do not report the number of potential voters, and the PRI has always been inclined to increase its electoral participation by tinkering with electoral lists. Moreover, some studies have noticed that blatant electoral "fraud" committed by the PRI is generally associated with a high turnout. As Molinar asserts, "the most common strategy for the PRI to win an election is not to subtract votes from its opponents, but rather to increase its electoral participation by tinkering with electoral lists or by stuffing ballots". 14 Thereby, it is not easy to foresee if higher turnout is correlated with an increase in the number of juxtaposed governments. In fact, it may well be the case that juxtaposed governments at the local level are more likely to happen if the level of participation is relatively low. To measure if participation is relevant variable I propose to estimate the number of "potential" voters —aged 18 and up— at the municipal level. This can be done doing projections from 1980, and 1990 censuses.

The other dependent variable generally studied by the modernization literature which may be pertinent for the phenomenon of juxtaposed governments is the competitiveness of the system. States and municipalities that do not have some degree of competitiveness in their elections may rarely experience the phenomenon of juxtaposed governments.

The following table shows that the national average of the Taagepera index—which measures the effective number of parties for all municipal elections—has increased from 1.31 in 1980 to 2.50 in 1997. This basically means that at the beginning of the 1980s there was very little electoral competition, and that in 1997 most municipal electoral contests were disputed between two and a half parties. Furthermore, the Taagepera average for the juxtaposed cases went from 1.86 in 1980 to 2.50 in 1997, and the average of the juxtaposed cases is always above the national average with the exception of the year 1997, when both averages are almost identical.

However, electoral competitiveness at the municipal level is a sufficient, but not necessary condition. In some cases juxtaposed government may simply be an

artifact of the electoral system. As mentioned in the preceding paragraph, some rural municipalities in Chihuahua became “unintentionally” juxtaposed to the state government when the state government became controlled by an opposition party. This has important consequences for a theory of democratization based solely on juxtaposed governments as not all juxtaposed governments are experiencing high degrees of competition and plurality. Indeed, this stresses the need to envision the process of democratization of a country as a two way process: 1) a top-down process in which reforms at the national level sometimes have spillover effects at the local level and; 2) a bottom-up process in which elections at the local level (especially competitive elections) tend to reinforce (and sometimes supersede) the results shown at national sphere. Yet, it should be clear that not all juxtaposed governments are the product of highly competitive elections, and that unintentionally juxtaposed governments also exist and may represent a significant part of the juxtaposed cases.

Exogenous shocks: economic crisis

The modernization literature posits that there is a positive correlation between economic development and electoral participation (or electoral competitiveness). The concept of economic development has generally been operationalized in different ways such as: income per capita, percentage of the total working population employed in the primary sector or even degree of urbanization (Lima and Robert, 1988).

For the case of juxtaposition, economic development seems to be a less crucial factor than the fact that an economic crisis may act as a trigger to increase the number of juxtaposed governments. The underlying logic behind this mechanism is that the electorate can vote retrospectively at the local level to punish the party identified of being responsible for the crisis.

Nonetheless, there are important caveats for using economic crisis as an independent variable. First, it is always difficult to determine precisely when an economic crisis begins or ends. As the following table shows, the number of municipalities experiencing juxtaposed governments increased in 1982 and 1983, (during the pinnacle of debt crisis) and in 1989, (one year after the anti-inflationary plan was launched) and of course in 1995 (after the Tesobonos crisis). Yet, this variable may be distorted by the electoral cycle as, for example, in 1992 we may have expected a decrease in the average of juxtaposed cases as the economy had already experienced a couple of years of moderate growth. Therefore it is important to acknowledge that descriptive statistics show some general trends on the phenomenon. Yet they are distorted by the timing of elections.
Table 1
Average of the Taagepera Competitiveness Index for Municipal Elections
According to Their Electoral Cycle

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<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>2.03</td>
<td>2.19</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>2.50</td>
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<tr>
<td>Juxt.</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>2.19</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>2.51</td>
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Another issue which is also difficult to determine is the lagged effects of an economic crisis on voters' behavior. How long does an economic crisis takes to affect voters' behavior? Again, descriptive statistics show some trends. The average of juxtaposition increases dramatically in 1982 and 1983 (after the bank nationalization) in 1989, (stabilization plan) 1995 (Tesobonos crisis) and 1997. Although I could be tempted to assert that it takes between six months and one year to see changes in voting behavior, a more stringent test need to be done to clarify this issue.

Finally, it is important to emphasize that economic crisis is a sort of spigot variable that appears and disappears. During the 1980s and the 1990s México has mostly experienced low or negative rates of growth with some pockets of “moderate” growth like those of years 1991 and 1992. Later in this manuscript I will propose ways in which this variable can be operationalized, and some of the problems of validity of this indicator.

The Partisan Dealignment and Realignment Literature

A second body of literature, which is somewhat connected to the modernization literature and has some interesting implications on the phenomenon of juxtaposition, is the literature on partisan dealignment and realignment. A dealignment is generally defined as a temporary change in the voting behavior which leads to a change in the relative party strength (e.g. when an entrenched Republican voter decides to vote Democrat for whatever reason or vice-versa). As Sundquist asserts, “if a voter crosses the party lines as a temporary matter, he is not realigning, he is merely deviating”. However, if an election (sometimes also called critical election) produces a durable change in patterns of political behavior, then we would be talking of a realignment in the party system. Klesner is even more precise in his definition of dealignment and realignment by stating that:

(...) Dealignment is said to have occurred when the groups that have regularly supported a particular party no longer do so. Realignment implies that within the electorate the group basis of support for major political parties has been reorganized, perhaps—but not necessarily—with the result that the party or parties that previously tended to dominate (or at least win more frequently) no longer do so (...)


Table 2
Average of Municipalities Experiencing Juxtaposed Governments
According to Their Electoral Cycle

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<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>3.30</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>11.89</td>
<td>5.01</td>
<td>8.98</td>
<td>12.14</td>
<td>6.58</td>
<td>21.61</td>
<td>33.97</td>
<td>25.20</td>
<td>46.37</td>
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</table>
The important twist introduced by Klesner is that party realignment should produce a change in the patterns of electoral dominance. Following Klesner’s argument, it would be possible to hypothesize that a party realignment could be the source of juxtaposed governments. However, as we shall discuss in depth in the following paragraphs, this literature does not offer a great improvement in theory and even in the operationalization of the variables over previous structural theories.

Classical readings on party dealignment and realignment have important assumptions which are not always explicit (Key, 1955, 1959; Burnham, 1970; Sundquist, 1973, 1983). First, dealignments and realignments are “demand driven models”. This means that it is voters’ behavior that leads to a change in party strength and party dominance. Second, this literature is also assuming that voters have a permanent bond to a political party (or at least to a group that regularly votes for a party), and that under “normal” circumstances, he or she will continue to vote for this party. Third, realignments are not everyday occurrences. Indeed, they may only happen once in several decades. Therefore, there must be some kind of “critical juncture” or extraordinary fact that triggers the dealignment process.

Living aside these hidden assumptions, the “demand side” of this literature has also been criticized on several grounds. Authors like Clubb Flanigan and Zingale (1990) introduce an important twist to the model by asserting that it is the performance of government and the political leadership which may be the point of departure for a realignment process. In other words, these authors think that the supply side of the story (politicians rather than voters) is at the center of the dealignment and event realignment processes.

Another difficulty with this literature is deciding which elections are critical and when does a dealignment-realignment process begins and ends. A realignment can be accomplished in two forms. It can be a very gradual change in voters’ preferences which, little by little, (through several years or even decades) will change the partisan loyalties. Otherwise, it comes in an abrupt fashion.

Despite this interesting twist in the model, the authors acknowledge that their explanation also rests on several assumptions, and that their study has severe limitations. Their most important assumptions are the following: 1) They are assuming that parties constitute mechanisms of perfect vertical and horizontal integration and they disregard problems of collective action; 2) They are assigning almost no role to the electorate as a source of political change, and this implies there are viewing the electorate as primarily passive and reactive in matters of policy, policy formation, and promotion of specific policies. Perhaps the most important limitation in their study is that they suggest that there is connection that links electoral behavior to the behavior of members of Congress, and to public policy. Yet their study does not trace how these processes work. They do find some parallels in each sphere (Congress, policy output and voting behavior) but there is no casual connection. For Further information on this subject see: Clubb Jerome, William Flanigan and Nancy Zingale, Partisan Realignment: Voters, Parties and Government in American History, Boulder, Westview Press 1980.
To validate if the distribution of party loyalties changes through time, scholars follow a straightforward procedure. First, they look if the actual vote deviates from the distribution of the vote in previous elections and yet resembles to the distribution in the following elections. This operationalization of the concept has triggered methodological as well as practical critiques. First, the methodology used to measure the dealignment-realignment process is equating voting behavior to partisan attitudes, and therefore treats change in the former as an indicator of the latter. However, there have been numerous studies that show that under some contexts, strategic voting can occur without a change in partisan identification. Second, pushing the argument to the limit, if an election shows a brutal departure from the previous distribution of votes, this would imply massive change of party loyalty from one party to the other although, even during the late 1920s crisis in the US, there is no empirical evidence of massive conversions (Clubb, Flanigan and Zingale, 1990). Finally, this literature needs to specify why sometimes a critical election gives birth to a new party (and consequently the decline of established one), and at other times a critical election results only in changes of membership among the established parties.

An additional complexity encountered in this literature is that the trigger mechanism for a dealignment-realignment process has not been perfectly established. According to Sundquist (1983) there are two factors that could lead to a critical election. First, there is what the author calls "organic change" resulting from changes in the voting population (e.g. due to a diminution in the voting age, or changes that come from newly enfranchised groups such as rural southern black in the US, and women more than half a century ago). The second source of change comes as the result of individual conversion (e.g. some voters may change their voting behavior when they rise from the working class to the middle class, etc.).

Other authors such as V.O Key (1959) identify some sort of crisis as the trigger mechanism for a realignment. Nonetheless As Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale assert, "with rather substantial agreement, scholars have treated realignments as the product of crisis or widespread tensions within the society... Yet, crises and tensions have been more common in American political history than partisan realignments, however defined". This implies that further research need to be done to determine why sometimes crisis produce a realignment, but at other time do not.

Despite methodological and empirical problems found in this literature, there have been several attempts to apply the dealignment-realignment model to the Mexican case. As we shall see, most authors have operationalized this model using dependent and independent variables which are almost identical to those found in the modernization literature. Perhaps the only variation is the use of regional variables to control for factors such as ethnic diversity, bipartisan competition, or migration.

Molinar and Weldon (1990) searched for evidence of a realignment in the Mexican electorate by studying levels of support for the three major parties in single-member districts during the period 1979-1988. Their independent variables were a compound of socioeconomic variables (urbanization, immigration, percentage of population that does not speak Spanish, number of schooling years) and regional variables to take into account variation in bipartisan competition. Their results showed that urbanization and higher level of education were strongly correlated with support for the PAN, and a decrease in votes for the PRI during the whole period. Meanwhile, the authors also found that the PRD in 1988 was making inroads in traditional voting bastions of the PRI, and therefore concluded that that the PRI was suffering a scissors effect. This means that after the 1988 election the PRI continued its tendency to lose votes among the urban and educated population and, for the first time, the leftist parties were challenging its traditional bases of support in rural areas. Weldon and Molinar concluded that 1988 was a “critical election” that would lead to a realignment in the electorate.

Klesner (1994), using a similar model and method to the one proposed by Weldon and Molinar, found different results which led to somewhat different conclusions. Klesner’s research, which covered the period 1979-1991 and the 290 single member districts, also found that the PRI did poorly in districts with high levels of education, industrialization and urbanization. In contrast, the PAN was gaining support among those segments of population. He also acknowledged that despite the fact that the PRD made some inroads in rural districts with uneducated voters in 1988, the coefficient for industrialization, immigration and socioeconomic variables did not show strong correlation with the PRD voting in 1991. Furthermore, according to Klesner, “this is an indication of dealignment in the electorate, specifically, a lack of alignment of key social groups with the principal party of the independent left”.

Klesner concluded that the PRI’s strong recovery in the 1991 election did not mean that this party has permanently recovered its basis of support that were lost in the 1980s. However, his study indicates that neither the PAN nor the PRD had realigned the Mexican electorate, other than realignment of the opposition electorate on regional grounds. In other words, Klesner hints that the Mexican electorate has dealigned, but he still cast his doubts on the realignment process.

The different conclusions in the studies of Klesner, and Molinar and Weldon can be partially explained by the time period researchers analyzed. While, Klesner’s study was able to examine elections from 1979 to 1991, Molinar and Weldon’s research stopped in 1988. Moreover, both studies showed that the concept of realignment need to be examined in long time series and taking into account regional variations.

\[\text{Klesner, Op. Cit., p. 188.}\]
Perhaps, one of the last attempts to save a research agenda based on the concept of dealignment and realignment comes from Nardulli (1995). Nardulli contends that the concept of critical realignment can be a powerful tool in the study of electoral behavior and an important component of a broader theory of political change. Yet, the author emphasizes that scholars must be sensitive to three neglected aspects of the theory: 1) enduring critical reelectons can assume a variety of forms and not all the electorate respond in the same way to an external stimulus; 2) scholars must examine a long time frame in order to capture accurately the phenomenon; and 3) as geopolitical diversity exists, there must be spatial considerations in the dealignment-realignment analysis.

Nardulli, using an interrupted time series, improves over previous operationalization of the model. His model was also able to show how important were regional variations to the same stimuli, and how they partial “regional realignments” can add up to produce a full critical realignment. However, the author does not go beyond the existing literature to explain what produces a critical realignment. As the author notes a theory of political change requires both, catalysts (electorate) and receptors (politicians). However he doesn’t offer any further explanation on how the demand and supply side of the story works. Furthermore, the author does not elaborate on what kind of stimuli produces political response, and why there is variation at the regional level to the same stimuli.

To conclude, although the concept of dealignment and realignment is intuitively appealing to assess the change in voting behavior, there are many methodological and empirical drawbacks with this concept. Perhaps one of the most interesting aspects of this approach is how the concept has been operationalized for the Mexican case, and the fact that this literature also emphasizes the importance of regional aspects in the process of realignment-dealignment.

Finally, let me stress again that structural variables such as those used in the modernization and partisan realignment literature can be used as a rough proxy to understand some of the factors that may trigger juxtaposition. However, these methods neglect important aspects of the phenomenon such as the timing of election (institutional variables) and the possibility that juxtaposition could be produced by individuals who have decided to split their ticket between two levels of government. Therefore, structural variables should only be taken as a “first cut” approach to the study of juxtaposed governments.

Divided Government Literature

American Politics theory, and especially the literature that deals with divided government, can also bring an interesting alternative explanation to the phenomenon of juxtaposed government. The most common explanations of divided government in American Politics can be classified according to two categories: 1) those factors
that might affect the behavior of politicians, and 2) those factors that might affect voters' behavior. Among the factors that affect the politicians' behavior are campaign spending, Gerrymandering, incumbency and professionalization of Congress. Yet, neither Gerrymanderring, nor incumbency seem plausible hypotheses for the phenomenon of juxtaposed governments in Mexico. Regarding incumbency, the Mexican electoral system does not allow governors to be reelected and municipal presidents need to wait at least one term —and they generally do not pursue reelection. Second, Gerrymandering at the municipal level is not impossible, but is difficult as municipalities are taken as single districts and they do not change their physical boundaries very often. At the state level, Gerrymandering cannot be excluded, but there are not enough electoral studies to validate this hypothesis for all states.

As for the argument concerning professionalization of Congress, it has little application to local elections in Mexico. Experts in American Politics, like Fiorina (1992), posit that "Congress is undoubtedly the most professional of the world's legislatures. It has an elaborate committee structure and a large supporting bureaucracy, and its members are quite well supported and compensated. As Congress transformed itself from an amateur to professional institution, turnover dropped and tenure rose". The author points out that professionalization gives an advantage to incumbents of both parties but it is professionalization which in the first place encourages Democrats to seek a legislative post. Thereby, term limits would have the effect of diminishing the incumbency advantages, but it would also decrease the professionalization of the members of Congress since they would have less time to build their area of expertise. In short, this argument posits that "encumbered" incumbencies is what produces juxtaposition.

This hypothesis, although interesting, has little application to the division of power between municipalities and state government in Mexico. As mentioned earlier in this section, in Mexico there is no re-election, and professionalization of Mexican politicians has been achieved by occupying posts in the executive branch at the municipal, state and federal levels rather than through legislatures (however this may be changing rapidly). Perhaps the most notorious aspect of opposition state governors in Mexico is that most of them have been municipal presidents before becoming candidates for the state government. Therefore, their career and professionalization were acquired through municipal expertise. The PRI seems to be

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20 The argument of Gerrymandering posits that electoral districts are delimited in such a way that they tend to favor some party and not the other. Yet this explanation is basically non-theoretical and has been dismissed. Regarding incumbency, the literature on divided government claims that "encumbered" incumbencies lead to the decline of "marginal districts"—those districts in which the challenger has an opportunity to win the election— and this diminishes the number of outcomes that would be determined by a president coattail effect. Nonetheless, this contention does not provide a clue to explain the massive return of Republicans to the House in 1995.

following a similar path and more and more municipal presidents are being nominated to occupy a gubernatorial posts. To summarize, divided government theories based on factors that affect politicians’ behavior are not well suited to explain juxtaposed governments in Mexico.

The literature on divided government which focuses on voters’ behavior has some interesting hypotheses which may also be applied to the phenomenon of juxtaposed governments. This literature posits that two factors are crucial to produce divided governments: 1) split-ticket voting and, 2) the timing of elections. The most common models that explain split-ticket voting are based on Anthony Downs’ seminal work (1957). This model postulates that the median voter closes the gap between extreme ideologies or policies by splitting his (or her) ticket between Congress and the Presidency. A comparable argument could be made for juxtaposed governments by positing that juxtaposed governments are the product of split-ticket voting between the municipality and the state government.

However, there are several theoretical and practical problems with this kind of model. First, this model is more difficult to replicate and analyze in a multiparty system, although Mexican electoral contests at the subnational level tend to have a bipartisan format. Second, when both parties are offering choices which are relatively close to the center of gravity of the median voter, ticket splitting should decline and ideological preferences should play a more important role. Third, it is somewhat more difficult to find where the median voters stands in the Mexican system as the PRI’s program and ideology has been so flexible they can be accommodated in a wide spectrum that encompasses both the right and the left. Finally, the two cases of divided government in Mexico came during non-concurrent elections and there is also a high probability that most juxtaposed government appear under non-concurrent elections. Therefore, there is not an overwhelming empirical evidence that confirms that Mexican voters split their tickets very often, and polls are required to assess this aspect of the puzzle.

To summarize, split-ticket voting theories offer interesting insights and constitute an important alternative hypothesis to the modernization and dealignment-realignment literatures. It is plausible to posit that the phenomenon of juxtaposed

22 Although other authors have emphasized other aspects of ticket-splitting. Gary Jacobson (1992), for example, stresses that generally Republicans are viewed as superior to the Democrats in the realms of macro-economic management and foreign relations. By splitting their tickets voters match party strengths with institutional responsibilities and give the Presidency to Republicans and the Congress to Democrats (who are generally better at distributive justice). Other explanations stress that changing legislators of the lower chamber is a costly process (due to losses in expertise, responsiveness and districts benefits). Therefore a voter who is dissatisfied with government performance might find that it is easier to express its discontent by voting for the gubernatorial or presidential candidate of the minority, while simultaneously preserving the same Congress member which has been delivering the pork to its district. For further information on this subject see Morris Fiorina, Op. Cit., p. 51-57.
government is simply the result of voters splitting their tickets between different levels of government. Nonetheless, to validate split-ticket theories I would need to look at very disaggregate electoral data (perhaps at the ballot level) or at polls and this information is not always available for municipal or state elections. Despite problems of data collection I do not disregard the possibility of trying to undertake a couple of case studies to address this issue in states like Michoacán, Baja California or Chihuahua. In fact in Chihuahua, where disaggregate data exists at the ballot level it is possible to look at different elections during the period 1994-1998 and rebuild the 1994 presidential election from the municipal perspective. Then I can look if the trend found in the 1994 presidential election is repeated in the 1995 and 1998 congressional and gubernatorial elections. This could provide some evidence about voters’ behavior, and it will show if voters were already splitting their ticket before the gubernatorial election of 1995. However, let me emphasize that split-ticket-voting approach needs to be considered only as an alternative explanation as this phenomenon may only explain a small part of the juxtaposed cases. Even in the US, where split-ticket voting is often the primary cause of a divided government, this phenomenon only accounts for 10 or 15% of the total vote.

Others scholars have looked at the causes of divided government from another factor which also affects voters’ behavior: the timing of elections and the consequences of electoral rules. Experts on electoral politics like Shugart claim that “the incidence of divided government will be greater in non-concurrent elections than in concurrent elections, and that the rate of occurrence of divided government resulting from concurrent elections will be greater if the electoral rules are localizing rather than if they are nationalizing”. In the case of state and local governments in Mexico, the electoral rules have almost no “localizing effects” as they offer no possibility for reelection. Thus, politicians tend to be less responsive to their constituency. Furthermore, only a few states have allowed regional parties to compete in the electoral processes (Díaz Cayeros, 1995), and candidates for public posts must generally be nominated by a national party and cannot run as independents. Therefore, it is difficult to argue that juxtaposed governments are a consequence of localizing electoral rules. However, it is possible to hypothesize that the phenomenon of juxtaposed governments is more likely to occur when elections are non-concurrent than when they are concurrent. In other words, when gubernatorial and municipal elections are held simultaneously, the party that wins the gubernatorial race may also win the race in most municipalities (or, at least, in the most important ones). Yet, when the gubernatorial race is not at stake, voters may use the municipal election as a “plebiscite” on the gubernatorial performance, and they may vote for the minority party if they dislike what has been accomplished.

at the state level. In short, concurrent vs. non-concurrent elections may be a crucial factor that explains juxtaposed governments. The case of Chihuahua in 1995 clearly shows that, despite the economic crisis, citizens decided to vote against what has been accomplished by the Panista administration, and the PRI was able to win the most important municipalities of the state.

Operationalization of the Variables at the Macro Level, and Size of the Sample

In the preceding paragraphs I posited that juxtaposed governments (the dependent variable) are influenced by several structural variables such as the degree of urbanization, competitiveness of elections, level of participation, education, economic crisis, and non-concurrent elections. Therefore the relation can be posited as follows:

\[ \text{Juxtaposition} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{urb} + \beta_2 \text{comp} + \beta_3 \text{part} + \beta_4 \text{edu} + \beta_5 \text{conc} + \beta_6 \text{cris} + e \]

Where \( \text{Juxtaposition} \) represents the phenomenon of juxtaposed governments, \( \text{urb} \) the degree of urbanization, \( \text{comp} \) the competitiveness of the election at the municipal level, \( \text{part} \) the level of participation, \( \text{edu} \), level of education, \( \text{conc} \) the fact that election are non-concurrent and \( \text{cris} \), the economic crisis. The letter "e" is the error term for those omitted variables that may affect the model.

The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable. By definition municipalities can only be juxtaposed vis-a-vis the state government or unified vis-a-vis the state government. Therefore, juxtaposed governments will be operationalized as a dummy variable which takes the numerical value of one, if juxtaposed, and zero otherwise. This implies that the regression model will take the form of a logit or probit model due to the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable.

The degree of urbanization can be operationalized following the criterion proposed by the Mexican institute of Statistics (INEGI). The INEGI has five categories by which it classifies municipalities. These are reproduced in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Category I</td>
<td>Rural  (0-25 000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category II</td>
<td>Moderately urbanized (25 000-100 000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category III</td>
<td>Urbanized (100 000-250 000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category IV</td>
<td>Highly urbanized (250 000-500 000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category V</td>
<td>Metropolis (500 000-infinite)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Most analysts consider that a municipality with less than 25,000 inhabitants is a rural municipality. Those municipalities which have between 25,000 and 100,000 inhabitants can be considered as moderately urbanized. Lastly, any municipality that has more than 100,000 is generally considered as urbanized and those exceeding half a million inhabitants as highly urbanized. This variable can be operationalized as a continuous variable by computing the percentage of the population living in settlements of more than 25,000 inhabitants.

The competitiveness of elections is generally operationalized using Rae’s fractionalization or alternative indexes such as those proposed by Laakso and Taagepera or Molinar. \(^{24}\) Laakso and Taagepera’s index seems better suited to measure the competitiveness of the system, especially because their index is able to capture more accurately situations of bipartisan and multipartisan competition. However, their index is less sensitive to non-competitive situations. In contrast, Molinar’s index is better suited to capture “hegemonic situations”, but tends to distort backgrounds which are highly competitive. As I decided to measure competition rather than hegemony, I will use Laakso and Taagepera’s index.\(^{25}\)

Participation is without any doubt one of the most difficult variables to operationalize. Experts in Mexican electoral politics have pointed out that the electoral list is the privileged means used by the PRI to commit fraud. In other words, rather than subtracting votes to the opposition parties, the PRI has generally increased its electoral participation by tinkering with the federal electoral list. At the local level the phenomenon is even more acute. In many municipalities, local electoral lists are not available. In other municipalities, the population registered to vote exceeds the total population of the municipality or at least surpasses clearly the active working population. Therefore, to operationalize the concept of participation rather than relying on highly suspicious electoral lists, I decided to divide the total votes by the population 18 years of age and over. This population will be estimated from the 1980 and 1990 censuses and from the 1995 Censo (a sort of mid-term survey performed by INEGI). I also need to compute the rate of growth of this segment of the population in every municipality in order to obtain an accurate estimate of the annual increase of this indicator.

The variables education and non-concurrent elections have no major operationalization problems. Education has traditionally been operationalized as the

\(^{24}\) Juan Molinar has never been completely satisfied with Rae’s index as it produces similar values for bipartisan and one party dominant regimes. His own index (which I shall call the Molinar Index) has the virtue of effectively capturing the difference between bipartisan and hegemonic situations. However, the Molinar index is not as effective in capturing multipartisan and highly competitive situations as Laakso and Taagepera’s index.

\(^{25}\) For a complete discussion of these indexes see Rein Taagepera and Matthew Shugart, Seats and Votes, The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems, New Haven, Yale U. Press, 1989 and M. Laakso, “Effective Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe”, in Comparative Political Studies 12:3 1979, p. 27.
percentage of population with no schooling. An alternative way to this measure is to compute the average years of schooling in each municipality which should give a more accurate indicator. The phenomenon of concurrent vs. non-concurrent elections can be operationalized as a dummy variable in which zero will indicate a concurrent election and one a non-concurrent election.\textsuperscript{26}

The variable economic crisis is somewhat ambiguous and has problems of operationalization. In general, the best way to operationalize economic variables is to look for indexes such as rates of growth, inflation and/or employment. Unfortunately, the INEGI (The Mexican Bureau of Statistics and Census) only provides data on unemployment or inflation for selected cities, and most of these cities are highly urbanized settings. If I decided to extrapolate the trends of unemployment from those selected cities to other municipalities in the state, I would be introducing an important bias, especially on those rural municipalities which have a very different structure.

To cope with this problem, I propose to look at the economic structure of each municipality at the beginning of the 1980s and 1990s. Thereafter I will construct indexes that will report how the most important economic activities have evolved in this last two decades. Although this method is very time consuming, it is perhaps the best way to assess the differentiated impact that an economic crisis may have on different sectors of the economy and on different municipalities that have different economic structures.

To conclude this section let me say a few words concerning the size of the sample. México has 2,442 municipalities, and elections are held every three years. This implies that in three elections (roughly a decade) I should have 7,326 data points regarding electoral information. I decided to perform regression analysis on the whole population in order to draw more accurate inferences. Until recently, information on municipal elections has been fragmented and partial. Moreover, quantitative analysis on municipal elections has been scarce and I hope that, despite the problems of data gathering and analysis that may be encountered during the research, it is worth trying to deal with the whole universe of municipalities.

Notes on Doubly Divided Governments at the State Level

Doubly divided government refers to a situation in which the state assembly is controlled by a party that is different from that of the governor and, simultaneously,

\textsuperscript{26} The only possible problem I anticipate with this indicator is that in cases of blatant fraud and/or intense post-electoral mobilization, municipal elections are declared null and void. Therefore an extraordinary election must be held at a time that does not always coincide with electoral timing of other municipalities in the state. There are also some cases in which new municipalities are created and their electoral cycle is different from all the other municipalities in the state such as in Tlaxcala in 1996.
the most important municipalities are governed by a party that is not the one of the governor. In other words, doubly divided government is a situation in which divided and juxtaposed governments operate simultaneously, this means that power is dispersed along two different lines: through co-equal branches (the governor and the state assembly), and through dissimilar territorial units (state and municipalities). In principle, doubly divided governments suggest that there are more veto points in the system of governance and this may have important consequences in the policy-making process.

Unfortunately, Mexico has only three cases to which this doubly divided principle applies: Chihuahua 1995-1998, Aguascalientes 1995-1998 and Guanajuato 1994-1997. It is too early to speculate on what will be the long term implication of this phenomenon. However, in cases like Chihuahua, doubly divided government led to deadlock between the legislative and executive on the budget issue. An innovative solution had to be found (Aziz Nassif, 1995, and Mizhari, 1997) to bypass the budgetary paralysis. This suggests that sometimes state assemblies have been experiencing problems of governance between the executive and the local legislature two or three years in advance before similar problems arise at the federal level.

Concerning doubly divided governments, I may hypothesize that most of the variables that have an impact on juxtaposed governments may also produce doubly divided governments. In fact, doubly divided governments appeared in states which have a relatively high degree of urbanization and education. Most important, the three cases of doubly divided government occurred when the elections for the state assembly and municipalities were non-concurrent with the gubernatorial election. Thereby, it is possible to posit that mid-term elections may have been used as a referendum on the performance of governors.

Perhaps the most important issue regarding doubly divided government is to analyze how the relations between the governor and the state assembly, as well as between the state assembly and municipalities evolve. As posited by Alvarado (1996), during the PRI’s hegemonic era most state assemblies have been controlled by governors, and this has limited the accountability of the system. Alvarado shows that according to the Mexican constitution municipalities are entitled to receive resources, autonomy and prerogatives, which are decreed by the state assembly. As competition increases and state assemblies become more plural, local legislatures tend to take a more independent stand on the allocation of resources. Juxtaposed municipalities should also fight more to get a better share of the resources. This new political struggle among different levels and branches of local governments might

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27 Many analysts consider that Guanajuato under the administration of Carlos Medina Plascencia (1991-1994) also constitute a fourth case in which this principle of doubly divided government applies. I decided to exclude Guanajuato under Medina Plascencia, because the first Panista governor in this state took office as the product of a political negotiation rather than as a clear result of an electoral outcome.
corroborate that juxtaposed and divided governments have mutually reinforcing effects. I propose to include a special section that will deal with this phenomenon. Moreover, the study of these cases may help to test the hypothesis concerning split-ticket voting and account for voters’ behavior and organizational variables that affect the model.\(^{28}\)

Alternative Explanations at Macro and Micro levels

Dealing with different levels of juxtaposition

A more traditional “hypothesis” concerning juxtaposed governments is that municipalities become juxtaposed to state governments not because voters particularly dislike the performance of the governor, but because they vote against the poor performance of the federal government. Yemile Mizrahi (1994) claims that the electoral outcome of the 1983 elections in Chihuahua can be explained as a reaction to the nationalization of the Mexican banks in 1982. The large entrepreneurs and the bankers, as well as small and medium size entrepreneurs, became more radicalized because big entrepreneurs were able to make an arrangement with the government to compensate for the losses due to the bank nationalization and exchange control imposed during the López Portillo administration (1976-1982). Moreover, small and medium entrepreneurs did not benefit economically from the government. They were also excluded from the decision-making process in their peak organizations, and thereby believed they could exert a greater pressure from outside the system. In addition, because of their geographical position (northern region of Mexico), these entrepreneurs were more autonomous from the central government as they depended less on the internal market for survival, and they had more financial resources to overcome problems of organization and collective action. In fact, these small businessmen began to acquire leadership positions in their local business associations and they began to shift their ideological and partisan loyalty towards the PAN. In 1983 and 1986 they supported the PAN in Chihuahua and contributed with significant resources to the opposition party campaign. Furthermore, for the middle class the electoral victories obtained by Panistas in Chihuahua and Durango at the beginning of the 1980s were an important contribution to generate a change in the electoral “expectations” of the people during a sexenio characterized by a harsh crisis.\(^{29}\) But perhaps the most important lesson from the economic crisis of the 1980s was in the northern region of Mexico, large

\(^{28}\) By organizational variable I mean party organization, but also societal organization of groups like the church, the civil society or business associations.

\(^{29}\) Juan Molinar, *El tiempo de la legitimidad*, Mexico, Cal y Arena, 1991, p. 124
urban municipalities began to operate under a juxtaposed scheme: the PRI controlled the state government and the PAN large urban cities, at least until the victory of Ruffo in Baja California in 1989, and Barrio in Chihuahua in 1992.

To recapitulate, local elections in the northern region of Mexico show that it was national events such as the nationalization of the banking system that triggered a response at the local level and produced juxtaposition. One way to deal with this phenomenon is to increase the variation on the dependent variable to capture the different levels of juxtaposition.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Municipality vs. State</th>
<th>Municipality vs. Federation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Category 1</td>
<td>Juxt.</td>
<td>Juxt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category 2</td>
<td>Juxt</td>
<td>Coincident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category 3</td>
<td>Coincident</td>
<td>Juxt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category 4</td>
<td>Coincident</td>
<td>Coincident</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this table, the unit of analysis continues to be the municipality. Therefore category one represents, for example, the case of a Perredista municipality which is juxtaposed to a Panista state government, and is also juxtaposed to a Priista federal government. Category number two can be found in cases like Ensenada, Baja California, where the PRI controls the municipality and the PAN the state government. Category three can be illustrated by cases like Tijuana where municipal and state powers are coincident. Yet, both levels of government are juxtaposed to federal government. Category four is perhaps the most common of all, and represents any Priista municipality operating under a Priista state government.

To cope with different layers of juxtaposition, I could reassess the structural equation posited before:
\[ \text{Juxt} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{urb} + \beta_2 \text{comp1} + \beta_3 \text{part} + \beta_4 \text{edu} + \beta_5 \text{conc} + \beta_6 \text{cris} + e. \]

The main difference with the preceding model would be that the dependent variable takes four different categorical values instead of two. This, in turn, implies the use of a multinomial probit instead of a standard logit or probit. However, there are some caveats. First, there are very few cases that fall in category number one (perhaps less than 20) as Peredista municipalities juxtaposed to a Panista state government (and vice-versa) constitute a rare and relatively recent phenomenon. Second, there isn't any variation at the federal level since the PRI has always won the presidential contest. Therefore, this multinomial probit model could be more meaningful in the future if plurality at the national increases and the presidency is won by another party. In the mean time, category number one is of little value for the statistical analysis, and variation in the dependent variable comes from local processes and not from the presidential election.
To end this section let me stress some of the problem of colinearity among the national and subnational levels which render more complex the phenomenon of juxtaposition. As mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, a national crisis seem to have a direct impact on local processes. In addition, national electoral reforms also have spillover effects at the local level. However, the opposite is also true, some local processes also affect the national level. Therefore, this model entails some sort of chicken and egg dilemma, which makes it difficult to identify which effect at the national (or local) level have consequences on the other level. Furthermore, it is even more complex to disentangle interactive effects among the national and subnational levels.

One partial solution to this problem would be to rebuild the 1991, 1994 and 1997 national elections at the municipal level and see if the trends found at the national level are repeated at the gubernatorial and municipal levels and vice-versa. This exercise, although extremely time consuming may lead to formulate two unproved (but highly plausible) hypotheses. The first hypothesis would stress that party strategy matters, therefore the results obtained by the PAN at the subnational level are good predictors of what will happen at the national level. This implies that the PAN has a more incremental (or bottom up) strategy: it wins municipal elections, then gubernatorial contests, and lastly subnational level results show up at the national level. Meanwhile the PRD follows almost the opposite strategy: its results at the national level tend to have a spillover effect on subnational levels. As for the PRI, the issue is more complex to determine a priori. It may be plausible to posit that the PRI has some kind of “mixed” strategy: 1) in states governed by a “hardline local executive or cacique”, subnational results may drive national ones, and 2) in other states with no such characteristics, the Prioletat electoral outcomes at the national level may be a good predictor of what will happen at the local level. In any case these hypotheses need to be validated.

**Parties’ strategy**

In the preceding section, I briefly discussed why party strategy may matter for local electoral outcomes. It is also possible to hypothesize that when parties (especially opposition parties) are well organized, and devote resources and time to mobilize the electorate, there is a greater probability to obtain the phenomenon of juxtaposed governments than if they don’t do so. This would partially explain why the first important cases of juxtaposed governments during the 1980s were precisely in the northern region of Mexico where the PAN was well organized and did whatever it could to protect elections from blatant fraud.

There are two different methods to test this proposition. First, it may be possible to search data on the parties concerning the number of militants that parties have in each state, and their spatial distribution within the state. If this information is
not easily available, I could also try to gather data on the number of party representatives that oversaw each voting booth (representantes de casilla) and this could be used as a proxy for party organization.

Campaign finance may also give some leverage on this issue. Yet, I suspect that "reliable and truthful" data on campaign financing will be hard to gather for the PRI. Concerning the PRD, I doubt they would keep good records on their finance and number of militants, and perhaps the only party which keeps good registers on these issues is the PAN.

An alternative way to assess party strength is to analyze opinion polls. Opinion polls may show how aware voters are about parties' platform, ideologies and organization. The main problem with polls is that most of them have been done for national (rather than local) elections. Nonetheless, the office of the president (and now the (CIDE) may have some interesting data for some "critical" local contests such as those of Michoacán in 1989 and Chihuahua in 1992. Furthermore since 1994-1995, some newspapers such as REFORMA have been systematically undertaking polls for local contests. Therefore, I do not discard to analyze polls in one or two states as a complementary approach to the spatial and financial organization of parties mentioned above.
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