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Abstract

Constant population migration and global interaction pose one of the most important questions to contemporary political theory: How to deal with the political problems that arise from ethnic and cultural diversity in modern societies? This sociological reality is further complicated by how western colonialism and culture has historically abased the colonized 'other', today in Canada embodied in the peoples with dark skin and/or slanted eyes. Mainstream liberal theory offers a number of answers that are insufficient to this predicament; and one of these theoretical answers is represented by a liberal type of multiculturalism espoused by Canadian political philosopher Will Kymlicka. Multiculturalism does not necessarily sit comfortably together with the liberal principles of neutrality: The tension between liberalism and multiculturalism is illustrated by modern cultural perception of otherness as a threat to liberal freedoms—as in the recent discussion about the importance of publishing cartoons that are disrespectful to Islam or of whether veiling women ought to be allowed in liberal democracies. In spite of this tension, Kymlicka regards group rights to their cultural differences as based on the liberal principles of tolerance and celebration of diversity. Canada has a policy of multiculturalism that is also a 'national' symbol and ideal. The Canadian experience is unique because Canada built its national identity on the symbol of seeing itself as a 'cultural mosaic' based on rights to diversity and reasonable accommodation. But cultural and ethnic diversity in Canada is lived within the consequences of early assimilationist policies that assumed western-culture superiority, which devalued the self-perception of non-white Canadians. Immigration, especially from non-white countries is now Canada's biggest source of population growth. This situation produces a micro-cosmos of world diversity in Canada where people forge their identity amid vivid awareness of ethnic and cultural differences. This is especially the case in Canadian children of ethnically mixed marriages, a small sample of which I interviewed in the province of British Columbia. This research shows that in order for people to overcome the problems of difference, it is important for them to realize that the idea of distinct human races is a socially constructed illusion. From an anecdotal perspective, these ethnically diverse individuals displayed a strong sense of individuality that included compassion both as a principle for moral behaviour and also as a powerful emotion that allowed them to create an identity of self that encompasses and embraces diversity. I argue that this attitude fosters a genuinely multicultural cosmopolitan vocation—the soul of what I call Cosmopolitan Liberalism.
La constante migración e interacción global producen una de las preguntas más importantes para la teoría política contemporánea: ¿Cómo lidiar con los problemas políticos que surgen de la diversidad étnica y cultural en las sociedades modernas? Esta realidad sociológica se complica aún más por la manera en que el colonialismo y la cultura occidental han visto como inferior al ‘otro’ colonizado; actualmente en Canadá encarnado en la gente con piel oscura y los ojos rasgados. La teoría liberal más aceptada ofrece un número de respuestas a estas cuestiones que son insuficientes para este predicamento histórico. Una de estas respuestas teóricas la constituye el tipo de multiculturalismo liberal defendido por el filósofo político Will Kymlicka. El multiculturalismo no se encuentra necesariamente cómodo al lado del los principios liberales de la neutralidad política: la tensión entre el multiculturalismo y el liberalismo se ilustra en la percepción cultural moderna de la ‘otredad’ como una amenaza a las libertades liberales — como en la reciente discusión sobre la importancia de publicar caricaturas irrespetuosas para el Islam o de si el velo en las mujeres deba ser permitido en las democracias liberales. A pesar de esta tensión Kymlicka contempla los derechos de grupo a sus diferencias culturales como algo basado en los principios liberales de tolerancia y celebración de la diversidad. Canadá tiene una política pública de multiculturalismo que es también un símbolo e ideal ‘nacional’. La experiencia canadiense es única pues Canadá construyó su identidad nacional basada en el símbolo de verse a sí misma como un ‘mosaico cultural’ basado en el derecho a la diversidad y al “acomodo razonable” (o adaptación de las instituciones públicas a la diferencia de las minorías). Sin embargo, la diversidad cultural y étnica en Canadá se vive bajo la sombra y consecuencias de la política pública asimilacionista que tomaban como un hecho la superioridad de la cultura occidental. Esto devaluó la autopercepción de los canadienses no blancos. La inmigración, especialmente de países no blancos, es ahora la fuente más grande de crecimiento poblacional de Canadá. Esta situación produce un microcosmos de diversidad mundial en Canadá donde la gente forja su identidad en una conciencia vivida de diferencias étnicas y culturales entre la gente. Este es especialmente el caso en los hijos de matrimonios mezclados étnicamente y entrevisté a un pequeño grupo de personas con estas características en la provincia de la Columbia Británica. Esta investigación muestra que, para que la gente supere los problemas de la diferencia, es importante darse cuenta de que la idea de que existen las razas humanas claramente distinguibles, es una ilusión construida socialmente. Desde una perspectiva de anécdota, estos individuos diversos étnicamente mostraron un fuerte sentido de su individualidad que incluía a la compasión tanto en calidad de principio para la conducta moral, como una poderosa emoción que les permitió crear una identidad que incluye en sí misma y acepta la diversidad.
Yo argumento que esta actitud cultiva una genuina vocación multicultural cosmopolita —el corazón de lo que yo llamo Liberalismo Cosmopolita.
Introduction

Liberal multiculturalism refers to a defence of tolerance and celebration of diversity on the basis of individual and equal rights. In theory, a liberal society is an association of rational and free people, each working the best they can, within fair rules, to further their own interests. There has been much liberal debate as to what exactly it is to be free: there is freedom from arbitrary imposition, freedom granted by having the means to do something, freedom found by being the citizen of a Republic, or freedom to express oneself and be creative, and this list is not exhaustive. All of these are valid forms of freedom in liberalism, which come down to the individual having agency and reason, the latter being the source of her principled morality. The state, a community, a group or association—the collectivity—ought not to impose arbitrarily on the individual because this would limit her freedom. So individual freedom is an important aspect of liberalism, but so is fairness of the rules of engagement in a liberal society where there ought to be equality before the law. However, equality was not always regarded by liberal thinkers as desirable; to conservative ones, political rights were to be deserved by merit and the proper position in society. This elitist and conservative attitude made Marx reject liberalism as a mere bourgeois ideology in the XIX century. One ought to recall that it was only very gradually that rights were extended to every adult in liberal societies, including men without property, women, racial minorities in a disadvantage due to racism, and eventually, minorities such as people with disabilities and people with different sexual orientations. So, in principle, liberalism came to protect the rights of all individuals equally in a political association.

Kymlicka’s theory of multiculturalism is liberal because, in spite of embracing the need for group rights, he also establishes the need to protect individuals from the arbitrariness that may come from their own group. His theory though sees the importance of granting group rights to ethnocultural minorities who may be in danger of being swept aside by the majority. An ideal multicultural society involves various cultures and lifestyles living together under the roof of a liberal polity in constant appreciation of each other and celebration of such diversity. According to Kymlicka:

Today [...] previously excluded groups are no longer willing to be silenced or marginalized, or to be defined as ‘deviant’ simply because they differ in race, culture, gender, ability or sexual orientation from the so-called ‘normal’ citizen. They demand a more inclusive conception of citizenship which recognizes (rather than stigmatizes) their identities, and which accommodates (rather than excludes) their differences (2002, 327).
The question here is how to move from exclusion and stigmatization of difference, through its recognition and accommodation, to its appreciation and celebration. Communitarian theory succeeded in showing that community matters in the creation of persons with moral depth; this brought the idea that human groups ought to be protected from the homogenizing powers of universal individuality. Kymlicka espouses the idea of rights for ethnocultural groups (within limits); however, he does not address the possible consequences of classifying people according to such criteria and construing them as belonging to clearly differentiated and discrete groups that ought to be the recipients of such rights. The problems of difference in a diverse society are complex and run through various levels of social interaction. I will concentrate on race and racism, topics that should be addressed when speaking of the desirability of group rights (and the ensuing classification of people). Kymlicka also speaks about the success of the Canadian implementation and constant review of a multicultural policy since the seventies. The latter involves a ‘group-differentiated citizenship’ (Kymlicka, 1996) that allows the state to accommodate difference because, according to the Supreme Court of Canada, “accommodation of difference is the essence of true equality” (quoted by Kymlicka, 1996, 153).

The shortcomings of both theory and policy come from simplifying the problems of difference in dealing with it as if it came from clearly discrete non-porous groups and individuals with very simple identities. I will complement my critique with an illustration of the complexity of racial difference, based on in-depth interviews with a small group of ethnic-looking mixed-blood people in British Colombia, Canada. This research will illustrate why liberal multicultural theory fails to provide an adequate answer to the problems of diversity: A well known argument is that individualist liberalism is based on the unrealistic conception of people in abstract individuality; a newer argument is that multiculturalism, and also communitarianism, base their arguments on a simplistic conception of people’s allegiances and sense of belonging to inherited clear-cut groups and communities (Appiah, 2006; Sen, 2006). The communitarian point that individuality is not an abstract characteristic of humanity but a learnt set of behaviours, beliefs, and ways of life—it is modern culture protected by liberalism—is well taken. Nevertheless, their notion of closed off human groups as the sole source of our identity and cultural context is misleading. My research illustrates this, and it also shows that in the creation of identity by real people, attached to a strong sense of individuality, moral principles may arise from sources unsuspected by both individualist liberals and communitarians. In what follows, I will critically examine Will Kymlicka’s theory of Liberal Multiculturalism under the light of Canadian history and experience with its multicultural policy, which has been heavily criticized from a variety of perspectives. I will also present the results of my research on the experience
of ethnically looking mixed-blood respondents, who grew up in Canada and parts of the United States, and now live in the province of British Columbia.

**Liberal Multiculturalism and the Problems of Difference in the Canadian Experience**

When Alexis de Tocqueville wrote his Democracy in America in the XIX century, he reflected about the future of liberal society where he saw the path of equality as unstoppable. This and other liberal thinkers (such as Edmund Burke and José Ortega y Gasset) considered the equalizing force of modernity as a danger to liberty due to its potential to engender stupid masses of people that would move like herds and could fall prey to authoritarianism. De Tocqueville warned us about the "tyranny of the majority" borne from equality in an age of individualism: When ancestral authorities (religion, morality) lose their value, public opinion becomes the sole authority and it imposes itself on everyone even more thoroughly than an arbitrary dictator. Also, he thought that the individualistic pursuit of self-interest destroys the moral fibre of mutual obligation and civic duty and degrades the human soul towards mere enjoyment of superficial pleasures. He observed in history how equality displayed an unstoppable advancement paired with individual freedom. However, all was not lost for he thought that he had found in America the way to overcome such bleak future for liberalism: In the mid XIX century, he observed how in this young country people associated with one another in order to participate in their local communities for the good of all. This constituted the basis of federalism in local and provincial institutions, in community-based self-government, and came from their Puritan drive to help one another and their moral identifications with one another. This conservative strand of liberal thought considers individuals as people embedded in their particular, cultural, and historical communities; values community and its bonds, and regards them as the source of the political vitality of modern social interaction. In contemporary political theory, this line of thought is inherited by communitarianism.

In contrast to this, an abstract type of liberalism —the kind espoused by philosophers such as John Rawls or Jürgen Habermas— believes that people can be seen as rational individuals whose reason gives them access to a higher type of universal moral reflection. This idea comes from Kantian metaphysics, according to which the transcendental subject —and end in itself— may overcome particularity through reason and produce universal principles for every moral decision. This rational competence for moral reflection is a measure of the freedom of an individual person in the liberal doctrine. Having such independent abilities means that nobody, no authority, may impose on the individual person any idea on how to live her life; or what principles are
the good ones to heed when it comes to making moral decisions. The only limitation to individual freedom in a liberal polity, in principle, should be everybody else’s individual rights. What this means is that when liberal authorities send somebody to jail, they do so because this person trampled on the rights of somebody else—not because she has done something that is considered wrong or bad. This is an important subtlety to ponder; in theory, liberal governments are neutral and this means that they do not judge the goodness or badness of the deeds of individuals. If they did they would produce arbitrary principles as impositions on their lives. The good of an individual life is a private matter. Public order in liberalism is based on the primacy of the ‘right’ over the ‘good’; that is, public authorities ought to defend individual rights and leave individuals alone to lead their lives according to the principles they themselves choose according to their own judgment. It follows that liberal states ought not to espouse any comprehensive conceptions of the good—such as a religion, a philosophy, or a doctrine. In liberalism, collective prerogatives ought never to come before individual ones. Nevertheless, as said before, it is an individual’s right to choose her own moral principles or those dictated by the community to which she belongs.

Will Kymlicka addresses the debate and tells us that both sides (individualists and communitarians) should move away from questions of what the true nature of individuals is and the importance of community; and should move to “more specific questions about the relationship between the state, society, and culture in liberal democracies” (Kymlicka, 1989, 165). He says both sides have lost sight of the legitimate concerns of the other side: Communitarians have not confronted the liberal worry that the authority and coercive means of state and society (community) may become tyrannical—and this is why the state should remain neutral. Liberals still take the existence of a diverse and tolerant culture for granted, as if it were a natural occurrence and not socially sustained. And yet he believes that much criticism of abstract liberalism—specifically that of John Rawls’s—rests on a misleading connection drawn between individualism and state neutrality (Kymlicka, 1989). Communitarians contend that Rawls’s theory is too individualistic; it denies the need for a shared cultural structure that provides individuals with meaningful options. They believe that without the latter, the culture of pluralism will eventually die in favour of a mass culture of sameness. However, Kymlicka says that this is not really a problem that arises from posing a theory of justice that is too individualistic; it is a social problem and society and its values ought to produce the cultural options to guarantee its traditions—liberal or otherwise. A theory of justice that defends individual rights does not deny the existence of society as a culturally alive entity, but he contends that its authority ought to remain in the societal domain and not in the state. He does not see why state neutrality precludes values from being
produced socially when there is freedom of speech and assembly in liberal democracies. Here, Kymlicka resorts to Habermas and his deliberative liberalism, his idea that existing conceptions of the good ought to be evaluated critically for this is what free individuals do (Kymlicka, 1989, 176). He supports the liberal idea that individuals are very capable of rational judgment within a culture—and even against it. When the state is not neutral, it is easier that there be oppression of minorities, state action would distort free evaluation of competing ways of life, would rigidify the dominant ones, and would give an upper hand to political elites on the values of the polity.

Will Kymlicka acknowledges the legitimate concerns of communitarians about the importance of the groups to which people may belong, emphasises the importance of diversity for the vitality of a liberal society and the availability of cultural choices for its members. He adds an argument about the justice in providing such minorities with the means to perpetuate themselves and flourish. However, one must remember that this is the case within a liberal framework and so he proposes that universal human rights be complemented by minority rights, but the latter must be limited by individual freedom. What this means is that communities (or non-modern ‘world cosmologies’) may demand privileges over their members that liberalism cannot accept because its main premise is that individuals ought to be free from arbitrary impositions. Liberal societies ought to have a neutral state in principle, yet Kymlicka also points out that modern states have historically engaged in “nation building” activities, which include the production of a societal culture for national unity and functionality. This effectively means that the state will not be so neutral after all, there is a very realistic need for state-endorsed common principles embodied in common public institutions that operate in one common language (or a couple of them). Yet, as has been mentioned, the wider majority in a country may try to impose its own values on minority groups, and this is what liberal multiculturalism seeks to avoid. Facing this reality, minorities that live within the borders of such state—and presumably hold different principles and speak different languages than the majority ones—ought to be given group rights to prevent that they may be wiped out and oppressed by the majority. In short, as Kymlicka puts it, minority rights are consistent with liberalism if “(a) they protect the freedom of individuals within the group; and (b) they promote relations of equality (non-dominance) between groups” (2001, 23). He has written and published widely on this particular line of argument (Kymlicka, 1995a, 1996, 1998, 2001).\footnote{And this is not an exhaustive list of references. Kymlicka is quite a prolific writer, but the framework of his theory has remained the same throughout his work with very slight refinements. His vast amount of publications cites more examples and covers more multicultural experience.}
Kymlicka differentiates between two types of groups that may be protected under this scheme: National minorities who are previously self-governing, territorially concentrated cultures that wish to maintain themselves as distinct societies within a larger state or may even seek to create their own nation-state (such as Quebec, Catalonia, Scotland, Northern Ireland, the Basque Country, Chechnya, Kosovo); and ethnic minorities whose source is immigration. The differentiation of these two groups is important because they seek different things and their existence comes as a consequence of different social phenomena. National minorities exist due to colonisation; these ethnocultural communities concentrated in a territory have been resilient to being assimilated into the larger dominant society and have managed to maintain their distinctiveness in spite of widespread attempts at assimilation. It is important to recall though, that multicultural treatment and theory came afterwards, typically after long struggles and violent confrontations —let us remember how terrorism first appeared in the political scenario of the western world. When it was clear that national minorities were not going to disappear quietly and peacefully, concessions had to be made. Amid the latter were self-governing rights (devolution and federalism) or the right to keep their own nation-building privileges; such as an educational system in their own language or the right to go to work and interact with the wider society in their own language. In Canada, the latter reason is the source of two official languages: English and French. What Kymlicka does not mention is that such rights do not really come from the liberal largesse of the dominant nations; they are compromises reluctantly accepted by the national minorities and generally achieved in favour of the dominant majority so that their country would not be split up. They are the product of power struggles between unequal contenders where the weaker and smaller one had to make do with the handouts of the stronger and bigger one. Having clarified their origin, it is hard to see how such rights can be seen as coming from a liberal point of view, except in hindsight.

Canada’s national minority par excellence is Quebec, whose struggle has shaped its political landscape in general: It is the neuralgic point of the struggle for the country to have two official languages and also a historically important part of the reason why Canada is a federation instead of a unitary system which would be more congenial with parliamentarianism. The Quebecois may complain that the federal government entrenched a Constitution without their consent and meddles in their provincial business too much; but the First Nations of Canada who are also national minorities were disempowered to a much greater degree by Canada’s original inhumane attempts at assimilation. Even when today there are efforts to give bands

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2 In the 1840’s Residential Schools for native children started to open in Canada and were designed to educate Indians under assumptions of their inferior culture and character. They were meant to “kill the Indian in the child”. In the decade of 1870 the federal government started to have an important role in their development and
some independence to govern themselves, they lack the administrative and financial capacity to become an effective third level of government. They are marginalised in poverty stricken reserves, quarrelling among themselves for the limited resources granted to them, and those who leave this system of segregation find themselves in a similar position to the second group that Kymlicka defines—ethnic minorities, especially with respect to racism and equal opportunities. While it is true that Aboriginals in Canada may be defined as national minorities, the mechanics of the old assimilationist policies in Canada left them disempowered to such a degree that they can access only a limited amount of national minority rights. One can explain this difference between the national minorities of Canada as a result of how Aboriginals were scattered all over the country with no real strength in numbers; or because of the deeper cultural differences between English Canada and them as opposed to those between English Canada and French Canada. These and other explanations may have their merit, yet the brutal way in which Aboriginals were forced into assimilation points at a deeper trait in the European culture of colonisation, one that we inherit today in the modern world and are at pains to let go—the racist identification and differential treatment of the 'other-than-human' dark people. In this article, I will not engage any further with the groups that Kymlicka defines as national minorities mainly because there is a vast amount of literature specialized on this topic and on the particularities that characterise each different case in the world. Also, liberal multiculturalism in the literature is more readily related with what Kymlicka identifies as ethnic minorities: people who have moved into the developed world looking for better life opportunities and have different cultural habits and—very importantly—look different to the Caucasian majorities.

According to Kymlicka's theory, ethnic minorities have typically left behind their own cultures and have done so wishing to integrate into the new society that they adopt. However, according to him, they do seek greater recognition of their ethnic identity so they ask to modify the institutions of the mainstream society to accommodate their cultural differences (the typical example is Sikh men in the Canadian police force or RCMP\(^3\) asking to be allowed to wear their turbans instead of the traditional head gear). And so ethnic minorities seek to integrate into the larger society and, to Kymlicka, integration is a very different term from assimilation. The latter would entail

\(^3\) Royal Canadian Mounted Police.
forcing people to accept a “thick” culture that includes views on how people should live their lives, which would entail impositions on individual freedom. Kymlicka tells us that liberal democracies must engage in nation-building and thus in promoting a specific set of common principles and also a common language for public institutions to work; but this type of nation-building refers to a “thin” societal culture that has room for many different lifestyles:

Societal cultures within a modern liberal democracy are inevitably pluralistic, containing Muslims, Jews, and atheists as well as Christians; gays as well as heterosexuals; rural farmers as well as urban professionals; socialists as well as conservatives. Such diversity is the inevitable result of rights and freedoms guaranteed to citizens in a liberal democracy—including freedom of conscience, association, speech, and political dissent, and rights to privacy—particularly when combined with an ethnically diverse population (Kymlicka, 1998, 27).

In Canada, immigrants—and also Aboriginals who leave their reserves—are ethnic minorities—‘others’, embodied in different-from-Caucasian phenotypes that seek a place in this modern polity.

The kind of policies that Kymlica refers to in order to accommodate the newcomers can be classified into two groups: The first one refers to policies that seek to accommodate ethnic minorities—their religions, languages, historical presence, and customs and costumes; such as revising school curricula (for greater recognition of their historical contributions), work schedules (to accommodate religious holidays other than Christian), and work dress-codes (to let them wear traditional garments at work); cultural diversity training for police and health care professionals; funding to preserve their cultures and languages or to make the transition from their own tongue to the dominant one. The second group includes policies that seek to provide them with equal opportunities in their host societies, such as affirmative action programmes, reserved seats in legislature and reserved government positions, and anti-racism programmes in the workplace, schools, and media (see Kymlicka, 1998, 42 & 2001, 162). So Kymlicka’s theory provides ethnic minorities with accommodation rights and equal opportunities rights in a diverse and culturally vibrant liberal polity. Both types of rights emerge from the liberal principle of equality—limited, as we have said, by the individual right of liberty with priority above all others in liberalism. In liberal societies, accommodation rights are justified because the culture of the dominant majority is woven into the practices of public institutions and it may oppress people who are different so it ought to change to welcome ‘ethnic’ newcomers.

The problem with the above theory is that it assumes that the state ought to be neutral but it also assumes that ‘non-ethnic’ people in the majority (generally white and Christian people) also ought to be neutral and refuses them the right to hold dear certain symbols and aspects of their own culture.
The theory does not consider that actual people in the majority culture may resent having to let go of certain figures and symbols; for example, the RCMP's traditional head gear; or Christmas wishes in the winter holiday concealed as "season's greetings," or accept customs and costumes that hurt modern individualist sensitivities, for example, regarding Muslim veiled women as a symbol of female oppression or Sikh children carrying knives as a safety hazard in schools. These examples of how actual folks who consider themselves non-ethnic have reacted to the presence of ethnic minorities show that Kymlicka's thin societal culture—meant to serve common functional interests—can actually be rather thick. Another way in which accommodation policies are justified in liberalism is that the newcomers are supposed to spice up urban life and diversity, and in an ideal world, these policies allow ethnic cultures to flourish and their folklore to enrich everybody's life with food, music, and diverse traditional customs and costumes. But it is hard to know whether ethnic folks find themselves actually flourishing under the light of accommodation rights. As pretty as 'celebration of diversity' sounds, it is hard to visualize exactly what this means; there is a lack of clarity when defining the 'goods' produced by granting ethnic minority rights of accommodation. As Jeremy Waldron puts it:

Are these goods secured when a dwindling band of demoralized individuals continues, against all odds, to meet occasionally to wear their national costume, recall snatches of their common history, practice their religious and ethnic rituals, and speak what they can remember of what was once a flourishing tongue? Is that enjoyment of their culture? Or does enjoyment require more along the lines of the active flourishing of the culture on its own terms, in something approximating the conditions under which it originally developed? (Waldron, 1995, 97).

If there is enjoyment due to cultural practice and exchange it comes from people meeting other people, which is something that happens at the societal level in the freedom of spontaneity and mutual trust. This has more to do with present creativity, the constant 'here and now' of social interaction with very suggestive possibilities of cultural syncretism. Unfortunately, not all cultural encounters are this happy.

As I have said, Kymlicka's theory seeks to address the problems of equality in the contemporary world from the perspective of compensation to the least advantaged due to the power of numbers (minorities vs. majority). Equal opportunity rights, the second group of rights granted to ethnic minorities by Kymlicka's theory represent this type of compensation. However, in this type of rights, there is a veiled aspect of compensation based on history and race. Ruthless freedom of enterprise was the origin of our contemporary liberal democracies, which produced a vast diversity of economic and political power levels in nations and individuals throughout the world. The great economic
powers of our day were built on the basis of slave trade and exploitation of both conquered people and resources. Powerful nations colonised the rest of the world and created a narrative of superiority which we all must deal with in the contemporary globalized world—both the (Caucasian) masters and the (ethnic) slaves. This history created unequal opportunities for people of dark skin and slanted eyes; yet some ethnics—not without difficulty—managed to rise above their social situation. The narrative created the possibility for human ignorance, pettiness, and even wickedness to manifest itself in the form of racism. Equal rights policies of the kind that Kymlicka describes seek to compensate the least advantaged due to historical wrongs in the past and present (politically) incorrect notions of race about ethnic minorities. However, in the present, people who see themselves as non-ethnic or the majorities in liberal democracies did not themselves commit the historical atrocities that are referred to in order to justify the type of compensation that is offered to ethnic minorities. Many of these folks may themselves be descendants of families stuck in poverty due to causes beyond their control. So equal opportunity rights and policies in affirmative action programmes for people with certain ancestry produce not only resentment but also very real anger. Especially when they end up favouring middle class ‘ethnics’ over lower and working class people in the majority—unfortunately one cannot find out what social class one belongs to from skin colour or the shape of one’s eyes. Such anger then fuels racism and goes against the antiracist policies and campaigns that complete the package of equal opportunity and reasonable accommodation rights for ethnic minorities.

In this article, I use the Canadian example in order to illustrate how Kymlicka’s liberal theory of multiculturalism falls short of addressing the most difficult problems of human diversity. One of the policy’s main problems is related to how it depends on social markers of difference in order to classify people and differentiate who ought to be recipient of ethnic minority rights; these people are referred to as “visible minorities”, for we can see they are different due to race. In the case of accommodation rights, classification may come from the recipients of such rights themselves, as in Sikh men who also want to be policemen in Canada and were allowed to wear their turbans in RCMP uniforms. As we have seen, change of this kind in public liberal institutions and symbols is not without conflict in the larger society, but at least it does not lead policy authorities to classify people according to their skin colour and shape of eyes. In Canada, there are historical reasons for these two phenotypical characteristics to justify the ancestry needed to be seen as belonging to a visible ethnic minority and thus be given the equal opportunity group rights upon which Kymlicka’s theory insists. However, seen in the wider context of “race” in the present time, they are as arbitrary as singling out having a big nose or curly hair to be able to receive certain privileges: Singling out people because of how they look—even if it is to grant
them equality rights—may work towards perpetuating the prejudices that it seeks to combat. Race is a socially and culturally built category that relies on folk taxonomies about groups, castes, ideas of who belongs and who does not belong to 'us' as a group. This is reflected on the current meaning and use of the word 'ethnic' which Kymlicka uses to designate the type of rights that his theory grants to newcomers who are visibly different from the majority in western liberal democracies.

In his book Beyond Ethnicity (1986), Werner Sollors discusses the etymological origins of the word 'ethnic' and ethnicity, and speaks of two conflicting uses of these words: According to the more contemporary and politically correct use of them, everyone is ethnic, in the sense that all people and all peoples must have some kind of ethnic origin or ethnicity. So in this sense even white folks are ethnic, it would be absurd to exempt them from having ethnicity or an ethnic background. Yet this inclusive use of the word is in conflict with its more vernacular use that has generally excluded dominant groups; it presupposes a contrastive terminology that refers to the point of view of whoever uses the term:

The Greek word ethnikos, from which the English 'ethnic' and 'ethnicity' are derived, meant 'gentile', 'heathen'. Going back to the noun ethnos, the word was used to refer not just to people in general but also to 'others'. In English usage the meaning shifted from 'non-Israelite' [...] to 'non-Christian'. Thus the word retained its quality of defining another people contrastively, and often negatively (Sollors [1986], 1995, 219-20).

He tells us that all groups—not only those who consider themselves Caucasian—have a way of culturally defining themselves as centrally human and other alien cultures as less-than-human. And so, the essence of ethnicity has been seen as boundary-constructing processes that work in creating cultural markers to differentiate between human groups. Sollors cites Frederick Barth’s Ethnic Groups and Boundaries (1969) to say that tracing the history of an ethnic group through time does not necessarily mean to trace the history of a culture simultaneously. Barth sees ethnic groups as defined by the boundaries that they build with stable continuity; yet culture changes from one historical context to another and lacks the kind of stability and clarity that the social construction of ethnic boundaries has. It is interesting to notice that in multicultural literature ethnicity and culture are often treated as one and the same thing. However, what this discussion highlights is the lack of clarity about the specific components of ethnicity, especially in its relationship to race. Sollors says that race has been regarded as the most prominent ethnic factor, yet it is also considered only a dimension of the larger cultural-historical phenomenon of ethnicity (1986). What one has to bear in mind is that the universalist conception of ethnicity (i.e. everyone has
Mónica Sánchez

an ethnic background) finds common use in the academic environment, while the idea of ‘ethnic’ as other-than-us is pervasive in the public at large.

It can be argued that the multicultural public policy in Canada contributes to building the classification of people as ‘ethnic’ (dark skin and/or slanted eyes) or non-ethnic (Caucasian) for the courts and public administration to be able to identify the recipients of rights that it claims to grant. In Canada, “‘[m]ulticultural’ often serves as a synonym for ‘ethnic’ or ‘immigrant’” (Roy, 1995, 200) and the newest multiculturalism program of 1996 refers to the need for looking after “ethnic, racial, religious and cultural communities in Canada” (Dewing & Leman, 2006, 8). Rogers Smith’s empirical research examines how American courts construct racial identities in their rulings; and this gives him the basis to produce a theory of how racial identity is built due to political processes and not solely at the societal level. All social sciences had traditionally believed the latter; “always, race and gender were exogenous variables, things created by biology, or economic or psychological imperatives, or pre-political social customs, practices, and traditions” (Smith, 2007, 363). Ethnic identity and also racial identity are not only built by people’s own identifications and allegiances but also at the level of public institutions. Smith tells us that as civil and women’s rights movements in America challenged inequality, scholars came to regard racial and gender identities as socially as well as politically constructed. And yet they still treated race, gender, and other identities as “created in locations and through processes outside ‘high politics’ like legislatures, executive agencies, courts, and campaigns” (2007, 364) because it was easier to see them coming from biology or remote and exotic places. To be sure, formal political institutions are not the source of such identities, yet all of them arise in contexts that are politically structured to some degree, they are not purely pre-political. In his book Stories of Peoplehood (2003) Smith shows how elites produce such stories to win constituents for the political community that they hope to lead. These stories are “ethically constitutive” of the identity of members in such communities and they permeate their membership with “ethical worth” related to traits that are supposed to define members intrinsically. “These traits”, Smith tells us, “include ethnicity, religion, language, gender, race, territorial origins, and more” (2007, 365). Such identities are generally defined by group leaders and perpetuated by members when seen as ethically valuable. The problems arise from the flip side of these types of definitions, when alien minorities are given a contrastive function and seen as inferior to the ethically valuable identity of the dominant group; as was the case in the racist past of all contemporary liberal democracies. Stories of doubtful ethical value in ‘outsider’ groups endure in institutions and in social definitions of belonging –especially when the outsiders or other-than-us groups can be marked and differentiated by phenotypical characteristics— in spite of subsequent efforts at retelling the
stories with a more positive hue on all of the involved. Canada was the first country in the world to adopt a multicultural policy and to retell its “story of peoplehood” in an attempt to become more inclusive, however the policy that implements such noble aspirations has been heavily criticised.

Canada was defined as a multicultural society by Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau in the seventies; a mosaic of diverse cultures and ethnicities, a vibrant society ruled by liberal principles of freedom and equality. This new story came as an inclusive move of its liberal leaders when the famous Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (set up in 1963 by the previous liberal government of Lester B. Pearson) discovered that “there were many vocal groups of citizens neither anglophone nor francophone who insisted on reporting their contributions to culture in Canada” (Cameron, 2004, xviii). It was the Ukrainians that most vociferously “reminded the federal government that not all Canadians belonged to the first two forces, French and English” (Roy, 1995, 200); and they gave Trudeau awareness about diversity in Canada and its potential political power. In Trudeau’s time, the federal concern about Canada’s unity sprang from Quebec’s threat of secession. The world at large found out about the strong possibility of Canada’s partition when French President Charles de Gaulle visited Quebec in 1967 and encouraged the crowds’ roaring with the separatist “Vive le Quebec Libre!” Against this social reality, Trudeau defended a unified Canada based in uncompromising individual rights and a multicultural view of Canadian society. He saw in ethnic minorities the symbolic strength that had the power to slow down the separatist impulse of Quebec. And so, he painted a picture of equality based on diversity that reminded Canadians that “every single person in Canada is now a member of a minority group” (Trudeau 1972, 32). His vision of liberal Canada included a constitution that would preserve its unity—entrenched in 1982 (without Quebec’s consent)—and a bill of individual rights for all Canadians—the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. He saw minority rights only as a derivative of individual rights and as a matter of equality. If it had been up to him, Trudeau would not have agreed to any group rights for national minorities in Canada (First Nations and Quebec). In his article “Understanding Canada” (2004), Samuel Laselva tells us that Trudeau was an “enigmatic figure”, a “philosopher turned politician”, a liberal that looked to the future, admired the American constitution, thought sovereignty resided in the individual—not the parliament—celebrated pluralism, and would have brought Canada to “a liberal utopia” (2004, 23). Trudeau was an important statesman that invented the idea of multicultural Canada and sold it to the Canadian people.

Yasmeen Abu-Laban and Daiva Stasiulis (1992) examine diverse arguments against the Canadian policy of multiculturalism that have come from various sources such as academic writings, public opinion, political parties, and ethnic minority groups. The conservative right in Canada adopted an integrationist
position against multiculturalism calling for an outright ending of the policy, supporting immigration solely on the basis of economic reasons, and seeking the promotion of a united Canadian national culture. For example, in 1990, the Reform Party called for the preservation of the RCMP tradition in keeping a uniform dress code; i.e., not allowing the use of Sikh turbans (1992, 373). The most vociferous critique of the policy came from Quebecois academia where it has been seen as undermining their claims to nationhood (Rocher, 1973; Harvey, 1985; Labelle, 1990 & 1991; McAndrew, 1991). Abu-Laban and Stasiulis tell us that general academic opposition to the multiculturalism policy has taken the form of criticisms that either accuse it of serving assimilationist purposes (Brotz, 1980; Hawkins, 1982; Roberts & Clifton, 1982), of co-opting and misrepresenting the more real and pressing interests of minority groups (Peter, 1981; Moodley, 1983; Ramírez & Taschereau, 1988), or more recently, of promoting divisiveness and lack of interaction between ethnic groups in Canada (Bibby, 1990). Two influential works that espouse the latter kind of arguments are Neil Biscoondath’s Selling Illusions (1994) and Richard Gwyn’s Nationalism without Walls (1995). Kymlicka (1998) himself addresses these critiques that claim that multiculturalism has ghettoized Canada and does not allow immigrants to think of themselves as full citizens. Abu-Laban and Stasiulis show that these arguments are echoed by some members of ethnic minorities who think that the policy “has not alleviated racism and discrimination” (1992, 377). They also point out that ethnic minority members have argued in the newspapers, at roundtables promoted by the government, and in parliament that the policy itself promotes racism. They quote John Nunziata an ethnic minority MP for the liberal party who has insisted that the policy is discriminatory. Immigrant newcomers and their Canadian-born and English speaking children resist being labelled ‘ethnics’ to be given ethnic rights because they see this as a public admission that they are not full members of the Canadian society.

In their review of the various sources of opposition to the Canadian multicultural policy, Abu-Laban and Stasiulis tell us that in spite of its many detractors and its paradoxical nature (finding unity in diversity or a multicultural society within a two-nation framework), multiculturalism in Canada allows for “ideological space” to pursue equality policies and “for a more inclusionary definition or discourse about membership in the Canadian political community” (1992, 381); to them, this is a “relevant and necessary policy” (1992, 367). As I have mentioned, the Canadian, ‘non-ethnic’, nationalist critique of multiculturalism perceives the policy as giving too much power to ethnic minorities where second generation immigrants slowly gain terrain economically, legally, and at the symbolic level of achieving accommodation for their cultural habits and costumes. They also stress that the policy is ‘under siege’ not only on account of internal Canadian factors, but also due to larger trends in the industrialized western world: a backlash
against multiculturalism due population pressures coming from poor countries. Today this has been made worse by 9/11 and the possibility of terrorist attacks on rich countries. Nevertheless Abu-Laban and Stasiulis point out that some ethnic minority people insist that the policy disempowers them. They see the latter critiques as inevitable due to the policy’s “high-sounding ideals that are seldom achieved” (1992, 380).

As we can see, many critiques have been raised against the policy of multiculturalism in Canada, but here I want to concentrate on the critiques that have been raised by ethnic minorities themselves. Abu-Laban and Stasiulis quote liberal MP Nunziata as he addresses the House of Commons referring to the policy:

...[It] is discriminatory because there is almost a suggestion that because one is part of the multicultural community, somehow one is inferior, is of a different class, is of inferior quality to Canadians who have origins that are French or English... (1992, 376).

...or Caucasian for that matter. Members of the “multicultural community” in Canadian eyes who can get equality of opportunity rights today are called “visible minorities”. At the time of the Royal Commission of Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Ukrainians may have been organized enough to show that they were also Canadian, yet not French nor English; but today they would not be the recipients of ethnic rights for they are Caucasian—not members of a visible minority. In Canada, to be considered a member of a visible minority one has to have dark skin and/or slanted eyes. One may be considered a member, but these types of markers do not really describe an actual community—they are racial markers that the state uses to be able to identify who will be the beneficiaries of its multiculturalism program. As has been discussed such markers and the way they are used may perpetuate social perceptions of who the outsiders are.

The social construction of race perceives human classifications as emanating from nature, from biology and yet, it has been widely proven that there is no such thing as distinct human races; genetically, it is impossible to pin down exactly what it is that differentiates one human race from another. 4 "Over the past generation", Smith tells us, "many identities once seen as creations of biology, divine providence, or impersonal historical forces have come to be regarded as ‘social constructions’, including racial, gender, religious, ethnic, and national identities" (2007, 362). Society and political authorities construct taxonomies based on folk perceptions of phenotypical difference between human groups, but they are not substantiated by evidence

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4 There are some physiological racial differences in terms of resistance or higher probability of getting specific diseases, but this is just based on statistical probabilities, not determined by the essential genetic make up of different peoples.
of clear genetic ‘difference’. So there are no human races yet there are “cultural operations which make them seem natural or self-evident” (Sollors, 1997, 3). In his article, “Mixed Blood” ([1995] 2008), Jeffrey Fish tells us that anthropologists know that race is a made up social phenomenon and that most social scientists should be ashamed to ignore it. The perception of otherness due to skin colour or specific human phenotypes is based on tales that we as societies tell ourselves about whom we are and who others are. He explains that race is an invented social fact by referring to how “folk taxonomies” categorize people according to race very differently in the US and Brazil. His own daughter (half white and half black) would be regarded as black in the US and as morena, or brunette, in Brazil due to her lighter skin colour. In America, when somebody has any black blood they are identified as black, whereas in Brazil—a heavily mixed country—the hues of skin colour matter to be classified as belonging to one of the various tipos or racial-types that they differentiate. In America, either you are black or you are white and the possibilities in between do not really matter; also, white women may give birth to black offspring, but a black mother could never give birth to a white baby (and this may be seen as a racist social rule to identify racial ‘purity’-whiteness; one drop of black blood makes a person black in America). The aspiring Democrat candidate to the presidency in America, Barak Obama, is half white and he is considered a black person in this nation’s folk taxonomy. There is some reference to his mixed ancestry and some African American descendants of slaves have claimed that Obama’s cosopolitan ancestry has no historically legitimate claim to represent black America. But nobody really regards him as a white person. Fish ([1995] 2008) reminds us that race does not exist, there is but one human species and race is a social myth. And yet, social myths have an important dimension of reality in their sui generis mode; in building identities that people find dear and even vital to their sense of self. I have argued elsewhere that us human beings need tales and social myths biologically to sustain our species in the planet (Sánchez Flores, 2005). The communitarian arguments on this issue are well known: they have argued that these tales are the real essence of what it is to be human. Nevertheless, old tales of superiority and supremacy related to how people look have a pervasive way of staying with us and can become sources of oppression, especially when sustained by public institutions.

Rogers Smith (2007) has argued that the way around colour-blind policies (universalist policy that ignores and perpetuates difference) and colour-aware policies (affirmative action and equality policies that stress difference) is to have a closer look to what he calls the “damaged-race” conception. He comments on how in America in 1954, Chief Justice Earl Warren ruled against racial segregation in the school system by saying that institutionally separating black children only on the basis of race is likely to produce feelings of inferiority from which they were not likely to recover, this damaged them.
In portraying institutional damage to black people this way, they were construed as inferior. This inferiority has become both interiorised and these black people in turn passing this damage on to their own children and also systemic in considering black people ‘damaged’—marked and stigmatized—to become recipients of compensation. However, as Smith points out, nowhere was it expressed that such systems of segregation damaged white children too. This may seem an odd claim because under the old order, whites received advantages in education, economic, political, and social opportunities. And yet Smith argues that the system damaged them in two ways; it prevented society as a whole to develop its economic and material potentialities: “It is expensive and inefficient to maintain a society built upon hatred, coercion, and underutilized human capital”. And also, the system damaged whites in a moral way: “When a segregated education led many people to shape their lives around the vicious myth of their racial superiority, when it made them feel psychologically and materially dependent on unjust institutions, it did them moral damage” (Smith, 2007, 378). Smith tells us that if people are willing to admit that America’s racist past damaged all Americans and not only blacks, then the questions of equality ought not to linger on whether policies and laws are colour-blind or whether they benefit races as distinct groups. Rather, the questions on equality should look at the contents of laws and policies to see if they alleviate or exacerbate race related patterns of disadvantage and judge every step in this direction on its own terms, as they are implemented. However, Smith realizes that altering racial identities so that they are not associated with systemic inequality is a complex issue. “These questions are not easy”, Smith tells us “especially the issue of whether race-conscious measures aid or damage the goal of freeing racial identities from their entanglement with structures of inequality” (2007, 385). Typically, abstract liberal and libertarian positions insist that universalist colour-blind policy and legislation is the answer, but it has been widely argued that this only perpetuates the problems by ignoring them. What could then be the principles in law and policy that would lead society to a point in which racial identities were valued on their own cultural terms and not associated to inferiority or otherness?

I believe that the lives of a small group of ethnic-looking mixed-blood people that I interviewed in British Columbia may give us some pointers in this direction. They grew up in Canada and have had to deal with an externally imposed idea of themselves as inferior due their looks, and also with a feeling of not belonging to any group. My respondents are offspring of marriages coming from different (socially made-up) racial groups. They are “ethnic-looking” because they have either dark skin or slanted eyes—or both—and this makes them a member of a visible minority in Canada. As children

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5 Their names have been changed.
6 Some of the respondents spent some time of their lives in the USA.
growing up, due to their mixture of blood, these people had intense moments of self-reflection for not clearly being sure about what their race was. Such reflection—as opposed to mere existential reflection—was very strongly related to race and ethnicity. They look different and are also perceived as different by every racial group with which they interact—including the two that they come from. They experience a close awareness about discrimination which triggers in them constant reflection on who they are and what that has to do with their ancestry and the way they look. The sample does not intend to be representative of any population; it is very small and diverse in terms of the heritage of the people interviewed, but also in terms of their origins, professions, roles, and affinities. However, all of them are proud to now have a loving nuclear family (in spite of some of them coming from dysfunctional families), all of them hold professional degrees except for one of them who is in the process of achieving it, all of them are Canadian, and all of them have a present middle class economic status—but most of them acknowledge to have come from humble origins. I interviewed people older than 30 years old so that they would have closer experience of the Canadian policy racist past. They talked to me about growing up in Canada and their relationship to all sorts of levels of human groups who they interacted with in this process and also who they interact with in the present. I believed this method of enquiry could yield a wealth of lessons from lived experience to abstract contemporary political theory. My aim was to investigate how people may create their own tools to transcend difference when it is socially perceived in them and self-perceived with respect to all ethnic groups including their own. They are seven ethnic-looking, mixed-blood people and the mix can be seen in the following table (the hue of the colour of their skin is arranged from darker at the top, to lighter at the bottom, ending with Carol who has white skin):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>AGE</th>
<th>MOTHER'S ANCESTRY</th>
<th>FATHER'S ANCESTRY</th>
<th>PHENOTYPE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ROD</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>NATIVE</td>
<td>CAUCASIAN</td>
<td>DARK SKIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TED</td>
<td></td>
<td>HALF NATIVE AND HALF CAUCASIAN</td>
<td>CAUCASIAN</td>
<td>DARK SKIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GORDON</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>EAST INDIAN</td>
<td>CHINESE</td>
<td>DARK SKIN AND SLANTED EYES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NANCY</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>NATIVE</td>
<td>CHINESE</td>
<td>DARK SKIN AND SLANTED EYES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SITA</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>CAUCASIAN</td>
<td>EAST INDIAN</td>
<td>DARK SKIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIM</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>NATIVE</td>
<td>CAUCASIAN</td>
<td>DARK SKIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAROL</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>JAPANESE</td>
<td>CAUCASIAN</td>
<td>SLANTED EYES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Their special position in society as children from mixed marriages with this type of looks, leads them to create a narrative of self that transcends folk classifications of race in various ways. This group of ethnic-looking, mixed-
blood people are pushed to internalize a strong sense of individuality related to the self-perceived uniqueness of their situation (not really belonging to any socially ascribed racial or ethnic group). A huge variety of human situations may produce an isolated sense of self—Modernity itself and urban life are accused of doing so. Nevertheless, these respondents' thoughts on race related to loneliness, aggressiveness, (not) belonging, and the way to leave it all behind; I believe, are valuable sources of reflection for contemporary liberalism. Their individual paths lead them to create a personal narrative about ethnicity that portrays it as non-existent and, if identifiable, unimportant. They are pushed by their social circumstances to develop a way of overcoming the social myths of race and ethnicity in their own lives.

Ethnic-looking people have a bigger chance of being victims of discrimination and I wanted to examine how experiencing discrimination may intensify the feelings of isolation due to their mixed ancestry while growing up. The sudden loss of dignity due to offensive deeds, behaviours, and utterances of racist bullies triggers reflection on oneself and the association of dark and/or slanted-eyes people to abased social archetypes. It is important to mention that two of the respondents (Ted and Carol) claim to have never been bullied; they may have noticed a couple of slurs addressed to them or their families, but in general they did not feel alluded or the offence did not touch them emotionally. If Caucasian people regard them as ethnic they are not moved. Of the two respondents who were not bullied, Carol’s skin is white and she looks Caucasian, except for the mysterious slant in her eyes whose origins cannot quite be placed. She thinks that the lack of bullying in her life has to do with the school she was attending and the particular personalities that she encountered. Nevertheless she was aware that her brother was bullied in school and she experienced seldom racial slurs directed at her family. Ted explains the lack of bullying in his life as due to his personality. He said: “[Discrimination is related] with what you project, that has a lot to do. Because people can take a shot at you but what matters is the effect it creates.” As he grew up, Ted was aware of racial stereotypes; he referred to people making jokes about “drunken Indians”, but he didn’t take it in as an offence directed at him. These are some attempts at explaining why these two respondents were not bullied, it is important to point out though that both of them have solid relationships with their Caucasian relatives and both of them come from middle class functional families. However, in spite of them not having had a clear recollection of being bullied, this does not mean that these two respondents were removed from the experience of reflection on ethnicity, race, self, human groups, and belonging. They did not have to face, deal with, and leave behind—or keep dealing with—a constant narrative (imposed and/or self-created) about their inferiority. Nevertheless, their experience as mixed-blood people facilitated them what I call a cosmopolitan outlook on race and ethnicity. The rest of the
people in the sample experienced and remember being bullied or discriminated against due to their ethnicity at one time or another while they grew up and to this day. This produced (and produces) in them as children, youth, and adults a wealth of emotions that go from outright anger to surprise and amazement, and eventually as they grew older, also a sense of empowerment due to their awareness of independence from groups.

As has been said, throughout their lives, there were many times when people in this group struggled with general rejection based on the public representation of one or the two ethnic groups with dark skin or slanted eyes that they belong to. Very tellingly, Rod refers to the reflective self-awareness of archetypes in the media when he was growing up:

I was younger and being influenced by the media, television and movies, and how First Nations people were portrayed it was a bit traumatic, it really was. Because as a young mind you’re thinking “am I bad? It looks like they’re saying that I am” and processing my thoughts and using media as a reference it seemed to be saying that, because of the colour of my skin, I was not a good person and it was troubling ever since I was young.

The use of these archetypes in the media was reinforced for Rod by the rejection that he experienced from mainstream society. Sita’s both parents are immigrants, her mother is German and her father Pakistani; she knows that her dark skin gives her an ‘ethnic’ look. This constantly marks her as an imagined outsider, not really belonging to Canadian society:

It’s not only being dark [people constantly ask] "Where are you from?" “What’s your native language?” Everyday, I’m 37 years old, I’ve lived here [in Canada] all my life and to this day it’s not uncommon that I will be asked questions like that. And with a sense of entitlement from […] your interlocutor, the person who’s asking—who is usually white— they see themselves a Canadians. They ask, “Where are you from?” Even though I speak with no accent, English is my first language.

Jim felt a sense of rejection by society’s prejudices, reflected in his white grandparents’ opposition to his parents’ marriage. When he tells the story of how his parents met and got married, an important part of it was his white grandmother’s efforts at splitting them up. Due to his unique life-story, he moved to different households to live with both sets of grandparents (his white grandparents eventually accepted him and his mother) and his own parents throughout his childhood. He recalls feelings of alienation in school due to his otherness:

When I was in schools, I was always a little chubby half-breed that everybody picked on. So the teachers made me go out for a recess, but I couldn’t be in the playground because I always got beat up. So I spent my recesses in between the
two doorways, in the vestibule of the school to sort me out as far as they could get me out, not involved.

This segregation designed only for him produced in Jim a sense of not belonging anywhere, of being a mere “observer” of a society that rendered him almost invisible. It is remarkable that the feeling of being nobody for him became a very real psychological experience of not-really-being-there.

All of the respondents expressed in one way or another feelings of not belonging to the ethnic groups that they come from. Most of the people I interviewed in this group seem to have had a realization at one time or another that their mixed-blood status prevented them from belonging to any group. Nancy reports that she was rejected by his Native relatives because they did not see her as fully belonging to them:

The racial slurs that came with being Chinese was something that I had to live with on a daily basis when I was in Ottawa so I thought I would get a break when I went to my [First Nations] grandmother’s place, but it didn’t stop and I would always live with a great sense of shame.

Rod reports having difficulty communicating with his Native relatives who to this day make him feel different due to his college education and even his healthy eating habits. He recalls:

It seemed like the European people —which was my father’s family— weren’t accepting who I was because phenotypically, I’ve got dark skin, I look Native. So I don’t think they were very accepting and not just my dad’s family, but the European community [in general]. And the Native side of the family I felt that because I didn’t grow up on the reserve or that my father was German, then it just seemed like they weren’t very understanding of me. So there was a lot of early age being told what I couldn’t do or where I didn’t belong.

Gordon says that because he is ethnically indefinable, he has always felt like an outsider in any group and that created a lot of self-doubt as a youth and growing up: “I’ve never really felt like one group has tried to embrace me and said ‘Oh, he is one of us’”. He has talked about this with his older brother and they both share the experience of always being the token ‘other’ in the group. He recalls having an idealized relationship of belonging to India and after his finishing his first degree he had the opportunity to go there and study:

There was a part of me that really thought that I would arrive in India and there would be this connect where I don’t know what it was but I thought there was going to be that moment when I would just be like “my brothers and sisters, here I am”. And they would be in acceptance; they would look at me and go “oh, welcome home” or something. It was really, really romantic.
However, the encounter with Indian society and culture made him realize that he had nothing much in common with that culture and society; he describes his experience in India as a “major culture shock”. Carol had a similar experience in Japan, but she learnt at an early age that she did not really belong there and had no chance to romanticise the relationship. She recalls:

Since I first went to Japan when I was four years old it was very evident there that I was white in terms of the reactions of everybody else. I was quite pale in complexion and that’s something that they strangely idealize. That’s something they would also say [...] “You’re white, you’re white”, that’s something that I learned right away, and also I didn’t speak the language so it was very evident that I’m not part of it [...] Maybe a little... but I always knew that I was not part of it.

And yet in Europe and Canada, a lot of people recognize her part-Asian side:

People ask me, “What’s your background?” or “Where are you from?” I say Canada and they go “no, no, I mean where are you really from?” Generally people ask. But I go, “oh yeah” they kind of guess that I’m half white. It’s usually the other half that they wonder about. They may have an idea and they look for confirmation.

One of the consequences of never fully belonging to any group was that it allowed some of them to move between groups and social cliques, especially as children growing up. Arguably, this gave them a wider view of society, because even though no group ever considered them full members, they managed to interact with a variety of people from diverse backgrounds. Ted recalls:

In Mission [there] was one of the last residential schools operating in the country and I played for their teams. My friends were from there and [also] non-Native kids from other groups. I felt some pressure there some times, about hanging out with “those Indians” —like that. And I had my other friends. There were the Indians and the other [white] kids, the rest of the population [who] did not mix with them at all, so I was kind of back and forth between them.

But Ted also had friends from other ethnicities that accepted him. This was revealed when I asked him if he had ever suffered discrimination, he told the following story:

In the town I grew up, in Mission, there was a large population of Eastern Indians that had migrated there, and [for] a long time some of my four best friends were East Indians. So we’d be travelling in a car somewhere and more than once I got called a “tall paki” because my skin is dark and was taken for an East Indian.
Gordon describes a similar situation with respect to groups at school and he relates it directly to his indefinable ethnicity:

Now I know that that kind of feeling of displacement as an outsider, maybe that was the start of feeling as though I could transcend groups, like I could float between cliques. And I think I really worked a lot at being more social. Obviously there were some cliques that I could never ever enter—because of the physicality of it: because I was brown or I was Chinese or I was just this small skinny kid and obviously I wouldn't be able to hang out with the ‘joks’, I didn’t belong to that tribe physically. But I felt, and I still feel this way strongly, that because I've become indefinable, it gives me carte blanche in terms of fitting into various groups, because I don’t look a certain way, I don’t act a certain way, I can kind of float. I tried to be like a social butterfly.

A commonality in all of the people in this group of respondents is that, when asked directly about it, none of them interpret their identity as attached to their ethnicity. All of them resist being classified as ethnically-something in spite of using on themselves such social categories. They may describe themselves as Native, Indo-Canadian, part-Asian, part-Caucasian, German, etc. but they insist that this is due to social conventions. When asked if she thinks of herself as German, Sita replied: “Not so much. I don’t really think of myself as Indo-Canadian that much either to tell you the truth but it’s easier to say that because of the colour of my skin. If I said I’m German, people would say ‘What’s German about you?’” Gordon reports to never have truly felt connected to his ethnic background, about this he said: “Sometimes I feel visibly more connected to some ethnic groups but I don’t think I’ve ever felt truly East-Indian or truly Chinese”. Gordon thinks of himself more like a hybrid, and he connects such feelings with the idea of being Canadian: “It’s funny, because if you say “I’m Canadian” that is still a synonym for a hybrid or multiculturalism”. Along the same lines, when Nancy is asked to define her ethnicity, she replies: “I want to call myself a Canadian first and foremost, but there is even a step beyond that I would go for: I would call myself a member of the human race. I consider myself a human being first and then a Canadian”.

In their own way, everyone in this group of ethnic-looking mixed-blood people managed to overcome the clash of ethnicity that lies within themselves by taking on board the realization that ethnicity is a social myth, it is made up and thus imaginary. They speak of their identity (when they are willing to define it somehow) resorting to various identity sources that are not ethnic, like roles, chosen community, profession, affinities. They choose the communities or groups that they belong to... or simply choose to not belong to any social group, they have friends and family as their community (especially their own nuclear family: chosen partner and children). It became obvious during the interviews that the common resistance in this group to being
identified with ethnic terms comes from a vivid awareness that those terms are not only unimportant, but actually quite unreal. Ted presents a very clear matter of factual awareness about the unreality of ethnicity in his trying to pass for a Brazilian to “blend in” during his travels or when people threw racial slurs at him that didn’t correspond to his actual ethnicity. Gordon clearly realized how ethnicity, race and all social ascriptions are imaginary as people have taken him at different times for a Philippine, a Mexican, a Peruvian or a Polynesian. About these misrepresentations of his background he says:

It just really points the finger at that whole idea that it’s just so malleable, it’s just such a free fall, identity and nationalism and all this sort of stuff. It’s just make-believe and people hold on to it!

Rod refers to the unreality of the idea of ‘belonging to a specific culture’ with an awareness of constant cultural change: “culture is what we do everyday and not only the paraphernalia of culture. People get caught up in whatever symbols of culture rather than seeing that the biggest and best part of culture should be our generosity and our hospitality”. He also defines a lack of reality in ethnicity with a sense of spirituality that transcends religion:

I am a phenotype I have been identified all my life as this... who I am, because I look a certain way. But more and more as life goes on I just feel like all there is, is light and frequency, I mean, really, and I'm just this electromagnetic bulb of light and that's how I feel. And I think that part of the reason that it would be helpful to think that way is for there to be a future on the planet that is getting smaller, I have to be able to let go of a lot of what I would think of as superficial differences and just help people.

As we can see all of the respondents in this group have some intimation into regarding race and ethnicity as imaginary or unreal, and this has created the possibility of getting closer to people of all groups, transcending “superficial differences”. In the end all of them came up with some kind of self definition that has nothing to do with ethnicity; if they define themselves as anything at all, it is really not related to race or to any of the ethnic groups where they come from.

All of the respondents came up with a narrative of self that puts them above and beyond the issues of ethnicity and in some of them clearly the one ingredient that has allowed them to transcend this is love; manifested as compassion, forgiveness and trust. Nancy worked, and keeps working through love and forgiveness, at overcoming the pain of the position ascribed to her in society due to her equivocal ethnicity. She recalls how both her parents would put each other down due to their races:
Because I was a combination of the two [...] it took me a very long time to understand that I was actually 'a mixed blessing' which is what I now call myself [...] I can go out there and prove that I am one of God's gifts [...] I used to blame my father for being Chinese and my mother for being Native and for putting me on this world through all this turmoil, yet now I understand they did the best they could with what they had. And I've forgiven them just as much as I've forgiven myself for being who I am and I've moved on with my life.

Ted puts a lot of importance in his role as a father, having two small children. He tries to be a loving father and firm basis for them to go back to, even if the world is a crazy place; he wants for them to know that their father is going to be there. Jim recalls how he overcame his feeling of being almost invisible, ignored and alone in the world; after he converted into the Baha'i religion, he recalls:

I realized, you know what, that's not what's happening at all [being alone, ignored]. What's happening is that I'm not caring about the other people. That's where the problem is. That's why nobody cares about me and I'm spending all my time thinking about "poor me". I had to drop that idea. I have to think about every other human being, if I show them love, then they will reciprocate [...] I realized that if you consider yourself invisible, if you consider yourself apart from humanity then you will be apart from humanity, you will be invisible. So it's not my responsibility to demand love, it's my responsibility to give it — and then it just comes back. So that became my modus operandi. I stopped thinking about myself and just started thinking about what the needs were of those people around me [...] and by doing that the whole issue disappeared.

Gordon believes that having had to face loneliness throughout his life as a mixed-blood person makes him more empathic towards other people. About this he says: "At times I feel like I can play or maybe slip into [other people's] shoes a little bit and understand where perhaps people are coming from". But to Gordon, the really tricky part is to have the ability to love one-self to be able at all to love and understand others: "Because also you're the glasses that you're seeing everything through. So if you can really love yourself you can love other people truly, because you're grounded to reflect that. But it's tricky". Rod's narrative of self construes his most important role as being part of a community of like-souls who find themselves throughout life:

I would say if I were to describe my community it would be one of love, one of peace, one of a certain sort of eclectic consciousness that is very old — and I can feel it — it's like a magnet in my life.

What these stories about themselves show is the most prominent commonality between the people in this group: All of them resort to a strong sense of individuality to be able to frame their narratives of self. As I have said before,
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Individuality is not an abstract characteristic of people but a culturally inherited and learnt set of behaviours, beliefs, and ways of life. One has to be trained to behave like an individual to be able to function properly and cost-effectively in the modern societal culture. Rational individuality is a form of learnt skill; one has to be able to operate as such for the type of legal-rational interaction to work properly. This type of interaction was defined by Max Weber as an ideal type (a utopia, a conceptual tool) and identified with the modern world of liberal democracies. When Weber defined this ideal type of interaction, he meant for it to be a utopia because he realized the vast complexity surrounding actual people and not just the ideal form of rational interaction based on individuality. What these people’s lives show is that, in the contemporary modern world, individuality is a type of “practice” in Maclntyre’s terms (1984). The excellence that this practice seeks is none other than the morality of the transcendental subject in Kant’s metaphysics. There is a solid and alive (liberal) philosophical tradition around the idea of individuality in a moral sense and this is why mere functionality does not refer wholly to what it is to be a modern individual in contemporary interaction. It refers to a moral tradition that goes back to the House of Abraham, yet found its first rationally Enlightened formulation in Kant’s transcendental subject. So individuality is not only ideal behaviour in these terms, but also it is constant practice in everyday interaction by people in liberal democracies. This skill can be procedural and competent in the mere workings of bureaucracy, but in modern interaction it entails—as has been proven by business ethics (the young branch of business administration)—an ideal substantive involvement of the moral rational self. This self is an aspect of modern culture that produces and reproduces the practice of individuality in contemporary life. All of the people in my sample belong to the culture of modern individuality; all of them are rational-modern beings that fit in functionally, psychologically and culturally with contemporary modern urban life.

In the absence of clear ethnicity this group of people resorted to the culture of modern individuality; they find through this culture the solace of belonging that they do not find in ethnicity. However, I found that the moral sense of individuality they espouse is not solely based on principled behaviour of the kind Kant referred to in his categorical imperative—although all of them include strong regard for principled behaviour in their portrayal of their life and aspirations. In some of the respondents, as has been shown, their moral sense of individuality is also at the same time very much based on the ideal of trusting and loving family and strangers which produces willingness towards empathy. An interesting finding in this particular group of people was that most of them, especially older respondents, resort to some representation of the importance that love has in their moral life. Loving behaviour represents an important source of moral reflection: the importance
of love for one-self, at home shown for children and relatives; but also in the streets with strangers. A very clear common feature of all respondents as modern individuals is that they choose the human groups that they belong to or interact with and, to some respondents; the idea of belonging to a group is definitely not close to their hearts. They join with people that are like-minded and create intentional communities or just friendship.

My group of respondents illustrates how a person may look like the 'other' of modern individuality according to local stereotypes (dark, Asian); and yet embody the modern individual consciousness that is generally related to white, middle-class, male people. Can it be said that they have embraced 'white' values? Some of the respondents have been accused of doing so, yet this view perpetuates racism paradoxically by those who are its victims. The dialectic is well known: the master objectifies the slave by exploiting her, but it is not always seen that the slave objectifies the master by desiring her position. This dialectic perpetuates the relationship between the master and the slave, it creates no way out. In history, rebel leaders become dictators; many a Revolution has been fought on behalf of the oppressed and created new types of oppression. The dramatic figure of the dialectic of the master and the slave will never be solved historically solely by the authority of reason as Hegel would have it, or by principled behaviour in the Kantian moral tradition. The only way out is not to desire the position of the oppressor, and instead, to hold her in a figurative embrace of love by means of the moral principle of universal compassion.
Conclusions

The idea of loving the oppressor may sound odd, but it works as a metaphor to represent the far reaches of universal compassion and why this concept ought to be seen and used as a guiding principle for our moral life in what I call Cosmopolitan Liberalism. I use this metaphor because at some point or another we identify the oppressor in many, or all, of the people that we interact with daily: one’s partner, one’s mother, our boss, other drivers, kids at school, policemen, people in the streets, rich celebrities... However, this is not a doctrine of surrendering and submitting oneself to the whims of the oppressor; rather, it is a discipline on how to deal morally with the generalized other in our daily individual lives. This is not solely related to the ‘other’ of Modernity, the person with dark skin and/or slanted eyes. It is also and most importantly a discipline of interaction with our loved ones, as well as with everyone else that we may come across on a day to day basis. The added aspect of this discipline is the cosmopolitan attitude that loves and trusts the dark other, the slanted eyed other... and the white other. This is a cosmopolitan attitude in a constant awareness that what we see as phenotypical differences and identify as diverse ethnic groups and races, are really imaginary folk categories of people that one ought to not apply to others but only let them apply to themselves if they so choose to. Here, the metaphor of loving and trusting the oppressor is useful to describe how the people I interviewed produced a narrative or an enacted idea of their moral self that is beyond ethnicity, and therefore cosmopolitan. In this narrative, they regard ethnicity as imaginary or unimportant, choose to appreciate themselves on the basis of their merits and compassion, and see in people, not oppressors, but potential friends. This all describes moral aspirations, because the frictions and realities of our everyday life may not always allow us to live up to our own ideals.

The metaphor of loving and trusting the oppressor allows us to speak about this attitude as a discipline practised on a daily basis that will lead us to avoid dramatic dialectics of violence and rejection of imaginary representations of otherness. These ‘dramas’ are played out everyday all over the world, the most terrible ones end up in oppression or worse —genocide. It is indeed a human trait to identify with other people like us, and to hold on to cultural uniqueness. This allows for such groups to influence our sense of self. However, individuality, as a practice and an ideal in the terms described here —based on moral reason and also on universal compassion— can be the source of reflection and heart-felt empathy in order to escape the dramatic excesses that sometimes human groups enact. About this Amartya Sen says:
We are indeed influenced to an amazing extent by people with whom we identify. Actively promoted sectarian hatreds can spread like wild-fire, as we have seen recently in Kosovo, Bosnia, Rwanda, Timor, Israel, Palestine, Sudan, and many other places in the world. With suitable instigation, a fostered sense of identity with one group of people can be made into a powerful weapon to brutalize another (2006, xv).

Such violence arises when out of anger and hatred people identify with only one group as the main source of their identity. Sen reminds us that it is more realistic to see people as having a multiplicity of affinities and affiliations. The atrocities cited by Sen refer to instigation that resulted in violence of one group over another in a relatively short period of time. One can also refer to such brutalization of one group over another in a systematic and institutionalized way over long periods of time, like the colonization of the world by Europe and the systems of segregation around the world. This was the case in the Jim Crow kind of segregation that blacks suffered in America, or residential schools that Natives suffered in Canada, for which they receive compensation today in affirmative action programs. The problem is that such programs may work towards perpetuating ideas of inferiority in the abased 'other' due to the notion of damaged-race (Smith, 2007). I contend that the way out of the consequences of short outbursts of violence as well as the long term consequences of institutionalized violence from one human group on another lies in a renewed notion of individuality: A cosmopolitan type of individuality that keeps present the "relevance of our many-fold affinities and involvements" (Sen, 2006, 177) and applies moral principles in daily behaviour as well as an openness of heart in universal compassion as a principle of moral action and reflection. So moral principled behaviour is important in modern individuality, but so is moral compassion, as I have argued in this paper, in order to embrace the other—the stranger and potential oppressor—in a loving figurative embrace. This latter principle would provide moral substance to Smith's idea of considering how terrible systems of segregation have been not only to the oppressed, but also to the oppressors (2007). What I refer to as the contemporary practice of a cosmopolitan type of individuality provides the ideals upon which legal and policy provisions of compensation may be revised in order to overcome the problems of difference in contemporary multicultural societies. I agree with Abu-Laban and Stasiulis that the Canadian policy of multiculturalism is important as a symbol of a national aspiration that ought to be revised in order to heal the social wounds inflicted by Canada's racist past. This is also the case for any history of racial or otherwise oppression from one human group upon another. I have tried to show in this article that this would involve the principles of moral reason embedded in the liberal tradition of individuality; but it would also involve considering the importance of how multicultural (and cosmopolitan) individuals today have embraced and apply in their own lives the principles of universal compassion...
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and trust in strangers to overcome the problems that arise from ethnic clashes.
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